United States v. James Nelson Holloway

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: May 20, 2026
• Docket: 25-1887
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0225n.06

Case No. 25-1887

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED May 20, 2026 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF JAMES NELSON HOLLOWAY, ) MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION

Before: BATCHELDER, GRIFFIN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

MATHIS, Circuit Judge. James Holloway faces a couple of federal criminal charges.

The district court declared him incompetent to stand trial and ordered his temporary

hospitalization. Holloway then filed a pro se notice of appeal. But as the government points out,

he filed it too late. We thus dismiss his untimely appeal.

I.

James Holloway emailed the U.S. Attorney’s Office, threatening to shoot a federal

magistrate judge. The government filed a criminal complaint charging Holloway with interstate

communication of a threat and threatening to injure a federal judge, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 875(c), 115.

After Holloway was arrested, he behaved erratically at his pretrial detention hearing. His

disruptive behavior prompted the magistrate judge to order the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to

evaluate his competency to stand trial. The BOP assigned Dr. Kristen McDaniel to assess him. No. 25-1887, United States v. Holloway

Dr. McDaniel testified to her opinion at a competency hearing. Dr. McDaniel diagnosed

Holloway with bipolar-type schizoaffective disorder and concluded that this disorder impaired

Holloway’s ability to understand the legal proceedings against him and assist in his defense. After

considering the evidence, the magistrate judge declared Holloway incompetent to stand trial under

18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) and ordered his temporary hospitalization for mental-health treatment.

The magistrate judge entered the commitment order on August 19, 2025. Holloway mailed

his pro se notice of appeal on September 26, and the district court filed it on October 1. While we

ordinarily do not accept pro se filings from criminal defendants when they are represented by

counsel, as was the case with Holloway’s pro se notice of appeal here, in this instance we allowed

the filing because we determined that, “generously construed,” it sought to remove “his appointed

counsel and to appoint new counsel.” D. 32 at p.1.

II.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) sets the timeline to appeal an order in a criminal

case. A criminal defendant must file his notice of appeal within fourteen days after the district

court enters its order. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). An incarcerated defendant’s notice is

considered filed on the date he mails it if, as relevant here, the envelope is accompanied by a

postmark or stamp corroborating that date. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1)(A)(ii).

Rule 4(b)’s fourteen-day appeal deadline is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional

requirement. United States v. Gaytan-Garza, 652 F.3d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 2011) (order) (per

curiam). The government can challenge the timeliness of a defendant’s notice of appeal by motion

or in its brief. United States v. Jackson, 995 F.3d 476, 482 (6th Cir. 2021). If the government

does so and “is correct, we would be obliged to dismiss the appeal.” Id.

-2- No. 25-1887, United States v. Holloway

In its brief, the government argues that Holloway’s appeal is untimely. Holloway, through

counsel, admits as much. Indeed, Holloway’s notice of appeal was due on September 2, but he

filed it on September 26. Holloway never requested or obtained an extension of time from the

district court within 30 days after the expiration of the appeal period. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4);

cf. United States v. Payton, 979 F.3d 388, 390 (6th Cir. 2020) (order). Nor does he argue that he

could establish excusable neglect or good cause to justify any late filing. See Fed. R. App. P.

4(b)(4). Because the government raised the timeliness issue, we must enforce Rule 4(b)’s time

limits. See Gaytan-Garza, 652 F.3d at 681.

III.

For these reasons, we DISMISS Holloway’s appeal and DENY his motion for a stay

pending appeal as moot.

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