United States v. James Cecil Flanagan

Fifth Circuit

United States v. James Cecil Flanagan

592 F.2d 252, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 15779

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedMarch 30, 1979

Docket78-5353

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 592 F.2d 252 (United States v. James Cecil Flanagan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. James Cecil Flanagan, 592 F.2d 252, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 15779 (5th Cir. 1979).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

James Cecil Flanagan appeals from his conviction and sentence on a guilty plea.

His first complaint is of the inclusion in his presentencing report and consideration by the trial judge of the “official version” of the far-flung drug smuggling conspiracy of which he was a part. His claim is that this version contains inaccuracies, though he does not specify how these affected him. The trial court stated, however, that he was not concerned with this portion of the report in sentencing James Flanagan; and we have noted that this portion of the report need not be sanitized since it is intended to be in the nature of an overall statement of defendant’s alleged complicity. United States v. Ramirez, 513 F.2d 72, 77-78 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912, 96 S.Ct. 215, 46 L.Ed.2d 140 (1975).

Appellant’s second point is so fine as to be well-nigh invisible. At sentencing, government counsel informed the court that James Flanagan, among several of the defendants, had agreed to cooperate with the government, that it was not dissatisfied with the cooperation it had received from any of them, and that this was taken into consideration by the government in the plea-bargain agreement. James Flanagan characterizes this as “a defacto argument for the maximum permissible sentence.” We are entirely unable to follow this reasoning. The government statement did no more than assert the obvious: that it had bargained for Flanagan’s cooperation in arriving at his plea agreement and was satisfied with the bargain, together with an assurance that it was satisfied as well with his cooperation. The bargain did not concern the sentence, a matter left to the court’s discretion. Defendant’s claim seems to be that the government’s statement amounted to an assertion that it had gone as far as it was willing to go in the plea bargain by promising to proceed on reduced charges and that, therefore, the court should impose the maximum sentence. The first assertion appears both obvious and harmless; the second does not follow.

AFFIRMED.

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PER CURIAM:

James Cecil Flanagan appeals from his conviction and sentence on a guilty plea.

His first complaint is of the inclusion in his presentencing report and consideration by the trial judge of the “official version” of the far-flung drug smuggling conspiracy of which he was a part. His claim is that this version contains inaccuracies, though he does not specify how these affected him. The trial court stated, however, that he was not concerned with this portion of the report in sentencing James Flanagan; and we have noted that this portion of the report need not be sanitized since it is intended to be in the nature of an overall statement of defendant’s alleged complicity. United States v. Ramirez, 513 F.2d 72, 77-78 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912, 96 S.Ct. 215, 46 L.Ed.2d 140 (1975).

Appellant’s second point is so fine as to be well-nigh invisible. At sentencing, government counsel informed the court that James Flanagan, among several of the defendants, had agreed to cooperate with the government, that it was not dissatisfied with the cooperation it had received from any of them, and that this was taken into consideration by the government in the plea-bargain agreement. James Flanagan characterizes this as “a defacto argument for the maximum permissible sentence.” We are entirely unable to follow this reasoning. The government statement did no more than assert the obvious: that it had bargained for Flanagan’s cooperation in arriving at his plea agreement and was satisfied with the bargain, together with an assurance that it was satisfied as well with his cooperation. The bargain did not concern the sentence, a matter left to the court’s discretion. Defendant’s claim seems to be that the government’s statement amounted to an assertion that it had gone as far as it was willing to go in the plea bargain by promising to proceed on reduced charges and that, therefore, the court should impose the maximum sentence. The first assertion appears both obvious and harmless; the second does not follow.

AFFIRMED.

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592 F.2d 252, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 15779, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-james-cecil-flanagan-ca5-1979.

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