NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0057n.06
No. 22-6047
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Feb 07, 2024 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) v. COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE ) JAMAAL PARKER, ) OPINION Defendant-Appellant. ) ) )
Before: WHITE, NALBANDIAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Jamaal Parker appeals his
convictions of two drug offenses and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-
trafficking crime, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on the firearm count and the denial
of his motion for a new trial. He also challenges his 290-month sentence as procedurally and
substantively unreasonable. We AFFIRM.
I.
A.
In 2014, the DEA and other law-enforcement agencies began investigating Jamaal Parker
and his co-defendant Jerriod Sivels. Using a confidential informant, agents began gathering
information on their drug-trafficking operation in 2014. Starting in 2019, the DEA began
monitoring Sivels’s and Parker’s calls and locations, gathering further evidence of their
relationship and drug activity. No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
In February 2019, the DEA followed Sivels, Parker, and a third co-defendant, Anthony
Poindexter, driving in two separate vehicles, to Atlanta. The group visited Nathaniel Wilkins, their
supplier in Atlanta, at his residence on Mildred Place. The DEA asked the Georgia State Police to
conduct a traffic stop of Poindexter’s vehicle as he drove back from Atlanta toward Chattanooga.
After pulling Poindexter over, police seized eight kilograms of cocaine from his vehicle. In the
days following the stop and Poindexter’s resulting arrest, Parker and Sivels spoke on the phone,
and Parker stated that they took “a big loss.”
On March 2, after intercepting phone calls indicating that Sivels was planning another trip
to Atlanta to meet with Wilkins and obtain more cocaine, the DEA followed Parker’s vehicle, a
black Chevy Silverado, down I-75 towards Atlanta, where it went to Mildred Place. Officers
observed a passenger in Parker’s vehicle, whom they later identified as Esmanda Sparks, Parker’s
girlfriend. The DEA continued to surveil the vehicle for several hours, then asked the Georgia
State Police to conduct a traffic stop. State Troopers Jordan Ennis, Eric Ramsey, and Charles
Chapeau responded to the request.
Ramsey attempted to pull Parker over, and Parker initially pulled onto the shoulder.
However, when Ramsey exited his vehicle, Parker started driving again, headed northbound on I-
75. After observing this, Ennis “activated [his] emergency equipment, and . . . pursued the vehicle
northbound on I-75.” R.430, PID 3491. Parker was “weaving in and out of traffic” and “driving
on the shoulder,” going over 100 miles per hour. Id. at PID 3491–92. Ennis then performed a
“precision immobilization technique”: he made contact with the fleeing vehicle “to break the
traction of the vehicle loose and then ultimately get the vehicle to rotate and leave the roadway.”
Id. at PID 3493. The Silverado stopped and Parker fled from the vehicle, running across all lanes
of I-75 with a backpack in his hands. Ennis caught up, tackled him, and took him into custody.
-2- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
He later searched the backpack and found four kilograms of cocaine that was eventually turned
over to the DEA.
Meanwhile, Chapeau arrived on the scene and observed Ennis chase Parker across the
highway. Parker’s Silverado was still in the roadway, with Sparks still in the passenger seat.
Chapeau ordered her out and handcuffed her. He then looked inside the Silverado, where he saw
a firearm in plain view on the driver’s-side floorboard. Chapeau seized the firearm and discovered
it was loaded.
The DEA arrested Sivels shortly after and conducted a search of a residence where agents
had observed Sivels and Parker engaged in drug-related activity. Officers found (among other
items) crack and powder cocaine, $1,600 in bundled bills, drug-packaging supplies and other
paraphernalia, and mail addressed to Parker.
B.
Parker was charged with several drug crimes and possession of a firearm in furtherance of
a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). At Parker’s three-day trial, the
government presented testimony from DEA agents who investigated the drug conspiracy and
Georgia State Troopers who conducted the traffic stops. Relevant here, DEA agent Andrew
Bergen testified about his experience with drug-trafficking organizations, noting that it is common
for drug traffickers to arm themselves with firearms to protect themselves, their families, and their
merchandise. In particular, he testified, drug traffickers frequently carry firearms when dealing
with drug quantities that are worth a lot of money, and a kilogram of cocaine costs approximately
$28,000.
At the close of evidence, Parker made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal. The motion
focused primarily on the § 924(c) charge and argued that the evidence was insufficient to show
-3- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
that Parker possessed the gun found on the Silverado’s floorboard or that he possessed it “in
furtherance of” drug activity. The district court reserved ruling on the motion. After deliberating
for less than a day, the jury acquitted Parker of one money-laundering count and convicted him of
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, use of a residence to distribute cocaine and
crack cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.
Parker filed a timely motion for new trial. He first argued that the verdict on the § 924(c)
charge was against the manifest weight of the evidence. His second argument asserted that a new
trial would promote the interest of justice because three jurors saw him in shackles in the
courthouse hallway. The district court rejected both arguments, and in a footnote, denied Parker’s
oral motion for acquittal as well.
The probation office prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR) for Parker that
calculated his sentencing guidelines range as 248 to 295 months. Although his initial guidelines
range was only 188 to 235 months, the five-year minimum sentence imposed on the § 924(c)
charge was required to run consecutively to his sentences on the other charges. At sentencing,
Parker asked the district court to vary downward to a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment.
However, the district court rejected that request and sentenced Parker to 290 months’
imprisonment, just five months shy of the top of the guidelines range.
Parker now appeals.
II.
Parker first argues that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
“possessed” the firearm found on the Silverado’s floorboard, as required under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),
and that the district court accordingly erred when it denied Parker’s motion for judgment of
acquittal on the § 924(c) count under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.
-4- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
In reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we consider “whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979) (emphasis omitted). We review the claim de novo and draw “all reasonable
inferences in support of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Stewart, 729 F.3d 517, 526 (6th Cir.
2013) (quoting United States v. Wettstain, 618 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2010)). We “will reverse a
judgment for insufficient evidence ‘only if the judgment is not supported by substantial and
competent evidence upon the record as a whole.’” Id. (quoting Wettstain, 618 F.3d at 583).
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla”—it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion. It is evidence affording a substantial basis of fact from
which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.” United States v. Taylor, 800 F.3d 701, 711
(6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant pursuing a claim
based on the insufficiency of the evidence “bears a very heavy burden.” United States v. Callahan,
801 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 473 F.3d 660, 669 (6th Cir.
2007)).
A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) requires the government to prove the
defendant “possess[ed] a firearm” “in furtherance of” a drug-trafficking or violent crime. The law
recognizes actual and constructive possession. “Actual possession exists when a tangible object
is in the immediate possession or control of the party”; “[c]onstructive possession exists when a
person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a
given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.”
United States v. Beverly, 750 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). The government may
prove possession by either direct or circumstantial evidence, and “[c]ircumstantial evidence alone
-5- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Vichitvongsa, 819 F.3d 260, 275 (6th Cir.
2016) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 758 F.3d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2014)). “‘[M]ere proximity’
to a gun is insufficient to establish constructive possession,” but “evidence of some other factor—
including connection with a gun, proof of motive, a gesture implying control, evasive conduct, or
a statement indicating involvement in an enterprise—coupled with proximity may suffice.” United
States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 610 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d
116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
The government’s evidence showed that when Parker was pulled over, he was driving his
own car, and there is no indication anyone else had driven the car that day. Officer Chapeau
testified, and photo evidence at trial confirmed, that the gun was laying in plain view on the floor
of the driver’s side. And the government presented evidence that those involved in high-dollar
drug trafficking, like Parker, often carry guns to protect themselves and their supply. Cf. United
States v. Castano, 543 F.3d 826, 838 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding firearm possession conviction in
part based on testimony “about the frequency of finding firearms when making arrests for drug
trafficking offenses and about the need for drug traffickers to protect themselves”).
This case is thus distinguishable from the cases Parker relies on, all of which include facts
that support an inference that the firearm was either unknown to the defendant or not in the
defendant’s possession. For example, in United States v. Bailey, “the only evidence supporting
Bailey’s conviction for constructive possession of the firearm is the fact that the loaded gun was
found underneath Bailey’s seat in the stolen car he was driving and that he had attempted to evade
police.” 553 F.3d 940, 945 (6th Cir. 2009). Further, Bailey “testified at trial that he was not aware
of the gun inside the car; that he did not put a gun inside the car; and that he did not have a gun on
his person when he got inside the car.” Id. at 946. Similarly, the defendant in United States v.
-6- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
Wilson was riding in the back seat of someone else’s truck when it was stopped and searched. See
No. 22-5068, 2022 WL 17456351, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2022). The police found three firearms
in the vehicle, one of which was underneath the rear seat. Id. Notably, that firearm “was not
visible without first lifting the seat.” Id. The court overturned the district court’s application of a
sentencing enhancement based on Wilson’s “possession” of the firearm because the “only evidence
that the prosecution offered to show constructive possession was the rifle’s location under the seat
and the prosecutor’s assertion that Wilson ‘would have access’ to the rifle in that location.” Id. at
*3 (citation omitted). But the “prosecution did not present evidence that the rifle was visible or
that Wilson knew it was under the seat.” Id. And the evidence in United States v. Beverly
established “only that Beverly was in the kitchen of [a] residence, that Beverly was standing close
to a waste basket which contained two guns, and that Beverly had at some point touched one of
the guns.” 750 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1984).
In contrast, the evidence here showed that Parker was driving his own vehicle and the
firearm was in plain sight by his feet. As we have previously observed, such evidence “serves as
circumstantial evidence allowing the reasonable inference by the jury that Defendant knew the gun
was there and likely placed it there himself.” United States v. Six, 600 F. App’x 346, 356–57 (6th
Cir. 2015).
Parker also argues that the trial testimony places the gun on the driver’s-side floorboard
sometime after Parker departed the vehicle, and at a time when Sparks was still in the car. Thus,
Parker argues, there is insufficient evidence to show that Parker knew the gun was there while he
was in the car; Sparks could have concealed it from him and placed it on the driver’s-side
floorboard after he fled the car. But “evidence need not ‘remove every reasonable hypothesis
except that of guilt.’” United States v. Brown, 147 F.3d 477, 489 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting United
-7- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir. 1996)). Parker’s alternative explanation may be
plausible, but given the dearth of evidence in support of this theory, a jury would be entitled to
reject that inference and instead infer that the gun found on the driver’s-side floorboard was
controlled by the driver. “[W]e cannot overturn the jury’s decision merely because it had to draw
reasonable inferences to find [the defendant] guilty.” United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 181
(6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, a reasonable juror could infer that Parker possessed the firearm.
Parker does not specifically argue on appeal that the government’s evidence was
insufficient to prove that he possessed the firearm “in furtherance of” his drug crimes, but such a
challenge would fail as well.
We have “held consistently that possessing a gun as protection in the course of drug
trafficking is sufficient to satisfy the ‘in furtherance’ element.” United States v. Reynolds, 534 F.
App’x 347, 361 (6th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases). Although courts often state that “the possession
of a firearm on the same premises as a drug transaction would not, without a showing of a
connection between the two, sustain a § 924(c) conviction,” if the firearm is “strategically located
so that it is quickly and easily available for use,” that is sufficient. United States v. Mackey, 265
F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2001). Other factors—such as whether the gun was loaded, the type of
weapon, the legality of its possession, the nature of the drug activity, and the circumstances under
which the gun was found—may also supply the required nexus between the firearm and the crime
charged. United States v. Maya, 966 F.3d 493, 501 (6th Cir. 2020). As with possession, jurors are
entitled to “infer . . . the purpose of a firearm.” United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 569, 576 (6th
Cir. 2013).
The evidence showed that Parker possessed the gun while returning from his supplier in
Atlanta with a significant amount of cocaine, and that drug traffickers carrying large quantities of
-8- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
drugs often carry guns for their own protection and the protection of their supply. The gun was
loaded and “strategically located” within arm’s reach on the driver’s-side floorboard. Mackey,
265 F.3d at 462. And there was no evidence that Parker possessed the firearm for any “‘innocent’
purpose—such as for ‘hunting’ or as a ‘wall-mounted antique.’” Maya, 966 F.3d at 500 (alteration
omitted) (quoting Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462). That evidence is sufficient to convince a rational
juror beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun was possessed in furtherance of the drug-trafficking
crime.
III.
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, the district court may grant a motion for a
new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” Parker filed a motion for a new trial shortly after
the jury’s verdict, presenting two bases: (1) the verdict on the § 924(c) charge was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, and (2) the jurors’ viewing him in shackles required a new trial.
Motions for a new trial asserting that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence “are granted only in the extraordinary circumstance where the evidence preponderates
heavily against the verdict.” United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 592–93 (6th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When considering such a motion, “district judges
can act in the role of a ‘thirteenth juror’ and consider the credibility of the witnesses and the weight
of the evidence to insure that there is not a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d
581, 589 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Ashworth, 836 F.2d 260, 266 (6th Cir. 1988)).
Motions for a new trial based on the weight of evidence are evaluated under a different
standard than motions for acquittal: a motion for acquittal may be granted only if no “rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” Jackson,
-9- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
443 U.S. at 319; a new trial “based on the verdict being against the manifest weight of the evidence
is proper when the government has presented sufficient evidence to convict, but the judge disagrees
with the jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence,” Lutz, 154 F.3d at 589.
The district court rejected Parker’s argument that the manifest weight of the evidence was
against the jury’s verdict convicting Parker of the § 924(c) count. Parker argues that the district
court applied the wrong standard in assessing his motion—that it used the standard for motions for
acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29; not the “thirteenth juror” standard
appropriate for motions for a new trial under Rule 33. And, Parker argues, under the proper
standard a new trial is warranted.
We disagree. First, the district court understood the correct legal standard, stating: “In
evaluating a motion under Rule 33, the Court may assess and weigh the evidence ‘as a thirteenth
juror.’” R.436, PID 3749 (quoting Hughes, 505 F.3d at 593). Admittedly, the court occasionally
used the word “sufficient,” the Rule 29 standard, in its discussion. But the order accurately stated
the proper standard before any analysis. And the court relied on the correct legal standard in its
conclusion, holding that “the manifest weight of the evidence does not fall against the proposition
that Defendant possessed a firearm,” and that “the evidence does not preponderate against the
verdict.” Id. at PID 3750–51. Notably, the opinion contained the court’s own conclusions on what
the evidence showed, which indicates it was independently weighing the evidence as required
under Rule 33. Contra United States v. Mallory, 902 F.3d 584, 596–97 (6th Cir. 2018) (remanding
for district court to apply correct standard on Rule 33 motion when district court “repeatedly
characterized its task as evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, rather than weighing the
evidence for itself”).
-10- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
The district court also denied Parker’s Rule 29 motion “[f]or the same reasons” as it denied
his motion for a new trial. R.436, PID 3751. However, it is clear the court found that the evidence
was sufficient to support the conviction and that the manifest weight of the evidence was not
against the conviction. The court understood the two standards and found that neither standard
was met.
Nor was the district court’s conclusion that a new trial was not warranted based on the
weight of the evidence an abuse of discretion. Unlike the district court, “[t]he court of appeals . . .
does not sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’ to judge the credibility of witnesses” or “reweigh the evidence.”
Ashworth, 836 F.2d at 266. We ask only “whether the district court’s determination that the
evidence does not ‘preponderate heavily against the verdict’ is a clear and manifest abuse of
discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).
In light of that deferential standard, “virtually every one of our cases dealing with the
weight of the evidence involves affirmances of district court denials of new trial motions.” United
States v. Burks, 974 F.3d 622, 627–28 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases). This case is no exception.
The district court assessed the evidence and determined that the Rule 33 standard was not met.
Parker has not presented us with any reason to conclude that determination was an abuse of
discretion; he offers no reason to disbelieve the government’s witnesses, nor any evidence
supporting his theory that the firearm in fact belonged to Sparks. Cf. United States v. Funzie, 543
F. App’x 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2013) (“That the evidence arguably points to a hypothesis other than
guilt does not render the verdict against the greater weight of the evidence.”). We thus affirm the
district court’s denial of Parker’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence.
-11- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
Parker also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on jurors’
viewing him in prison garb and shackles in the courtroom hallway. In the Chattanooga courthouse,
defendants must cross a public hallway when moving between the holding-cell elevator and the
courtroom. The U.S. Marshals typically check the hallway to ensure it is clear before crossing it
with a defendant. On the last day of trial, before closing arguments, Parker was escorted across
the public hallway wearing “orange pants and a sweatshirt, not street clothes, and . . . in leg irons
and a waist cuff device.” R.460, PID 4583. Although the hall was clear when Parker began to
cross, two alternates and one primary juror saw Parker as he walked across the hallway. The jurors
saw him for “less than five -- probably three seconds,” and there was “no interaction, or no
gawking or anything.” Id. at PID 4582–83. The district court brought the incident to the parties’
attention immediately after and defense counsel suggested the court question the jurors about
whether they could be fair and impartial.
When the jurors returned, the district court addressed them:
If you have something that -- that is an affirmative response to my questions, just raise your hand, don’t begin to talk, we’ll note who raises their hands, if anybody, and then we’ll talk to you in private. The first question: Since we broke last night, has everyone followed my instructions not to talk about the case other than in the jury room? Does anybody have any concerns about whether you’ve followed that instruction? . . . Number 2. Has anyone seen or heard anything that would cause you difficulty in being fair and impartial in performing your duties as a juror? Raise your hand if you’ve seen or heard anything that causes you concern. Anybody?
Id. at PID 4590. No jurors raised their hand. The court discussed the situation further with the
parties outside the presence of the jurors, and after conferring with Parker, defense counsel agreed
that the questioning was sufficient and that the court should “tell the jury they can start
deliberating.” Id. at PID 4593–95. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23, the district
-12- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
court asked Parker if he would like to stipulate to an 11-person jury and dismiss the one primary
juror who had seen him in shackles. Defense counsel stated that he was “not asking to excuse”
the juror, that he would “rather . . . have a jury of 12 than 11,” and that he was “just fine to leave
things as it is.” Id. at PID 4597.
In his motion for new trial, Parker nonetheless argued that “the interest of justice” required
a new trial based on the jurors seeing him in shackles. The district court rejected this argument,
stating that Parker was “required to show actual prejudice where ‘the conditions under which
defendants were seen were routine security measures rather than situations of unusual restraint
such as shackling of defendants during trial.’” R.436, PID 3751–52 (quoting United States v.
Moreno, 933 F.2d 362, 368 (6th Cir. 1991)). The district court recounted that it had questioned
the jurors and none indicated his or her impartiality would be impaired. In addition, the jury
acquitted Parker of the money-laundering charge, which “bolster[ed] the [c]ourt’s confidence that
they deliberated fairly and impartially.” Id. at PID 3752. Thus, the court rejected this basis for a
new trial.
Parker argues on appeal that the district court incorrectly believed that “actual prejudice”
was required to grant a new trial, although, he argues, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
33, a district court has discretion to grant a new trial whenever “the interest of justice so requires.”
He then raises a related question left open in United States v. Munoz, 605 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 2010):
whether a district court may grant Rule 33 relief where the verdict is not against the substantial weight of the evidence, and where no reversible error or violation of the defendant’s substantial rights has occurred, but where the district court nonetheless believes that “the interest of justice” requires a new trial.
Id. at 374.
-13- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
But we need not decide whether Rule 33 requires “actual prejudice” to grant a new trial
nor answer the question left open by Munoz, because the district court’s decision, read as a whole,
shows that it would not have awarded a new trial even under a broader “trial unfairness” standard
that does not require reversible error. See Munoz, 605 F.3d at 375.
Parker is correct that the district court stated that a new trial was not warranted because
Parker had not shown actual prejudice from the shackles incident. But the court said more than
that. It explained why it concluded that Parker’s jury remained unbiased notwithstanding the
shackles incident: no one indicated any bias when questioned and the jury acquitted Parker of the
money-laundering count. The district court would not have awarded a new trial on fairness
grounds when it expressed confidence that the jury “deliberated fairly and impartially.” R.436,
PID 3752; see also United States v. Lattner, 385 F.3d 947, 959 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming denial
of motion for new trial based on juror’s view of defendant in shackles). We accordingly find no
error in the district court’s denial of a new trial based on the interest of justice.
IV.
Parker’s final challenge is to his within-guidelines sentence of 290 months’ imprisonment.
He challenges both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of this sentence. We review a
district court’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard” for procedural and
substantive reasonableness. United States v. Albaadani, 863 F.3d 496, 504 (6th Cir. 2017)
(quoting United States v. Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d 345, 351 (6th Cir. 2015)).
Parker first argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district
court failed to address several mitigation arguments: “the jury’s acquittal for money laundering,
the harshness of pretrial incarceration during the COVID lockdowns, the distorting Guidelines
-14- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
effects of the § 924(c) count, and § 924(c)’s inclusion in the list of disqualifying offenses for
earned-time credit under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii).” Appellant Br. 31.
When considering procedural reasonableness, we must “ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence.” United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328, 370 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). The district court must explain “its reasoning to a sufficient
degree to allow for meaningful appellate review,” United States v. Trejo-Martinez, 481 F.3d 409,
412–13 (6th Cir. 2007), and “set forth enough facts to satisfy this court that it considered the
parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decision-making
authority,” United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 510 (6th Cir. 2008).
“Where a party has failed to object to a procedural defect, we review claims of procedural
unreasonableness for plain error.” United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 802 (6th Cir. 2010)
(citing United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385-86 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Here, the district
court gave the parties an opportunity to object to the sentence imposed and its basis, and neither
party objected. Accordingly, we review Parker’s challenge to the adequacy of the district court’s
explanation for plain error. See United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004).
The district court did not specifically address the four arguments Parker raises on appeal
during its explanation of Parker’s sentence. But we do not require the district court to address
every issue in depth. It is sufficient that the “‘context and the record make clear’ that the sentencing
judge understood [the mitigation arguments] but did not believe they outweighed other § 3553(a)
factors that the judge found more pertinent.” United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 340 (6th Cir.
-15- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
2007) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007)). “On appeal, ‘[w]e focus less on
what the transcript reveals that the court said and more on what the transcript reveals that the court
did.’” United States v. Paden, 743 F. App’x 621, 624 (6th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Taylor, 696 F.3d 628, 634 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Here, the context and record make clear that the district court understood and engaged with
Parker’s arguments throughout the sentencing hearing. To begin, Parker filed a notice of
objections to the presentence report, which the district court reviewed. And at the hearing, the
parties argued their positions and the district court engaged with some of Parker’s various
arguments for leniency. For example, when Parker’s counsel raised the issue of the distorting
Guidelines effects of the § 924(c) count—an issue he claims the district court did not
acknowledge—the district court interjected to clarify the specific guidelines range Parker would
have faced without the § 924(c) count. That back-and-forth, along with the context and record of
the full sentencing hearing, shows that the district court heard, understood, and considered Parker’s
non-frivolous arguments. See Paden, 743 F. App’x at 624 (affirming sentence even though “the
district court did not specifically address” two of Paden’s arguments because “it is apparent that
[it] considered “ those arguments “but concluded that [they] were of minimal significance in
comparison to his conduct”).
And unlike the cases on which Parker relies, the district court gave an extensive explanation
of its reasons for the sentence imposed. Contra Wallace, 597 F.3d at 802. It responded to several
arguments raised by the defense, but focused heavily on specific factors it believed warranted a
significant sentence. The court noted that Parker moved “large quantities” of cocaine, and that his
drug crimes were “brazen” and “calculated.” R.457, PID 4510–11. It explained that Parker was
“a professional long-term criminal who has engaged in remarkably destructive behavior over the
-16- No. 22-6047, United States v. Parker
years.” Id. at PID 4513. The case involved not only a significant quantity of drugs, but the
“incredible” flight from law enforcement, which put “a lot of people at risk.” Id. at PID 4515.
And Parker committed his crimes “for profit, not to feed an addiction.” Id. at PID 4514. In sum,
the court was faced with “a really serious set of circumstances” and determined that “a guideline
sentence” would “justly punish[]” Parker. Id. at PID 4513–14. Thus, the district court provided
enough information for this court to easily “‘answer the simple question of why the district judge
decided to impose” the sentence it did. Wallace, 597 F.3d at 803. We reject Parker’s argument
that this lengthy explanation, combined with the clear indications from the rest of the sentencing
transcript that the court considered Parker’s mitigation arguments, was insufficient.
Parker’s final argument is that his 290-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. We
review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Young,
847 F.3d at 370. To be substantively reasonable, a sentence must be proportionate to the
seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and the offender, and sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a). Vowell, 516 F.3d at 512 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “[A] sentence may be substantively unreasonable where the district
court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider
pertinent § 3553(a) factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.”
Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d at 356 (cleaned up). In reviewing substantive reasonableness, “the
district court is entitled to deference in its sentencing decisions because of its ‘ringside perspective
on the sentencing hearing and its experience over time in sentencing other individuals.’” Vowell,
516 F.3d at 510 (quoting United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349, 352 (6th Cir. 2007)). And the
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court applies “an appellate presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences.”
Vonner, 516 F.3d at 389.
Parker argues that the district court “put little to absolutely nothing on the side of
mitigation,” and thus placed “an unreasonable amount of weight” on other factors. Appellant Br.
34 (quoting Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d at 356). Parker also cites two specific reasons for mitigation
that he thinks the district court should have credited: (1) “the reduced risk of recidivism that older
individuals pose” and (2) a study from the U.S. Sentencing Commission finding that “federal
prisoners had a substantially lower recidivism rate than state prisoners.” Id. at 34–35.
Neither those factors nor any others raised at sentencing overcome the presumption of
reasonableness accorded to Parker’s sentence. The district court gave an extensive explanation of
its reasons for Parker’s sentence, and weighed each of the relevant § 3553(a) factors without
unduly weighting any. That Parker “desired a more lenient sentence, without more, is insufficient
to justify our disturbing the reasoned judgment of the district court.” Trejo-Martinez, 481 F.3d at
413.
In sum, Parker gives us no reason to believe the district court erred in sentencing him, and
we affirm the district court’s sentencing as both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
V.
For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
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