United States v. Jaison Coleman

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: October 7, 2025
• Docket: 24-3051
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-3051 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

JAISON L. COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 3:24-cr-00012-wmc-1 — William M. Conley, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 9, 2025 — DECIDED OCTOBER 7, 2025 ____________________

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Responding to 911 calls of domes- tic violence is one of the most difficult responsibilities of po- lice officers. This case is a good example. Just after 4:00 a.m. on April 20, 2023, Officer Jamie Kizer of the Marshfield, Wis- consin police department, responded to a caller reporting that her stepfather (Jaison Coleman) threatened to kill her mother (Lisa Coleman) and was still inside the home. Officer Kizer knocked on the door and spoke to Lisa, who balked when 2 No. 24-3051

asked whether her kids were okay. Officer Kizer reacted by saying, “I’m sensing that we almost need to come inside to make sure of that.” Lisa then said, “Okay” and proceeded to tell Officer Kizer that her kids were in one bedroom, her hus- band was in another, and her dogs were friendly and would not bite. The district court found that this exchange supplied Officer Kizer with the consent necessary to enter the home and, further, that he and his colleagues did not exceed the scope of Lisa’s consent once inside. The district court, there- fore, did not suppress the firearms ultimately found in the home. We agree and affirm Jaison Coleman’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm. I A The pertinent facts come from body camera footage rec- orded by Officer Kizer and his colleagues at the Coleman home. See United States v. Norville, 43 F.4th 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[A] video record of the events at issue can evaporate any factual dispute that would otherwise exist ….” (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007))). Upon arriving, Officer Kizer knocked on the door and an- nounced himself. Lisa responded by stepping onto the porch and telling Officer Kizer that her son and daughter were in- side. She hesitated to answer whether her kids were safe, say- ing (at that initial moment) only that they were in her bed- room. Officer Kizer then tried again, asking if her kids were going to be okay. Lisa again waffled, this time saying that she “hope[d] so.” Taking a different approach, Officer Kizer next asked where her husband was located inside the home. When Lisa responded that she did not know, Officer Kizer asked if No. 24-3051 3

he could enter. Lisa, who had just turned back to the door, paused before saying, “um … I’d prefer you not.” A break in the conversation followed, with Lisa then tell- ing Officer Kizer that she needed to go inside to get her shoes. After some time passed with no sign of Lisa coming back out- side, a concerned Officer Kizer cracked the door and called into the house several times asking if she was okay. A minute or so later, Lisa returned to the doorway and again stepped outside, prompting Officer Kizer to ask anew how things were going inside and, even more specifically, the name of her husband—who Officer Kizer understood had threatened her. Lisa responded that it was Jaison, whom we refer to as Cole- man from here forward. A key exchange then followed. When Officer Kizer asked if Coleman was “more calm right now” and, in turn, if the kids were okay, the following dialogue occurred: Lisa: I … I … I don’t … They’re … They’re okay right this second … [unintelligible]. Officer Kizer: Okay, um, I’m sensing that we al- most need to come inside to make sure of that. Lisa: Okay. Officer Kizer: Okay, um …. Lisa: They’re in my bedroom. Officer Kizer: Are we gonna get bit by dogs if we come in or are they like …. Lisa: You shouldn’t, they’re just gonna jump all over you. Officer Kizer: Okay. 4 No. 24-3051

Lisa: They’re not gonna bite. Officer Kizer: Okay. Alright, where do you think [Coleman] is right now? Lisa: I’m pretty sure he’s in the back bedroom. Officer Kizer: Okay, alright. Lisa then opened the door for Officer Kizer and his col- leagues and facilitated their entry by brushing her dogs away. She led the officers to one of the back bedrooms and pointed out where the kids were. Not seeing Coleman, Officer Kizer asked where he was, and Lisa responded that she did not know. A quick canvas of the home resulted in Officer Kizer finding him in a separate bedroom. A brief discussion fol- lowed, with Coleman permitting Officer Kizer to conduct a protective pat down. In talking to the two children, the officers learned that Lisa and Coleman had been fighting, with Coleman reportedly be- ing loud, aggressive, and mean. The children added that their father pointed a gun at their mother and threatened to shoot her and to light the house on fire. In response to questions, the children confirmed they saw the gun, both that night and be- fore, but did not know where it was at that moment. B Based on information gained following their entry into the house, the officers sought and secured a warrant to search the Coleman home. The search turned up several guns, leading in time to a federal indictment charging Coleman with pos- sessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). No. 24-3051 5

Coleman moved to suppress the recovery of the firearms from his home, contending that his wife never consented to Officer Kizer and his colleagues entering in the first instance. Following a hearing, a magistrate judge issued a report find- ing that Lisa did consent to the officers entering her home and recommending the denial of Coleman’s motion. The district court agreed, adopting the magistrate judge’s finding that Lisa consented to the officers’ entry and, separately, rejecting Coleman’s contention that the officers’ activity inside the home exceeded the scope of his wife’s consent. Following the district court’s denial of his motion to sup- press, Coleman chose to plead guilty while reserving his right on appeal to challenge the suppression ruling. That appeal is now before us. II A The governing legal principles are well-established, with both parties recognizing that consent is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for searching a home. See United States v. Banks, 60 F.4th 386, 390 (7th Cir. 2023); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). So too do both sides agree that consent need not come from the defendant: “[a] third party may give consent to search a place in which both she and the defendant have le- gitimate expectations of privacy, and the defendant can chal- lenge the validity of the consent given by the third party.” United States v. Cellitti, 387 F.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)). The Supreme Court has long recognized that, for consent to be valid, it must be “freely and voluntarily” given. Bumper 6 No. 24-3051

v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). Our case law echoes the same standard. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 22 F.4th 667, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing and applying the standard an- nounced in Bumper). Courts assess the voluntariness of consent by considering the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Han, 105 F.4th 986, 991 (7th Cir. 2024). Pertinent factors often include, but are not limited to, “(1) the person’s age, intelligence, and education; (2) whether he was advised of his constitutional rights; (3) how long he was detained before he gave his con- sent; (4) whether his consent was immediate, or was prompted by repeated requests by the authorities; (5) whether any physical coercion was used; and (6) whether the individ- ual was in police custody when he gave his consent.” United States v. Figueroa-Espana, 511 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2007) (cit- ing United States v. Santiago, 428 F.3d 699, 704–05 (7th Cir. 2005)). Even with voluntary consent, the subsequent search must respect “the scope of consent.” United States v. Saucedo, 688 F.3d 863, 865 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Jackson, 598 F.3d 340, 348 (7th Cir. 2010)). The proper inquiry for evaluat- ing the scope of consent is “objective reasonableness,” with courts asking, “what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer” and the person giving consent? Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (cleaned up). As a court of review, our role is more limited. We review a district court’s finding of voluntary consent and any chal- lenge to its scope for clear error. See Jones, 22 F.4th at 675 (ci- tations omitted). No. 24-3051 7

B Having viewed the complete interaction between Officer Kizer and Lisa, we see no clear error in the district court’s finding that she consented to the police officers entering her home. Two aspects of the interaction stand out. First, Officer Kizer’s tone and demeanor throughout was that of someone concerned, not someone coercing. Second, Lisa showed that she had the ability to deny consent to entry, as she did just that in response to Officer Kizer’s initial request. She chose to let Officer Kizer enter after he asked again, with the second request being unaccompanied by any coercion. These observations are clear from the video footage. From the time Officer Kizer arrived at the Coleman residence, he spoke calmly and respectfully to Lisa, who—at all points in time—responded in ways demonstrating she understood what was transpiring. While Officer Kizer did not explicitly tell her that she did not need to consent to his entry, the fact that he asked for permission implied as much, as did the fact that she initially denied his request. At no point was Lisa in custody. And while Officer Kizer did ask twice for permission to enter, their entire conversation lasted but a few minutes. While Lisa may have felt some degree of pressure to let the police enter her home, at no point did Officer Kizer exert co- ercion. On this record, the district court committed no clear error in finding that Lisa consented to the police entry. Coleman begs to differ, focusing on Officer Kizer’s use of the word “need” in the critical second exchange: “Okay, um, I’m sensing that we almost need to come inside to make sure [the kids are okay].” While a plenty fair argument, Coleman’s focus is too narrow. The district court could reasonably find that Officer Kizer’s use of the word “need” did not make his 8 No. 24-3051

request coercive in light of the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Hicks, 539 F.3d 566, 570–71 (7th Cir. 2008). Officer Kizer asked for permission to enter by expressing con- cern for the safety of Lisa’s children and relayed that concern with some urgency and intensity, but the district court did not clearly err by finding that he did so without overstepping and coercing her consent. Lisa’s response all but confirms she heard Officer Kizer’s request just that way. After responding “Okay,” Lisa told Of- ficer Kizer where the children were inside the home while also assuring him and the other officers present that her dogs may jump on them but would not bite. All of this leads us to affirm the district court’s finding that Lisa consented to the police entering her home. We likewise agree with the district court’s finding that the officers acted within the scope of Lisa’s consent upon their en- try into the home. Their stated purpose was to check the wel- fare of her children inside, including by confirming that Cole- man presented no danger to them or anyone else. Doing so necessarily required the police to scan the home, locate every- one, and ask some basic questions. The information the police acquired led to their securing a warrant to search the home and recovering three firearms. We see no infirmity in the dis- trict court’s finding that the officers, once inside the Coleman home, respected the consent that Lisa conferred in the first in- stance. These conclusions eliminate any need to consider the gov- ernment’s alternative contention that the doctrines of exigent circumstances and inevitable discovery also supported the police’s entry into and initial sweep of the Coleman residence. No. 24-3051 9

In the end, then, we AFFIRM. And we do so with a closing and overarching observation: Officer Kizer and his colleagues exhibited sound and balanced decision making in delicate and difficult circumstances.