United States v. Ibrahimshah Shahulhameed

629 F. App'x 685
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedOctober 22, 2015
Docket14-5718
StatusUnpublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 629 F. App'x 685 (United States v. Ibrahimshah Shahulhameed) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Ibrahimshah Shahulhameed, 629 F. App'x 685 (6th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

BOGGS, Circuit Judge.

On the evening of August 23, 2012, Ibra-himshah Shahulhameed was fired from his job at GlobalSource IT as a contractor for *687 Toyota Motors. A few hours later, Toyota experienced a cyberattack that rendered several of its computer servers inoperable. Toyota’s investigation revealed that the attack came from Shahulhameed’s Toyota-owned laptop and Shahulhameed’s user account. An independent investigator and the FBI corroborated Toyota’s findings.

Shahulhameed was arrested and charged with “knowingly caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causing] damage ■without authorization, to a protected computer,” resulting in at least $5,000 of damage in a one-year period, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A), (c)(4)(B)®. After a five-day trial, a jury returned a guilty verdict. Shahulhameed appeals on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. After carefully considering the evidence, we affirm Sha-hulhameed’s conviction.

I

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must affirm the conviction if “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 308 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).

II

A

A reasonable jury could have found that Shahulhameed knowingly transmitted computer codes and commands to a protected computer. Dennis James Seibert, Jr., a specialist in Toyota’s information security department, testified that Shahulhameed’s password-protected user account (“ishah”) logged in to Toyota’s remote-access system on the following occasions:

Login Logout
Access # 1 August 23, 2012 11:56:04 PM August 24, 2012 1:55:26 AM
Access # 2 August 24, 2012 3:10:10 AM August 24,2012 4:20:07 AM
Access # 3 August 24, 2012 4:40:45 AM August 24, 2012 6:13:48 AM
Access # 4 August 24, 2012 6:26:07 AM August 24, 2012 6:55:09 AM

The IP address associated with these log ins, 10.235.0.150, matched the IP address of the Toyota-owned laptop issued to Sha-hulhameed for work. Logging in to the remote-access system from a Toyota-owned laptop using an assigned user name and password is the only way to access Toyota’s servers from outside of Toyota’s facilities.

That night, during those remote log-in sessions, Shahulhameed’s laptop accessed Toyota’s computer servers and transmitted codes and commands to them. Shahulha-meed’s laptop made changes to the configuration files for the ToyotaSupplier.com website, the eKanban system, the Long Lead Time Parts system, and the Oracle Business Intelligence system. A search of the Internet browsing history on Shahul-hameed’s laptop confirmed that his laptop accessed the servers. Because these changes came from Shahulhameed’s laptop and his password-protected user account, a reasonable jury could have found that Sha-hulhameed was behind them.

In addition, Toyota’s computer systems were “protected.” A “protected computer” is a computer “used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B). *688 Tom Cantrell, assistant manager at Toyota’s information systems technology department, testified that approximately 700 suppliers across the United States interact with Toyota through ToyotaSupplier.com, and that the above-mentioned computer systems are used by Toyota employees in states across the country. Based on the foregoing evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that Shahulhameed knowingly transmitted computer codes and commands to Toyota’s protected computer systems.

B

The evidence also shows that Shahulhameed acted without authorization. Authorization requires approval or sanction. See WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir.2012). Andrew Sell, a technical recruiter for GlobalSource IT, testified that he received a call on August 28, 2012, from Adi Gimpaunu, a GlobalSource contractor working for Toyota, stating that Shahulhameed had harassed Gimpaunu by demanding that Gimpaunu pay Shahulhameed a “finder’s fee,” or something to that effect. Managers at Toyota heard about the incident and called GlobalSource that evening, stating that one of the two contractors had to be removed. Sell called Shahulhameed on the evening of August 23, 2012, and “told him that the decision has been made that your project has been terminated, that you should have no contact with anyone at Toyota, [and] that you should not report to Toyota tomorrow morning, the next day.” Sell asked if Shahulhameed understood, and Shahulhameed said, “yes, okay.” Sell also sent Shahulhameed an email that same evening clarifying that he should not report to work the next day and that he should not have contact with anyone at Toyota. Shahulhameed testified that he received the e-mail and replied to it.

Shahulhameed argues that his access was authorized because Toyota did not disable his user account until at least eight hours after his conversation with Andrew Sell. But Toyota’s failure to disable his account does not mean that his access was authorized; the phone call and email from Sell are sufficient to establish a lack of authorization. Given the late hour — Sell e-mailed Shahulhameed around midnight — it is not surprising that Toyota waited until the next business day to disable his account. A reasonable jury could have found that Shahulhameed was not authorized to access Toyota’s computer systems.

C

Shahulhameed intentionally caused damage to Toyota’s computer systems. Dennis Seibert testified that the configuration changes traced to Shahulhameed’s laptop on the morning of August 24, 2012, included: (1) disabling load balancing between ToyotaSuppher.com servers, which prevented users from accessing the systems; (2) changing letters in connector names, which made it impossible for servers to communicate with each other, effectively shutting the servers down; and (3) adding unknown password requirements for access to administrative consoles, which made it impossible to use the consoles. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could discredit Shahulhameed’s claim of only trying to help Toyota close his projects or transition them to others.

The destructive nature of these changes betrays an intention to cause damage. Seibert testified that in his opinion, the changes were not consistent with a business purpose. Some of the changes were minute and difficult to detect without a specialized tool.

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Bluebook (online)
629 F. App'x 685, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-ibrahimshah-shahulhameed-ca6-2015.