United States v. Intalco Aluminum LLC

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: August 19, 2024
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01066
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-01066-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 12 v. ENTER STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT 13 INTALCO ALUMINUM LLC, 14 Defendant. 15

16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff United States of America’s Unopposed 17 Motion to Enter Stipulation of Settlement. Dkt. No. 2. The United States requests that the Court 18 enter a proposed Stipulation of Settlement among the United States, Defendant Intalco 19 Aluminum LLC, and Intalco’s parent company Alcoa Corporation as a guarantor to resolve the 20 United States’ claims for civil penalties under Sections 110, 112, and 113 of the Clean Air Act 21 (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. Dkt. No. 2 at 1; see also Dkt. No. 2-1 (proposed stipulation 22 of settlement); Dkt. No. 1 at 4 (identifying Alcoa as Intalco’s parent company). 23 The United States’ claims arise from Intalco’s alleged violations of (1) Section 112 of the 24 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, and its implementing regulations, including applicable National 1 Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants under 40 C.F.R. Part 63, Subparts A and LL, 2 (2) the permit provisions of Title V of the CAA, its implementing regulations, and Washington’s 3 corresponding Title V operating permit program, and (3) the national ambient air quality 4 provisions of Title I of the CAA, including requirements under the Washington State

5 Implementation Plan. Dkt. No. 2 at 1; see also Dkt. No. 1 at 1–2, 4–11. Both Intalco and Alcoa 6 consent to the stipulation and neither oppose the United States’ motion. Dkt. No. 2 at 2. 7 In determining whether to enter a proposed consent decree,1 the Court must examine 8 whether the consent decree is procedurally and substantively fair, reasonable, in the public 9 interest, and consistent with the polices of the underlying statute. United States v. Aerojet Gen. 10 Corp., 606 F.3d 1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Sierra Club v. North Dakota, 868 F.3d 11 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017). Although the Court gives deference to the Government’s evaluation 12 of the proposal, see United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal., 50 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 13 1995); Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 130 (3d Cir. 2016) 14 (“[T]he government’s prosecution is entitled to great deference.”); Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v.

15 Cnty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cnty., 523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen presented with a 16 consent decree we must be particularly deferential to the agency’s expertise[.]”); Karr v. Hefner, 17 475 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Particularly when the EPA chooses to enforce the CWA 18 through a consent decree, failure to defer to its judgment can undermine agency strategy.”), the 19 Court cannot simply rubber stamp the parties’ proposed decree, Montrose Chem., 50 F.3d at 747. 20 The United States’ motion and proposed settlement agreement do not include the facts 21 necessary for the Court to evaluate the above-listed factors. For example, the United States does 22

23 1 “A consent decree is essentially a settlement agreement subject to continued judicial policing.” United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the United States asks the Court to maintain continuing jurisdiction to “interpret[] and enforc[e]” the parties’ agreement, Dkt. No. 2-1 24 at 6, so the Court refers to the proposed settlement as a consent decree. 1 not indicate whether it complied with or is otherwise excepted from the statutory and regulatory 2 notice-and-comment requirements, making it unclear whether the proposed settlement agreement 3 is procedurally fair. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g); 28 C.F.R. § 50.7(b).2 Nor can the Court assess 4 procedural fairness without information about the parties’ negotiations. See Oregon, 913 F.2d at

5 581 (a consent decree is presumptively valid if it was the product of “good faith, arms-length 6 negotiations”); In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig., 326 F.3d 201, 207 (3d Cir. 2003) 7 (Because “[p]rocedural fairness requires that settlement negotiations take place at arm’s length,” 8 a court should “look to the negotiation process and attempt to gauge its candor, openness and 9 bargaining balance.” (cleaned up)).3 10 For these reasons, the Court cannot adequately evaluate the proposed decree. The United 11 States’ motion is therefore DENIED without prejudice. The parties4 may file an amended motion 12 addressing the above-listed factors within 30 days of the date of this Order. 13 Dated this 19th day of August, 2024. A 14 Lauren King 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19

20 2 No notice appears to have been filed by the United States in the Federal Register regarding this stipulated settlement agreement. 21 3 With respect to substantive fairness, the Court notes that the factors listed in 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1)—the size of the business, the economic impact of the penalty on the business, the violator’s full compliance history and good 22 faith efforts to comply, the duration of the violation as established by any credible evidence (including evidence other than the applicable test method), payment by the violator of penalties previously assessed for the same violation, the economic benefit of noncompliance, and the seriousness of the violation—will inform its analysis. 23 4 The United States does not provide authority supporting this Court’s power to enter a consent decree against a non- appearing party outside the confines of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. Absent such authority, Intalco and Alcoa 24 must appear in the case.