United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc.

150 F. Supp. 397, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3711, 1957 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,649
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 8, 1957
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 150 F. Supp. 397 (United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 397, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3711, 1957 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,649 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).

Opinion

OUTLINE OF OPINION

1. The Issues Presented.

2. Findings oe Fact.

I. Description of Defendants and Others.

II. Professional Boxing.

III. State and Municipal Regulation of Professional Boxing.

IV. The Trade and Commerce Involved.

V. The Interstate Character of This Trade and Commerce.

VI. The Promotion of Championship Contests — a Separate Part of This Interstate Commerce.

VII. The Sale of Television and Broadcast Rights to Championship Contests — -a Separate Part of This Interstate Commerce.

VIII. The Defendants’ Position in the Professional Boxing Business in 1949.
IX. The Unlawful Combination and Conspiracy.

a. The defendants combine and conspire.

b. The Garden joins the combination and conspiracy.

X. The Conspiracy Afoot.

a. Elimination of competitors.

1. Michael S. Jacobs and Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc.

2. Tournament of Champions, Inc., Sporting Events, Inc., and Co-

lumbia Broadcasting System, h. Defendants’ control of important stadia and arenas.

c. Defendants’ exclusive contracts with contenders for championship.

XI. The Results of Defendants’ Conspiracy.

3. The Law Applicable to the Findings oe Fact.

4. Conclusions oe Law.

RYAN, District Judge.

This civil anti-trust suit was filed on March 17, 1952 by the United States under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, C. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. A. § 4, to prevent and restrain violations by the defendants of Sections 1 and 2 of the Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2. The amended complaint alleges, in substance, that the defendants combined and con *400 spired in restraint of, and to monopolize, and have monopolized, interstate and foreign commerce in the promotion of professional championship boxing contests, including the sale of radio, television and motion picture rights thereto.

• Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, i. e., for lack of interstate commerce and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, was granted on February 8, 1964. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of dismissal and remanded the suit for trial, United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 1955, 348 U.S. 236, 75 S.Ct. 259, 99 L. Ed. 290. This determination was a holding that accepting the allegations of the complaint, a claim was stated entitling the Government to some form of relief and that “ * * * the Government is entitled to an opportunity to prove its allegations ***..”

I note, with gratitude and appreciation, that I have had the utmost cooperation from counsel both in the pre-trial hearings and at trial. This expedited the presentation of the evidence and shortened the trial.

1.

THE ISSUES PRESENTED

The complaint alleges that the defendants, beginning in 1949, combined and conspired in restraint of and to monopolize interstate trade and foreign commerce in the promotion, exhibition, broadcasting, telecasting and motion picture production and distribution of professional championship boxing contests in the United States. The Government contends that the combination and conspiracy resulted in a monopolization, and that it consisted of a concert of action among the defendants to exclude others from the promotion and exhibition of and the sale of radio, television and motion picture rights in professional championship boxing contests in the United States.

The acts alleged to have been committed by the defendants, pursuant to the conspiracy and combination, are: (1) purchasing of promotional control of certain championships, (2) acquiring the assets of competitors, (3) acquiring the exclusive use of principal stadia and arenas, and (4) requiring each of certain contenders for a title, as a condition of being aiforded an opportunity to engage in a championship contest, to enter into a contract pursuant to which the contender, if he won the contest and thereby became champion, was required to engage in title bouts only under the promotion of defendants for a period of from three to five years.

The complaint alleges that defendants have promoted, or participated in the promotion of, 80% of all championship contests presented in the United States during the period between January 1, 1949 and May 15, 1953.

Specifically, then, the complaint alleges that the trade and commerce involved in suit is the business of promoting championship boxing contests on a multi-state basis, which includes the staging of the boxing contest in a suitable arena, the sale of tickets of admission, and the negotiations and sale of rights to broadcast, televise and to make and distribute motion pictures of such contests. This, the Supreme Court has held, “constitutes ‘trade or commerce among the several States’ within the meaning of the Sherman Act”, United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., supra, 348 U.S. at page 240, 75 S.Ct. at page 261. The complaint further alleges that, in addition to monies received from the sale of tickets of admission, a substantial portion of the total revenue from championship fights comes from the sale of rights involving radio, television and motion pictures.

The answers deny that defendants have unlawfully conspired or combined, or that they have, either individually or collectively, a monopoly within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The main thrust of the defense lies in the conten *401 tion that championship boxing contests are not independent of and would not exist without non-championship contests and, therefore, the promotion of championship boxing contests does not constitute a relevant “market” for purposes of testing violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.

The Government argues that the pro-' motion and exhibition of, and the sale of radio, television and motion picture rights in professional championship boxing contests constitute a “market” for purposes of determining whether there' were restraints of trade and monopoly as alleged. The defendants urge that the relevant market is the entire entertain-' ment field (or, at the very least, the pro-' motion of all boxing contests). They contend that if the sale of radio, television and motion picture rights with respect to championship bouts have material significance, such a finding would serve only to establish that the correct and relevant market is the entire entertainment field.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hudson's Bay Co. Fur Sales Inc. v. American Legend Co-Op.
651 F. Supp. 819 (D. New Jersey, 1986)
SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co.
427 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1976)
United States v. General Motors Corporation
369 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D. Michigan, 1974)
Peto v. Madison Square Garden Corp.
384 F.2d 682 (Second Circuit, 1967)
United States v. American Oil Company
249 F. Supp. 799 (D. New Jersey, 1966)
MacHen v. Johansson
174 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. New York, 1959)
Portsmouth Baseball Corp. v. Frick
21 F.R.D. 318 (S.D. New York, 1958)
Affiliated Music Enterprises, Inc. v. Sesac, Inc.
160 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. New York, 1958)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
150 F. Supp. 397, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3711, 1957 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,649, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-international-boxing-club-of-new-york-inc-nysd-1957.