United States v. James Evans

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: July 12, 2024
• Docket: 23-4664
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4664

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES EVANS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Irene C. Berger, District Judge. (2:19-cr-00267-1)

Submitted: May 21, 2024 Decided: July 12, 2024

Before QUATTLEBAUM and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Mary Claire Davis, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Jonathan T. Storage, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

James Evans appeals his 18-month, upward-variant revocation sentence. He argues

that the sentence is plainly unreasonable because the district court based the sentence

predominately on the retribution factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). We affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of

supervised release. [We] will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory

maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436

(4th Cir. 2020). To determine “whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we

must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable,”

applying the same general considerations used in evaluating original sentences, “with some

necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature of supervised release

revocation sentences.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “Only if a sentence is either procedurally or substantively

unreasonable is a determination then made as to whether the sentence is plainly

unreasonable—that is, whether the unreasonableness is clear or obvious.” Patterson,

957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A district court imposes a procedurally reasonable revocation sentence by

“considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and

the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,” “adequately explain[ing] the chosen sentence,”

and “meaningfully respond[ing] to the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments” for a different

sentence. Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207 (footnotes omitted). A district court imposes a

substantively reasonable sentence when “the totality of the circumstances indicates that the

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court had a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant should receive the sentence

imposed.” United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

When fashioning an appropriate revocation sentence, “the court should sanction

primarily the defendant’s breach of trust.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt.

A(3)(b), p.s.; see United States v. Lewis, 90 F.4th 288, 290-91 (4th Cir. 2024) (holding

“that Chapter 7 faithfully implements the governing statutes and therefore is not ultra

vires”), cert. denied, No. 23-7145, 2024 WL 2116463 (U.S. May 13, 2024). While the

court also must consider certain enumerated factors under § 3553(a), excluded from that

list are the “retribution” factors “in § 3553(a)(2)(A), stated as the need for the sentence

imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to

provide just punishment for the offense.” Lewis, 90 F.4th at 295 (cleaned up); see

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). “Offense” in this context “refers to the offense of conviction for

which the defendant was originally sentenced, not the new conduct violating his supervised

release conditions.” Lewis, 90 F.4th at 297; see id. at 298. Accordingly, the statute should

not be “read to restrict a district court from even considering the relative seriousness of the

conduct underlying the defendant’s supervised release violation,” as that factor is relevant

when “measuring the extent of the breach of trust.” Id. at 298 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Moreover, we have recognized that the retribution “factors listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A)

are intertwined with the factors courts are expressly authorized to consider under

§ 3583(e),” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 2013), including, “the

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defendant’s history and characteristics, the need to deter criminal conduct, and the need to

protect the public,” Lewis, 90 F.4th at 295. Thus, although the district court may not base

a revocation sentence “predominately” on the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, “mere reference to

such considerations does not render a revocation sentence . . . unreasonable when those

factors are relevant to, and considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a)

factors.” Webb, 738 F.3d at 642. When deciding whether a district court improperly relied

upon the retribution factors, we examine the “overall context” of the court’s explanation

for the revocation sentence. Lewis, 90 F.4th at 299.

Because Evans did not object to the district court’s reliance on the retribution factors

in § 3553(a)(2)(A), we review the issue for plain error. Webb, 738 F.3d at 640-41. To

establish plain error, Evans “must show that: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain;

and (3) the error affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187,

191 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc). In the sentencing context, a defendant establishes that an

error affected his substantial rights by showing “a reasonable probability that, but for the

error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Rosales-Mireles v.

United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134-35 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). But even

if a defendant makes this showing, we will not recognize the error unless it “seriously

affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Webb, 738 F.3d

at 641 (cleaned up).

After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal, we

conclude from the “overall context” that the district court based Evans’ revocation sentence

predominately on permissible considerations such as his breach of the court’s trust, his

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history and characteristics, and the need for the sentence to deter him from future criminal

conduct and to protect the public. While the court mentioned some impermissible factors,

such as the need to promote respect for the law, its discussion of those factors was

intertwined with proper considerations. At the very least, we cannot say that the court

based Evans’ revocation sentence predominately on those impermissible factors.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED