United States v. Iesajaco

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: March 10, 2026
• Docket: Criminal No. 2020-0111
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES Criminal Action No. 20-111-1 (JDB) v. HUMBERTO IESAJACO-DIAZ, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

The Court sentenced Iesajaco-Diaz on July 28, 2021, to 44 months in prison for conspiracy

to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine, with credit for

the time served since his arrest on May 21, 2020. Judgment, Dkt. 32. He began supervised release

on November 10, 2023. Probation Pet. 1, Dkt. 49. Nearly six months later, Iesajaco-Diaz was

arrested and charged in Maryland state court with a hit and run resulting in death. Id. He pled

guilty to negligent manslaughter and the court sentenced him on December 18, 2024, to three years

in prison. Probation Mem., Dkt. 52.

Following his release from that incarceration, Iesajaco-Diaz is now before this Court again

because committing a state crime violates the terms of his supervised release for the federal drug

conviction. On March 13, 2026, the Court will hold a final hearing on revocation of supervised

release. See Min. Entry (Feb. 17, 2026). Ahead of that hearing, defense counsel has moved for

Iesajaco-Diaz’s release from custody under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). Mot. for Release, Dkt. 60.

The government opposes release. Gov’t’s Resp., Dkt. 62.

Section 3143(a)(1) requires pre-sentencing detention unless the Court “finds by clear and

convincing evidence” that the defendant is neither a flight risk nor poses a danger to the

community. In other words, detention is the “background rule” and the defendant bears the burden

1 of proving lack of flight risk or danger. United States v. Wiggins, 613 F. Supp. 3d 348, 353-54

(D.D.C. 2020). Courts consider the four factors set out in section 3142(g) in evaluating a pre-

sentencing motion for release: the (1) nature and circumstances of the offense, (2) weight of the

evidence, (3) history and characteristics of the defendant, and (4) nature and seriousness of the

danger to the community from release. Id. at 355.

In support of his motion, Iesajaco-Diaz argues that he does not pose a flight risk because

he has local family ties and a stable residence and because he complied with supervision before

the hit-and-run crime. Mot. for Release 3. He further contends that he does not pose a danger to

the community because the offense was an accident, there is no evidence of other criminal activity

while on supervised release, and he has mental health and medical challenges. Id. at 4. For its

part, the government highlights that Iesajaco-Diaz has other criminal convictions for violent or

drug offenses and is a deportable alien who previously reentered the country without permission.

Gov’t’s Resp. 2.

As to the nature and circumstances of the crime, Iesajaco-Diaz concedes that this violation

of supervised release—a hit and run resulting in death—is a “serious offense.” Mot. for Release

4. Although negligent manslaughter is not a “crime of violence” under the categorical approach

because it can be committed without the use of physical force, see United States v. Williams, 353

F. Supp. 3d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2019); cf. Delligatti v. United States, 604 U.S. 423 (2025) (holding

that knowingly or intentionally causing death necessarily involves the use of physical force), this

particular crime was violent.

Next, Iesajaco-Diaz also concedes that he committed the hit-and-run offense, Mot. for

Release 4, although the weight of the evidence “is the least important” factor, United States v.

Padilla, 538 F. Supp. 3d 32, 43 (D.D.C. 2021) (quotation omitted).

2 Iesajaco-Diaz’s history and characteristics further support detention. As the government

points out, Gov’t’s Resp. 2, he has other serious convictions, including for assault with a machete

and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, see Presentence Investigation Report ¶¶ 38-42,

Dkt. 29. And he committed the hit-and-run offense while on supervised release. See 18 U.S.C.

3142(g)(3)(B). Moreover, his risk of flight appears higher because he previously crossed the U.S.

border illegally following deportation, demonstrating his capacity to evade border authorities. Id.

¶ 41. The Court does not find that either his local family ties and stable residence or his mental

health and medical challenges adequately mitigate these risks. See Mot. for Release 3-4.

Finally, the Court observes in terms of danger to the community that, in addition to his

drug and assault convictions, Iesajaco-Diaz has numerous convictions and charges for driving

offenses, including for driving on a suspended license. Presentence Investigation Report ¶¶ 40,

42, 48, 51-52. The fact that Iesajaco-Diaz has repeatedly driven while not authorized to do so

highlights the danger to the community of releasing him before the final hearing on revocation of

supervised release for this hit-and-run offense. That the hit and run was not intentional does not

alleviate these dangers. See Mot. for Release 4.

Accordingly, all four section 3142(g) factors weigh in favor of detention, so the Court does

not find by clear and convincing evidence that Iesajaco-Diaz poses neither a flight risk nor danger

to the community.

***

Because defendant has not carried his burden under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1), the Court

DENIES [60] defendant’s motion for release from custody.

/s/ JOHN D. BATES United States District Judge Date: March 10, 2026