United States v. James Scott

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: November 21, 2025
• Docket: 24-4389
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-4389 Doc: 34 Filed: 11/21/2025 Pg: 1 of 10

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4389

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES ARTHUR SCOTT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Raymond A. Jackson, Senior District Judge. (4:23-cr-00079-RAJ-DEM- 1)

Submitted: July 28, 2025 Decided: November 21, 2025

Before QUATTLEBAUM and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Salvatore M. Mancina, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Amanda C. Conner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Jonathan S. Keim, Assistant United States Attorney, Devon E.A. Heath, Assistant United States Attorney, Daniel J. Honold, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, USCA4 Appeal: 24-4389 Doc: 34 Filed: 11/21/2025 Pg: 2 of 10

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4389 Doc: 34 Filed: 11/21/2025 Pg: 3 of 10

PER CURIAM:

James Scott was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than 500

grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, see 21 U.S.C.

§ 841, and sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment. Scott appeals, challenging his

conviction and sentence. We affirm his conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for

a full resentencing.

I.

Special Agent Ashby Marshall worked in the drug enforcement division of the

Virginia State Police, specializing in parcel interdiction. On August 10, 2023, Marshall

was monitoring packages received at a parcel facility in Newport News and saw a package

addressed to “Lit Wick” at 1718 North King Street in Hampton, Virginia. The package

appeared suspicious to Marshall for several reasons, including the manner in which it was

packed and the fact that “Lit Wick” did not match information about the occupants of 1718

North King Street. Marshall placed the package in line with several non-suspicious

packages for scanning by a drug dog; the dog alerted when it passed the package addressed

to “Lit Wick.” Marshall then obtained a warrant authorizing a search of the package. The

search revealed two shoeboxes, each containing a kilo of cocaine inside a block of melted

wax.

The officers elected to rewrap the package and make a controlled delivery that same

day to the North King Street address. Detective Robert Stewart began surveilling the

address, which was one of several small buildings sharing a small parking lot. See J.A.

406-07. When Stewart arrived, Scott was already there, driving a Dodge Charger that he

3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4389 Doc: 34 Filed: 11/21/2025 Pg: 4 of 10

had backed up to the tree line at the edge of the parking lot. Scott remained in the lot for

more than an hour; during this time, he got out of the car to get a snack from the trunk but

did not enter any of the buildings. An undercover officer posing as a UPS driver drove a

van into the parking lot and got out of the van carrying the package. Scott then got out of

his car and intercepted the officer before he reached the building. Scott accepted the

package, placed it on the front passenger seat of his car, and then walked back to the

driver’s side. Uniformed law enforcement officers then entered the parking lot and arrested

him.

Officers searched the car incident to Scott’s arrest and found two semi-automatic

pistols—one in the front-seat center console, placed grip-up and plainly visible when the

console was opened; the other in the trunk, also plainly visible despite being partially

covered by clothes. See J.A. 116-17. Both pistols were loaded and had a round in the

chamber. A jacket with Scott’s wallet (which contained $1000 in cash) was found in the

front seat. A rental agreement found in the trunk showed that Scott had rented the car a few

weeks before the arrest.

Police spoke to the UPS driver who had been making deliveries to the North King

Street address for three years. The driver told police that he had delivered packages

addressed to “Lit Wick” at that address several times and identified Scott from a photo

array as the person who took delivery of those packages. 1

1 At trial, the UPS driver estimated that he had delivered “Lit Wick” packages to the North King Street address four times. See J.A. 129. At sentencing, the government (Continued) 4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4389 Doc: 34 Filed: 11/21/2025 Pg: 5 of 10

Scott was charged with possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of

a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841, and

with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense, see 18 U.S.C. §

924(c). Scott proceeded to trial, where a jury found him guilty of the drug charge but not

guilty of the firearm charge. The district court imposed a sentence of 108 months’

imprisonment, to be followed by a four-year term of supervised release. This appeal

followed.

II.

Scott first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a) (“After the government closes its evidence or after the close of all

the evidence, the court on the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any

offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.”).

“To prove possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances, the

government must show: (1) possession of a narcotic controlled substance; (2) knowledge

of the possession; and (3) the intent to distribute.” United States v. Williams, 130 F.4th 177,

182 (4th Cir. 2025). To satisfy the knowledge element, the government must show that

“the defendant knew he was dealing with a controlled substance.” McFadden v. United

States, 576 U.S. 186, 188–89 (2015) (cleaned up). Scott contends the government’s

presented evidence that Scott had signed for nine packages addressed to “Lit Wick” at the North King Street address.

5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4389 Doc: 34 Filed: 11/21/2025 Pg: 6 of 10

evidence failed to show that he knew the package contained a controlled substance and that

the district court therefore erred by denying his motion for acquittal. We disagree.

“Sufficiency review essentially addresses whether the government’s case was so

lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury.” Musacchio v. United

States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) (cleaned up). When considering such a challenge, we

must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the government, and we must presume “that

the jury resolved all evidentiary conflicts in the [g]overnment’s favor.” United States v.

Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 184 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1890 (2025). The question

is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 243 (cleaned up).

The circumstances surrounding the delivery of the “Lit Wick” packages are clearly

enough to show that some sort of illegal activity was afoot in this case, as counsel for Scott

essentially concedes. See Brief of Appellant at 19-20. Nonetheless, it is not enough for the

government to show that the defendant knew he possessed some form of contraband; the

knowledge element of § 841 requires evidence the defendant knew that what he possessed

was a controlled substance. See McFadden, 576 U.S. at 195 (rejecting government’s

argument that the knowledge requirement in § 841(a)(1) “is met if the defendant knew he

was dealing with an illegal or regulated substance under some law”) (cleaned up); United

States v. Louis, 861 F.3d 1330, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]o prove that Louis

knowingly or intentionally possessed with intent to distribute a controlled substance under

§ 841 the government would have to prove that Louis knew the boxes contained a

6 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4389 Doc: 34 Filed: 11/21/2025 Pg: 7 of 10

controlled substance, and not just contraband illegal under some law.”) (cleaned up). In our

view, the government’s evidence was sufficient to submit the § 841 charge to the jury.

Although many things can qualify as contraband depending on the circumstances—

untaxed cigarettes or alcohol, stolen cars, etc.—there is a much smaller universe of

contraband types that can be mailed in packages small enough to be picked up by a single

person driving a not-particularly large sedan but yet still be valuable enough to justify a

criminal operation. Scott waited in his car for more than an hour to pick up a package

addressed to a fictitious person or company with no connection to the address where the

package was sent, and he intercepted the driver as soon as he arrived with the package.

This unusual behavior suggests a strong interest in ensuring that the package was not

handed to anyone other than Scott, which a jury could conclude is an indication that Scott

knew the package contained a controlled substance. After all, if a package full of untaxed

cigarettes were opened by an unintended recipient, the unlawful nature of the cigarettes

would not likely be immediately apparent; the unlawful nature of a package full of cocaine

would be obvious.

In addition, Scott’s car contained two loaded semi-automatic pistols in places that

were accessible to Scott whether he was in the car or standing outside it. Given the trial

testimony that those involved in the drug trade frequently carry guns to protect their drugs

and themselves, the jury could rationally have found the presence and location of the guns

7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4389 Doc: 34 Filed: 11/21/2025 Pg: 8 of 10

to be an indication of Scott’s knowing involvement in the drug trade. 2 And because the

word “lit” is often used to describe someone who is high or intoxicated, 3 the jury likewise

could have found the fictitious name itself—Lit Wick—to be evidence of Scott’s

knowledge that the package contained controlled substances.

We recognize that these inferences and bits of evidence are not necessarily the most

persuasive when viewed individually. Nonetheless, we believe that when considered

together with the other evidence presented at trial, they are sufficient to support the district

court’s decision to deny Scott’s Rule 29 motion and submit the § 841 charge to the jury.

III.

We turn now to Scott’s challenges to his sentence. He contends the district court

erred when it calculated his Guidelines sentencing range, improperly relied on acquitted

conduct, and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Scott also contends that the

2 Scott contends that the jury’s acquittal on the § 924(c) count shows that the jury rejected the theory that “Scott was engaged in the drug trade because dealers often carry guns to protect their product and money.” Brief of Appellant at 20. The jury’s verdict on the § 924(c) count is not a factor we consider in our review of the evidence supporting the 841(a) count. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984) (“Sufficiency-of-the evidence review involves assessment by the courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any rational determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This review should be independent of the jury’s determination that evidence on another count was insufficient.”) (cleaned up). 3 See, e.g., Dictionary.com (defining the adjective “lit” to include slang meaning “under the influence of liquor or narcotics”), available at https://www.dictionary.com/browse/lit [https://perma.cc/4HVD-DD7P] (last visited November 20, 2025); UrbanDictionary.com (defining the adjective “lit” to include “high, stoned, out of it”), available at https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=lit [https://perma.cc/69TX-3NTY] (last visited November 20, 2025).

8 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4389 Doc: 34 Filed: 11/21/2025 Pg: 9 of 10

district court failed to orally pronounce or properly incorporate the non-mandatory

conditions of supervised release that were included in the judgment of conviction, as

required by United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020). We agree that a Rogers

error occurred, which makes it unnecessary to consider Scott’s other sentencing challenges.

In Rogers, this court held that a district court must orally pronounce at sentencing

all nonmandatory conditions of supervised release. Id. at 297-98. This obligation can be

satisfied “through incorporation—by incorporating, for instance, all Guidelines ‘standard’

conditions when it pronounces a supervised-release sentence, and then detailing those

conditions in the written judgment.” Id. at 299. “Discretionary conditions that appear for

the first time in a subsequent written judgment . . . are nullities; the defendant has not been

sentenced to those conditions, and a remand for resentencing is required.” United States v.

Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2021).

In this case, the judgment of conviction included thirteen standard conditions of

supervised release. The district court did not orally pronounce those conditions during

sentencing but instead stated that Scott was required to “comply with the standard

conditions of supervised release that have been adopted by this Court and are incorporated

into this judgment.” J.A. 355. In United States v. Smith, 117 F.4th 584 (4th Cir. 2024), the

district court announced that it was imposing the “standard conditions of supervised release

that have been adopted by this Court—that is, this Court in the Eastern District of Virginia.”

Id. at 606. We found that language inadequate to avoid a Rogers error because “the Eastern

District of Virginia did not then have a standing order—or any order—adopting ‘standard

conditions of supervised release,’” thus making unclear what conditions the district court

9 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4389 Doc: 34 Filed: 11/21/2025 Pg: 10 of 10

intended to impose. Id. This case before us likewise comes from the Eastern District of

Virginia, and the language used by the district court here is substantively identical to that

found wanting in Smith. Accordingly, as the government concedes, Smith is controlling

and compels the conclusion that the district court committed a Rogers error when

sentencing Scott.

“[D]efendants who succeed on Rogers claims are entitled to a full vacatur of their

sentences and remand for resentencing if they so request.” United States v. Kemp, 88 F.4th

539, 547 (4th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Because Scott has requested a full resentencing, we

must vacate the entirety of his sentence. Under these circumstances, “we need not and

should not proceed further to reach his additional arguments about his prior sentencing.”

Id. at 547 n.4 (cleaned up).

IV.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm Scott’s conviction but vacate his

sentence and remand for plenary resentencing.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED