WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
I.
In United States v. Wise, 923 F.2d 86 (8th Cir.1991), a panel of this court reversed James Michael Wise’s sentence on the ground that the district court had improperly relied upon a probation officer’s hearsay testimony without undertaking the confrontation clause analysis required by our decision in United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir.1990). Thereafter, we considered the question of rehearing en banc on our own initiative. We directed the United States to file a supplemental brief stating its position on whether the case should be reheard en banc and explaining why the United States had not petitioned for en banc review. The United States responded by explaining that the Assistant United States Attorney who had handled the appeal had failed to report the panel’s decision to the Department of Justice for review by the Solicitor General, as required by the United States Attorneys’ Manual. Because no extension of time in which to file a petition for rehearing was sought and because a petition for rehearing would thus have been time-barred, the Solicitor General had no occasion to consider the appropriateness of en banc review in this case. In response to our direction that a supplemental brief be filed, the case was resubmitted to the Solicitor General for a review of the merits of our decision and a determination whether en banc review should be sought. Following such review, the Solicitor General determined that the issue presented was one that should be resolved by the court en banc.
On March 15, 1991, we entered an order vacating the panel opinion and setting the case for argument before the court en banc. We now affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.
H.
Wise pleaded guilty to two counts of counterfeiting Federal Reserve notes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 471.
The sentencing hearing commenced late on the afternoon of October 27, 1989. As is apparent from the record, the district court expressed some dissatisfaction at having been given defense counsel’s objections to the presentence report only minutes before the start of the hearing. After determining that the objections had been filed within the ten-day time limit, the district court announced the procedure that would be followed:
Well, what we’re going to do — I just do not have time to read 17 pages handed to me five minutes ago. What we’re going to do is that I’m going to put Mr. Sexson [the probation officer] under oath. I’m going to ask Mr. Sexson to tell me whether the information, the factual statements contained in the presentence report are accurate to the best of his knowledge and belief.
If there are specific items that you think are not accurate, and I’m only concerned now with the factual statements, if you think some are not accurate, you may cross-examine him about that. You may call any witnesses you wish to in relation to those factual statements but otherwise I’m going to assume that the factual statements — Now forgetting for a moment about the application of the [396]*396guidelines — the facts and statements are correct and accurate unless you are able to convince the Court that they are not.
After being sworn, Sexson testified in response to the district court’s questions that the factual matters set forth in the presentence report were accurate to the best of his knowledge and.belief and that the report correctly reflected the statements made to him by those persons to whom he attributed the statements. The district court then stated to defense counsel that “[i]f there are factual statements that you believe are inaccurate — again, forgetting for the moment about the application of the guidelines to those facts, you may point those out by cross-examining Mr. Sexson.” Defense counsel then questioned Sexson regarding the matters set forth in the presentence report.
Regarding Wise’s role in the offense, Sexson testified that, counting Wise, there were five individuals involved in the counterfeiting operation. Two of these were persons on pretrial diversion. The other two were Terry Lankford and Earl Dean Laughlin, Jr., both of whom had been charged and pleaded guilty to counterfeiting charges in state court as a result of their involvement in Wise’s counterfeiting scheme. Sexson testified that based upon the admissions made by the two persons who were placed on pretrial diversion and the admissions made by Lankford and Laughlin in connection with the state court proceedings, he believed that Wise had given the four individuals counterfeit money for the purpose of distributing it for him. Sexson acknowledged that he had never spoken with Laughlin and that his information regarding Laughlin had been gathered from the Secret Service’s investigation report and from Sexson’s conversation with personnel in the prosecuting attorney’s office. (Sexson also testified regarding Wise’s involvement in a burglary and his involvement in drug use with minors.).
Upon completion of Sexson's testimony, defense counsel called Wise’s mother as a witness and, in response to the district court’s ruling that the testimony would be cumulative and redundant, made an offer of proof, which was accepted by the district court, that Wise’s father would give the same testimony as previously given by Wise’s mother on the point in issue.
The testimony completed, the district court then ruled on the disputed factual matters. After ruling that it would impose no enhancement for obstruction of justice, the district court found that the factual matters set forth in the presentence report were accurate and correct and adopted the factual matters contained in the report as the court’s findings of fact. The court then gave Wise a four-level enhancement for his role in the offense, pursuant to section 3Bl.l(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, and denied Wise a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Finding that the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines called for a sentence of from 30 to 37 months, the court sentenced Wise to thirty-two months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years on supervised release.
Wise appealed, challenging, among other things, the use of hearsay testimony to increase his offense level for being an organizer of a criminal activity involving five or more participants. As indicated above, the panel opinion reversed and remanded for resentencing because the district court’s use of the hearsay violated Wise’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.
III.
As authority for the proposition that the Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing, the panel in Wise cited Fortier. Fortier, in turn, derived this rule from United States v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781, 792 (8th Cir.1990), which stated, by way of ipse dixit, that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause applies at evidentiary hearings held pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D).
The rule announced in Streeter, however, conflicts with previous decisions of this court. In United States v. Papajohn, 701 F.2d 760 (8th Cir.1983), for example, we did not apply the Confrontation Clause to evidence introduced at sentencing. Instead, we held that the sentencing court may properly consider “uncorroborated hearsay evidence that the defendant has had an [397]*397opportunity to explain or rebut.” Id. at 768 (citing Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1360 (9th Cir.1978)) (“hearsay evidence of unproved criminal activity not passed on by a court may be considered in sentencing”).
Subsequent to our decision in Papajohn, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)), pursuant to which the United States Sentencing Commission issued the Sentencing Guidelines. It is for us, then, to address explicitly what we assumed in Streeter, that is, whether sentencing under the Guidelines is so different from previous practice that the Confrontation Clause should apply to evidence introduced at sentencing proceedings.
IV.
When considering the scope of the right of confrontation, courts have consistently distinguished the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding from the sentencing phase. Historically, “[tribunals passing on the guilt of a defendant always have been hedged in by strict evidentiary procedural limitations.” Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1082-83, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949) (footnote omitted). Having found a defendant guilty, however, “courts in this country ... practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment....” Id. “Whatever the prevailing sentencing philosophy, the sentencing authority has always been free to consider a wide range of relevant material.” Payne v. Tennessee, — U.S.-,-, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2606, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991); Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S.-,-, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1097 (1992); see also United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 893 (8th Cir.1987) (“A sentencing judge has broad discretion as to the type of information he may consider, as well as its source.”) (pre-Guidelines), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1074, 108 S.Ct. 1047, 98 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1988).
The practice of conducting a wide-ranging inquiry at sentencing is reflected in the United States Code, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Guidelines themselves. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court ... may receive, and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d)(3) (rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing);1 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 (“In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law.”); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a), p.s. (“In resolving any reasonable dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”).
The difference in the procedures followed and the standard of proof applied at the guilt and sentencing phases “reflects the’judgment that a convicted criminal is entitled to less process than a presumptively innocent criminal defendant, as well as the concern that ‘over-burdened trial courts would be greatly disserved by the time-consuming hearings’ that more intensive procedural protections would require.” United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1100 (3d Cir.1990) (citations omitted). In addition, the issues at each stage differ. At the trial itself, the guilt or innocence of the defendant is the sole issue. To avoid prejudice, therefore, evidence of other misconduct must generally be excluded. [398]*398Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 246-47, 69 S.Ct. at 1082-83.
The sentencing phase does not have so narrow a focus. The sentencing judge must fashion a sentence appropriate to the particular circumstances of the case. “Highly relevant — if not essential — to [a judge’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.” Id. at 247, 69 S.Ct. at 1083 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, sentencing judges have “not [been] restricted to evidence derived from the examination and cross-examination of witnesses in open court but may, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth . Amendment, consider responsible unsworn or ‘out-of-court’ information relative to the circumstances of the crime and to the convicted person’s life and characteristics.” Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584, 79 S.Ct. 421, 426, 3 L.Ed.2d 516 (1959).
It is only where the sentencing phase constitutes “a separate criminal proceeding” that due process requires that a defendant have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 1212, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967).2 In Specht, the Court considered a statute which provided that, once convicted of specified sex offenses, a defendant could thereafter be convicted of a second crime and subjected to an additional sentence between one day and life imprisonment. To obtain a conviction under the statute, the prosecution had to show that the person convicted of a sex offense posed a threat of bodily harm to the public or was an habitual offender and mentally ill. The Court determined that “invocation of the [statute] means the making of a new charge leading to criminal punishment.” Id. at 610, 87 S.Ct. at 1212. Application of the statute violated due process because it allowed conviction based on “a new finding of fact that was not an ingredient of the offense charged,” id. at 608, 87 S.Ct. at 1211 (citation omitted), yet without such procedural protections as the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 610, 87 S.Ct. at 1212.
V.
That the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines has wrought substantial changes in federal sentencing procedures is clear. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, — U.S. -,-, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 2184-85, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991). For a discussion of some of the significant changes instituted by the Guidelines, see Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 Am. Crim.L.Rev. 161 (1991). See also Note, An Argument for Confrontation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 Harv. L.Rev. 1880 (1992).
We must determine, therefore, whether the application of the Guidelines has so changed the sentencing phase that it now constitutes a separate criminal proceeding to which the right of confrontation applies.
Before the Guidelines took effect, a sentencing court considered the defendant's uncharged conduct, prior convictions, em[399]*399ployment history, community and family ties, and other factors when fashioning a sentence. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 250 n. 15, 69 S.Ct. at 1084-85 n. 15. The Guidelines have in certain respects narrowed the range of information considered relevant to sentencing. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. H (age; education; mental, emotional, and physical conditions; employment record; and family and community ties not ordinarily relevant in determining sentence).
Although the Guidelines have narrowed the categories of information considered relevant to sentencing, the sentencing judge still considers information not strictly relevant to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, such as uncharged conduct, when fashioning a sentence. See United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1494 (11th Cir.1990) (both before and after Guidelines, sentencing courts considered defendant’s actual conduct, not just charged conduct). Moreover, the sentencing judge still requires full and complete information as to those categories deemed relevant. United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 3302, 111 L.Ed.2d 811 (1990) (enactment of the Guidelines does not indicate the need to restrict “the sources of information available to the sentencing judge”). Accordingly, because the sentencing judge still considers information not strictly relevant to a defendant’s guilt and needs to conduct a broad inquiry to obtain that information, the Guidelines have not fundamentally transformed the search for information at the sentencing phase.
A second change accompanying the Guidelines is the determinacy of the effect of a certain piece of information, say prior convictions, upon a sentence. Previously, each piece of information concerning a defendant’s background and conduct simply constituted one element of the melange from which the sentencing judge derived the sentence. Now, in contrast, one can often determine the exact effect of a certain piece of information upon the ultimate sentence. One can trace, for example, the effect of proof that a defendant has previously committed certain numbers and types of felonies. The quantification of a defendant’s conduct is especially significant in drug offense cases, where the quantity of drugs properly attributable to a defendant has a fixed mathematical impact upon the applicable sentencing range. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763, 773 (8th Cir.1992).
This change, however, simply reflects Congress’ decision to limit the scope of the sentencing judge’s discretion. It does not provide a reason for increasing the procedural protections at sentencing. See Castellanos, 904 F.2d at 1494-95 (Congress’ decision to provide federal sentencing courts with additional guidance does not suggest a reason to change the due process calculus as to the appropriate standard of proof). As the Third Circuit has stated, “[wjhether the sentence is one chosen by the court or one within the range mandated by the Sentencing Commission, the consequence for the defendant of the court relying upon hearsay evidence is exactly the same.” United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 97 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 997, 110 S.Ct. 553, 107 L.Ed.2d 549 (1989).
The Guidelines also reflect a shift in the theory of penology. Previously, judges fashioned sentences with a view toward the rehabilitation of the defendant. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 248, 69 S.Ct. at 1084. Accordingly, the Court encouraged the sentencing judge to consider a wide range of information relevant to the defendant’s character and history so the remedy fit the offender, not just the crime. The Sentencing Reform Act, in contrast, reflects Congress’ intention to place greater emphasis upon achieving the goals of honesty, reasonable uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A3, p.s. Indeed, the Sentencing Reform Act places rehabilitation of the defendant as the last of four goals to be accomplished through a sentence, the first three of which are punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Nonetheless, as set forth above, sentencing judges are encouraged to consider a wide range of information relevant to the nature [400]*400and severity of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.4, 6Al.3(a), p.s.
While the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines have reordered the priorities of the goals to be achieved through sentencing, the sentencing system still places a premium on obtaining all evidence deemed relevant. See Payne v. Tennessee, — U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2606. This is so because the sentencing judge needs information in order to fashion a sentence appropriate to these reordered goals. It follows that the pre-Guidelines policy of conducting the inquiry free from the strictures of the right of confrontation still obtains.
In addition to pointing out the changes discussed above, some have argued that the Guidelines’ use of relevant conduct in fashioning a sentence effectively transforms the sentencing phase into a new guilt phase. We disposed of this argument in United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc). There, we applied the due process analysis of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), and concluded that the use of relevant conduct at sentencing does not require application of the rights to indictment, jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt because uncharged conduct is treated as a sentencing factor, not a new element of the offense. Galloway, 976 F.2d at 422-25.
In McMillan the Court recognized the distinction between the guilt phase and the sentencing phase. While the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applies to the proof of facts necessary to conviction, it does not follow that the same standard applies to the proof of facts at sentencing, even though proof of those facts may increase a defendant’s sentence. Likewise, the protections of the right of confrontation apply at the guilt phase, but it does not follow that the same protections apply at sentencing simply because facts proved at sentencing may increase a defendant’s sentence. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098-1103 (no need for higher standards of proof and admissibility at sentencing proceedings after advent of Guidelines, except in instances of extreme departure). Indeed, we have repeatedly held that the facts relied upon by the district court at sentencing need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Simmons, 964 F.2d at 771; United States v. Johnson, 962 F.2d 1308, 1313 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Payne, 940 F.2d 286, 292 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 616, 116 L.Ed.2d 638 (1991), and cert denied, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 1589, 118 L.Ed.2d 307 (1992).
As we concluded in Galloway, the sharp distinction between conviction and sentencing that antedated the Guidelines still exists under the Guidelines regime. The guilt phase remains the stage at which the fact-finder determines whether a defendant broke the law, while at the sentencing phase the court determines the extent to which a defendant broke the law and what punishment would be appropriate. At the latter stage the court may consider relevant conduct in determining a defendant’s culpability, but only if it is just that— relevant conduct. The court may consider only
(1) all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense, or that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense;
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts [i.e., where the offense level depends on the total harm, quantity of a substance, or where the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous] all such acts and omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction....
U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a).
Just as increasing a defendant’s sentence on the basis of relevant conduct does not constitute a conviction for a separate of[401]*401fense, so also establishing a defendant’s role in the offense on which he has been convicted does not constitute a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.
We conclude that the enactment of the Guidelines has not so transformed the sentencing phase that it constitutes a separate criminal proceeding. The right to confront witnesses, therefore, does not attach. See Specht, supra. This conclusion is in accord with the decisions of other circuits that have addressed the issue.3 We therefore overrule our holdings to the contrary-in United States v. Fortier and United States v. Streeter.
VI.
We recognize, however, that in certain instances a sentence may so overwhelm or be so disproportionate to the punishment that would otherwise be imposed absent the sentencing factors mandated by the Guidelines that due process concerns must be addressed. This may occur where a defendant’s sentence is so greatly increased as a result of considering relevant conduct that the conduct essentially becomes an element of the offense for which the defendant is being punished. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88, 106 S.Ct. at 2416-17 (legislature generally free to create sentencing factors so long as the factors do not become “a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense”); Galloway, 976 F.2d at 425-26.
In the instant case, Wise had a criminal history category of I. On the basis of the challenged hearsay testimony, the district court increased Wise’s offense level by four because of his leadership role and denied him a two level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in an offense level of nineteen rather than fifteen. These rulings effectively increased his sentencing range from 18-24 months to 37-46 months, an approximate two-fold increase.
The maximum sentence prescribed by statute for the crime to which Wise pleaded guilty is fifteen years’ imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. See 18 U.S.C. § 471. The enhancement imposed in this case equals approximately one-tenth of the maximum prison term for the offense. An increase of this magnitude does not raise the concerns that the Court expressed in McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88, 106 S.Ct. at 2416-17; and thus does not offend due process. Compare Galloway, 976 F.2d at 426 (threefold increase did not offend due process) with Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098-1103 (twelve-fold departure requires heightened standards for admissibility and proof). Since the increase here is less than that which Galloway held did not trigger due process concerns, we find no cause to apply the right of confrontation to Wise’s sentencing hearing.
[402]*402VII.
Although the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing proceedings, this is not to say that there are no constitutional limitations on the use of hearsay evidence at such proceedings. A defendant may not be sentenced on the basis of “misinformation of constitutional magnitude.” United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 592, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972). “Uncorroborated hearsay evidence ... [is a] proper topic[ ] for the court’s consideration, as long as the defendant is afforded an opportunity to explain or rebut the evidence.” York, 830 F.2d at 893.
The Guidelines themselves recognize this principle:
When any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding that factor. In resolving any reasonable dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient in-dicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a), p.s. (emphasis added). The commentary to this section explains further:
In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges are not restricted to information that would be admissible at trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3661. Any information may be considered, so long as it has “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Reliable hearsay evidence may be considered. Out-of-court declarations by an unidentified informant may be considered “where there is good cause for the nondisclosure of his identity and there is sufficient corroboration by other means.” Unreliable allegations shall not be considered.
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, comment, (other citations omitted); see also United States v. Granados, 962 F.2d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir. 1992) (sentencing court may consider hearsay if reliable).
We hold that the Guidelines’ standard for the consideration of hearsay testimony at sentencing meets the appropriate constitutional test and fulfills the Confrontation Clause’s basic purpose of promoting the integrity of the factfinding process. See White v. Illinois, — U.S.-,-, 112 S.Ct. 736, 743, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992). Before considering whether the hearsay testimony introduced at Wise’s sentencing hearing satisfies this standard, we offer a few observations concerning the sentencing court’s role in evaluating information presented in support of an enhanced sentence.
As we emphasized in Galloway, “[a]l-though the Guidelines certainly channel the court’s discretion in sentencing, they also underscore the significant responsibility that remains with the district judge.” 976 F.2d at 427. We went on to point out that it is for the district court to resolve as a question of fact whether the allegations of relevant conduct raised by the government are supported by satisfactory proof. Id. at 427-28. The same observations apply to a district court’s findings regarding a defendant’s role in the offense.
Contrary to the views of some who are hostile to the concept of guideline sentencing, the Guidelines do not reduce district court judges to mere automatons, passive compilers of ciphers, or credulous naifs who must accept as canon all that which is presented to them regarding a defendant’s involvement in the crime charged or conduct relevant thereto. To be sure, the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is a lesser burden for the government to satisfy than that necessary to establish a defendant’s guilt, but it is not without rigor. It certainly does not relieve the sentencing court of the duty of exercising the critical fact-finding function that has always been inherent in the sentencing process. To say this is not to issue a call to judicial anarchy, nor is it to suggest that the rejection of the reliable is a legitimate means by which to circumvent the strictures of the Guidelines in those cases in which the mandated sentence appears to be [403]*403harsher than that which the court would have imposed absent the Guidelines. Rather, it is a recognition of the fact that if the probation officer and the prosecutor believe that the circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s role in the offense, or other pertinent aggravating circumstances, merit a lengthier sentence, they must be prepared to establish that pertinent information by evidence adequate to satisfy the judicial skepticism aroused by the lengthier sentence that the proffered information would require the district court to impose. What evidence will be deemed sufficiently reliable to satisfy this burden is for the district courts to determine, exercising the same fact-finding faculties they are daily called upon to utilize in a myriad of situations.
VIII.
The determination of whether hearsay is sufficiently reliable to warrant credence for sentencing purposes necessarily depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. For example, in United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 236-38 (7th Cir.1991), the sentencing court imposed an obstruction enhancement on the basis of a confidential informant’s report to a detective that the defendant had accused him of being an informant and had threatened him. The court doubted whether the informant’s report, standing alone, would be sufficiently reliable. It found adequate corroboration for the report, however, because the informant had been shot at within days of the defendant’s arrest for a cocaine transaction that the informant had helped arrange. In addition, the informant’s assailant had accused the informant of being a “snitch” just prior to the assault.
The Second Circuit has found sufficient indicia of reliability in a situation in which the evidence was gathered from several independent sources, yet did not conflict. United States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 574-75 (2d Cir.1989); see also United States v. Holmes, 961 F.2d 599, 603 (6th Cir.1992) (corroboration of hearsay statements by trial testimony generates sufficient indicia of reliability). But see United States v. Cammisano, 917 F.2d 1057, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (corroborating stories of confidential informants not sufficiently reliable, in part because evidence was merely “hearsay upon hearsay upon hearsay”).
In Sciarrino, 884 F.2d at 97, the court held that a co-conspirator’s prior inconsistent statement, brought out during his testimony at the sentencing hearing, was sufficiently reliable, when considered' along with the other corroborating circumstances present, to satisfy due process standards. Similarly, in United States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 68 (1st Cir.1991), the court held that a detention officer’s affidavit was sufficiently reliable in view of the fact that there was no evidence to suggest that the affiant lacked personal knowledge or had a reason to prevaricate. See also United States v. Burns, 894 F.2d 334, 336-37 (9th Cir.1990) (not error to rely on Secret Service report regarding amount of probable or intended loss); United States v. Cuellar-Flores, 891 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir.1989) (probation officer’s testimony sufficiently reliable because he obtained the information from a law enforcement officer and had no motive to distort or misrepresent facts).
We conclude that Sexson’s hearsay testimony was sufficiently reliable to support the district court’s finding that Wise had indeed been an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more persons. As we mentioned above, two of these persons were on pretrial diversion as a result of their participation in the offense. Although the record does not tell us the circumstances under which they were diverted from formal court proceedings, it is fair to assume that a condition to such diversion was their agreement to cooperate with the authorities and to give truthful information concerning the details of the offense and those involved therein. At a minimum, then, we can assume that any self-incriminatory statements made by them fell within the definition of a statement against penal interest excepted from the exclusions of the hearsay rule by Fed[404]*404eral Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) (we put aside that Rule’s precondition of the witness’s unavailability). When viewed in this light, the information provided by these two unnamed witnesses was more than unsubstantiated rumor or second-hand knowledge.
The information obtained as a result of the state court proceedings against Lank-ford and Laughlin is rendered even more reliable by virtue of the fact that their admissions of guilt to charges arising out the counterfeiting scheme were made in open court. True, Sexson acknowledged that he had never spoken to Laughlin, but the source of Sexson’s information concerning Laughlin — the Secret Service and the personnel in the prosecutor’s office — gives the information an aura of authenticity that renders it sufficiently reliable as the basis of a finding of fact on the question in issue. As was true in Aymelek, and Cuel-lar-Flores, there is nothing in the record before us to indicate that the probation officer had any reason to lie or to distort or misrepresent the facts.
IX.
There remains the question of the procedure followed by the district court in conducting the sentencing hearing. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3) governs the manner in which a presentence report is disclosed to a defendant, objections are filed thereto, and disputed matters are resolved by the district court. See Burns, — U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2185; Granados, 962 F.2d at 771-72. Chapter Six of the Guidelines Manual generally outlines the procedures to be followed at sentencing, although it does not require the district courts to follow any specific format in resolving disputed matters:
When a reasonable dispute exists about any factor important to the sentencing determination, the court must ensure that the parties have an adequate opportunity to present relevant information. Written statements of counsel or affidavits of witnesses may be adequate under many circumstances. An evidentiary hearing may sometimes be the only reliable way to resolve disputed issues. The sentencing court must determine the appropriate procedure in light of the nature of the dispute, its relevance to the sentencing determination, and the applicable case law.
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, comment, (citation omitted). The procedure to be followed rests in the sound discretion of the district court. Prescott, 920 F.2d at 144.
A “presentence report is not evidence and is not a legally sufficient basis for making findings on contested issues of material fact.” Streeter, 907 F.2d at 791-92. The district court erred, then, in announcing that it would assume that the factual statements in Sexson’s presentence report were true and that it was defense counsel’s burden to prove that they were not, for “[o]nce a defendant objects to a factual allegation in the presentence report, the court must make ‘(i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing.’ ” Granados, 962 F.2d at . 771 (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D)). The district court’s announced course of action was in accordance with that which Judge Becker and Professor Orenstein have charged is a departure from the usual manner in which proposed hearsay evidence is treated: “Thus, in assessing admissibility of evidence in sentencing hearings, courts have turned the general approach to hearsay on its head. The hearsay is presumed reliable — the defendant has the burden of demonstrating otherwise.” 60 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. at 889.
Following its announcement, however, the district court put Sexson under oath and then conducted an abbreviated interrogation as to the truth of the statements contained in the report. Defense counsel was then permitted to challenge the eviden-tiary basis for Sexson’s statements, with the government being given an opportunity to in effect rehabilitate Sexson’s testimony.
The record does not reveal why the district court chose the course of action that it did. Perhaps it was due to the lateness of the hour at which the hearing commenced [405]*405(5:16 p.m.) or the brief time that the court had to review defense counsel’s written objections to the presentence report. Nevertheless, although we do not endorse the manner in which it was conducted, we conclude that the hearing did not deprive Wise of due process. He had an opportunity to voice his objections to the presentence report and to cross examine the probation officer who had prepared the report. We perceive no functional difference between the procedure that was followed and the result that would have been reached had the government been required to proceed to establish the truth of the allegations contained in the report by questioning Sex-son in the first instance. The basis of Sexson’s information was the important fact to be established, and it was developed as well through the procedure that was followed as it would have been had the procedure been that prescribed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and by our case law.
X.
Finally, we reject Wise’s contention that the district court erred in denying him a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. From what we have said above, and in view of the broad discretion given to the sentencing court in making a finding on this issue, see, e.g., United States v. Keene, 915 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir.1990) (determination regarding acceptance of responsibility not to be disturbed unless it is without foundation), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1001, 112 L.Ed.2d 1084 (1991); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir.1989) (same), we believe that no further discussion is necessary regarding this issue.
The sentence is affirmed.