United States v. Jaimon Hannah

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: May 26, 2026
• Docket: 25-4452
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4452

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAIMON TYWAN HANNAH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (0:24-cr-00405-MGL-2)

Submitted: May 21, 2026 Decided: May 26, 2026

Before AGEE and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Louis H. Lang, CALLISON, TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. William Kenneth Witherspoon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Jaimon Tywan Hannah pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1951(a). The district court sentenced Hannah to 132 months’ imprisonment and

three years of supervised release. On appeal, Hannah’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no potentially

meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the guilty plea is valid and whether

the sentence is reasonable. Hannah has not filed a pro se supplemental brief, though he has

been notified of his right to do so. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal as to

all issues within the scope of the appeal waiver in Hannah’s plea agreement. Hannah has

filed a response to the motion to dismiss, questioning whether the determination of the

issues presented in Hunter v. United States, No. 24-1063, will render Hannah’s appeal

waiver unenforceable. * We dismiss in part and affirm in part.

We first conclude that, with certain exceptions inapplicable here, Hannah has

waived his right to appeal his sentence. A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive

the right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. See United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53

(4th Cir. 1990). This court reviews the validity of an appeal waiver de novo and will

enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope thereof. United

States v. Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 2016).

* In Hunter v. United States, No. 24-1063, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine whether the only permissible exceptions to a general appeal waiver are for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum; and whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has a right to appeal and the government does not object.

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An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to the

waiver. Id. at 169. “To determine whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed

to waive his appellate rights, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the

defendant’s experience, conduct, educational background and knowledge of his plea

agreement and its terms.” United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2023).

“Generally, . . . if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate

rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant

understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). We conclude that Hannah knowingly and voluntarily agreed to waive his

right to appeal. Moreover, the district court’s statement at sentencing, while advising

Hannah of the timeline for filing a notice of appeal, also explicitly advised Hannah that he

had waived his right to appeal. Therefore, this statement did not affect the validity of the

appeal waiver.

The waiver, however, does not preclude our review of the validity of the guilty plea

pursuant to Anders. See United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 2018).

However, the district court conducted a thorough and complete Rule 11 hearing before

accepting Hannah’s guilty plea. See United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir.

2013) (finding a guilty plea is valid if the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently pleads guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and

likely consequences” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The record thus shows no plain

error that could have affected Hannah’s substantial rights or the fairness and integrity of

the proceedings; thus, Hannah’s guilty plea is valid. See United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d

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812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that where a defendant does not move to withdraw his

guilty plea, we review validity of guilty plea for plain error).

We therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal as

to all issues falling within the scope of the broad appeal waiver in Hannah’s plea agreement.

In accordance with our obligations under Anders, we have reviewed the entire record for

any potentially meritorious issues that do not fall within the scope of the appeal waiver and

have found none. Accordingly, we affirm the remainder of the criminal judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Hannah, in writing, of the right to petition

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Hannah requests that a

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel

may move this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must

state that a copy thereof was served on Hannah. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART