United States v. Hulick

2012 DNH 014

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: January 18, 2012
• Docket: 08-CV-499-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States v . Hulick 08-CV-499-SM 1/18/12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America, Plaintiff

v. Case N o . 08-cv-499-SM Opinion N o . 2012 DNH 014 David M . Hulick and Caroline P. Hulick, Defendants/ Counterclaim Plaintiffs

and

State of New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, Defendant/ Counterclaim Plaintiff

O R D E R

By order dated December 7 , 2011, the court denied cross-

motions for summary judgment filed by the Hulicks and the

Internal Revenue Service, concluding that the existence of

genuinely disputed material facts precludes the entry of judgment

as a matter of law in favor of either party. The Hulicks seek

clarification of that order, raising two points.

First, David Hulick says that his deposition testimony

establishes that he “had nothing to do with Maine Aviation at any

point in time,” and the government did not attempt to contradict

that fact with admissible evidence. Therefore, he argues, he

cannot be found to be a “responsible person” with respect to Maine Aviation given the undisputed fact that he played no role

in the company. Motion for Clarification (document n o . 81) at 2

(quoting Hulick deposition (document n o . 48-4) at 1 2 ) .

Consequently, he cannot be held legally responsible for the Trust

Fund Recovery Penalty (“TFRP”) related to Maine Aviation that was

assessed against him. Second, the Hulicks say the court erred by

failing to “rule upon the Hulicks’ (unopposed) summary judgment

motion as to the [New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security]

claim.” Motion for Clarification at 3 .

Discussion

As discussed more fully in the court’s prior order, the

Internal Revenue Service determined that Hulick was a

“responsible person” with respect to seven related companies

associated with the Manchester-Boston Regional Airport: Aviation

Jet Services; Inflight Service, Inc.; Aviation Jet Services-

Manchester; Jet Ground Support Services, Inc.; Precision

Turbines, Inc.; Precision Aviation; and Northeast Express

Regional Airlines. The IRS also concluded that he was a

responsible person with respect to one aviation-related company

associated with the airport in Portland, Maine: Maine Aviation

Corporation. Accordingly, the IRS looked to Hulick, personally,

for payment of taxes and F.I.C.A. contributions that had been

withheld by those companies from employees’ paychecks, but never

2 remitted to the IRS. In other words, the government claims

Hulick is liable for TFRPs relating to those eight companies.

See generally 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a).

At this juncture - particularly in light of Hulick’s motion

for clarification - it should probably be noted that neither

Hulick nor the IRS has clearly described Hulick’s (alleged) role

with respect to each of the eight individual companies. The

parties - the government in particular - tend to avoid precision,

preferring instead to employ gross generalities, referring to

various companies collectively as the “Airline Companies” or the

“Jet Companies.” See, e.g., United States’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (document n o . 50) at 1-2; United States’ Memorandum

(document n o . 50-1) at 3 ; Hulicks’ Memorandum in Opposition

(document n o . 57-2) at 1 3 . More importantly, however, the

government has never identified which assessments related to the

eight companies it actually seeks to recover in this litigation.

Its pleadings and memoranda group the companies together as if

they were a single entity. See, e.g., Complaint (document n o . 1 )

at 2-3. While the government says Hulick is liable for distinct

TFRPs relating to each of the eight companies, its complaint is

ambiguous in that it does not describe Hulick’s liability-

generating activity on a company by company basis.

3 I. The Specific Claims Pending Against M r . Hulick.

It is time to clarify precisely what is sought in this

litigation. The government’s complaint is not clear and its

various memoranda needlessly blur and confuse what should be a

fairly straight-forward case.

Careful reading of the complaint, and consideration of the

record evidence (particularly the various notices of assessment

the IRS issued to Hulick), discloses that the government seeks a

judgment that Hulick is liable for two Trust Fund Recovery

Penalty assessments - one relating to Precision Valley Aviation

and one relating to Maine Aviation Corporation. Parenthetically,

the court notes that the government thinks its complaint asserts

claims relating to all eight companies (the one in Maine, and the

seven in Manchester). See, e.g., Government’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (document n o . 50) at 1-2 (seeking a judgment that “David

H . Hulick be deemed a responsible person of the seven aviation-

related companies associated with the Manchester, New Hampshire

International Airport.”) (emphasis supplied).

A. Maine Aviation Corp.

The first assessment at issue in this case was made on March

1 7 , 1997, in the amount of $28,375.19. See Complaint at 2-3,

para. 6. As the government correctly notes, that assessment

4 relates exclusively to Maine Aviation Corporation. See Complaint

at 3 , n . 4 . See also Exhibit 11 to Hulick Affidavit (document

n o . 48-26) (IRS notice of assessment of TFRP against Hulick for

Maine Aviation Corporation in the amount of $28,375.19 - that i s ,

the precise amount of the second of two assessments specified in

paragraph 6 of the government’s complaint).

B. Precision Valley Aviation.

The second assessment at issue in this litigation is for the

tax periods ending on June 3 0 , 1994, in the amount of

$485,713.43. Complaint at 2-3, para. 6. The government says

that particular assessment “relate[s] to the seven Manchester,

New Hampshire International Airport companies.” Complaint at 3 ,

n.3. That statement seems incorrect (and the government’s

adherence to that view is likely the major source of confusion in

this litigation). Instead, that assessment relates exclusively

to Precision Valley Aviation, Inc. See, e.g., Exhibit 4 to

Hulick Affidavit (document n o . 48-19) (IRS notice of assessment

of TFRP for tax period ending June 3 0 , 1994, against Hulick for

Precision Valley Aviation in the amount of $485,713 - that i s ,

the precise amount of the first of two assessments specified in

paragraph 6 of the government’s complaint). Compare Government’s

Response to Hulick’s Interrogatories (document n o . 48-35)

(confirming that the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty for the tax

5 quarters ending June 3 0 , 1994, and for which Hulick is allegedly

responsible is $485,713), with Declaration of IRS Agent Rai

Shepardson (document n o . 50-3) at para. 3 (stating that the total

assessment for all seven companies associated with the Manchester

airport is $873,125.80 - i.e., substantially more than the figure

identified in the government’s complaint).

In his memorandum in support of summary judgment, Hulick

points out the government’s mistaken understanding of precisely

what its complaint alleges and, therefore, what is at issue in

this litigation:

Though the Complaint purports to rest on M r . Hulick’s activities with respect to eight separate companies (the two airlines, five of the Jet Companies, and Maine Aviation Corporation), the United States actually seeks relief with respect to only two separate assessments: (1) an assessment on February 3 , 1997 for $485,713.43, and (2) an assessment on March 1 7 , 1997 for $28,375.19.

Id. (document n o . 48-1) at 2 1 , para. 116 (emphasis in

original)(citations omitted). In its response to that specific

assertion, the government did not dispute that the complaint

identifies only those two assessments:

The United States does not dispute that it appears that the only companies Hulick was formally assessed for are Precision Valley on February 3 , 1997 for $485,713.43, and the Maine Aviation Company [sic] on March 1 7 , 1997 for $28,375.19. The United States further notes that Hulick admits that his primary responsibility with the Airline Companies was with Precision Valley, whose

6 outstanding tax assessment as of August 1 0 , 2011, totals $2,360,024.75.

Government’s Response to Defendants’ Statement of Facts (document

n o . 58-2) at 34 (citations omitted). The only plausible reading

of that response is that the government admits that it has only

sued Hulick to recover TFRPs for Precision Valley and Maine

Aviation.1 In short, while the government continues to argue

about Hulick’s alleged liability with respect to all seven of the

Manchester-based companies, the complaint only seeks judgment

with regard to one of them: Precision Valley Aviation. The

government has conceded that point.

Consequently, as to Hulick’s alleged liability for TFRPs,

the only issues presented in this case are: (1) whether Hulick is

a responsible person with respect to Precision Valley Aviation

for the tax periods ending June 3 0 , 1994; and (2) whether he is a

responsible person with respect to Maine Aviation Corporation,

for the tax periods ending September 3 0 , 1994.

1 The court will not ascribe any intent to engage in sharp practice to the government because it employed the limiting phrase “it appears.” The government plainly meant to concede the point.

7 II. Trust Fund Recovery Penalties for Maine Aviation Corp.

Turning to the Hulicks’ motion for clarification, the IRS’s

position is one of indifference. It has neither objected nor

otherwise responded to the motion, and so does not dispute their

claim that M r . Hulick was not involved “in any way” with Maine

Aviation. See, also, United States’ Opposition to Defendants’

Statement of Facts (document n o . 58-2) at 29-30 (in response to

Hulick’s assertion that he “had nothing to do with Maine Aviation

at any point in time,” the government stated that “This fact is

not material, as there is not a genuine issue of fact to be tried

as to this assertion.”).

Given that the IRS remains mute,2 and given its earlier

response to Hulick’s factual claims about his lack of involvement

with Maine Aviation, the court accepts as undisputed that Hulick

had no relationship with Maine Aviation. Accordingly, he cannot

be found to be a “responsible person” as to that company, and so

cannot be held liable for the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty

assessed against him related to that company’s failure to remit

withheld taxes. On that specific claim, then, Hulick is entitled

to entry of judgment as a matter of law.

2 Having failed to file any timely response to Hulick’s motion for clarification, the IRS is deemed to have waived any objection to the relief he seeks. See Local Rule 7.1(b).

8 III. The Hulicks’ Alleged Claim Against the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (“NHDES”).

Next, the Hulicks “seek clarification as to their unopposed

motion for summary judgment on [NHDES’s] claim.” Motion for

Clarification (document n o . 81) at 3 . The Hulicks go on to

assert that, “As set forth above and in the Hulicks’ summary

judgment motion, the [NHDES’s] claim fails as a matter of law,

and summary judgment is appropriate, because the undisputed

factual record demonstrates that [NHDES] is time-barred from

enforcing its lien.” Id.

The United States initiated this action by filing suit

against David and Caroline Hulick, seeking to recover TFRPs for

which M r . Hulick is allegedly responsible and to foreclose its

lien on property in which both Hulicks have an interest - their

family home. The government also named as a defendant the New

Hampshire Department of Employment Security because i t , too,

claims an interest in (i.e., has a lien upon) that same property.

See generally Complaint (document n o . 1 ) . The NHDES answered the

complaint and filed a counterclaim against the United States,

asserting that its own lien on the subject property is superior

to the United States’ tax lien. Answer and Counterclaim

(document n o . 7 ) . The Hulicks answered the IRS’s complaint

against them and also filed counterclaims against the United

States. Amended Answer and Counterclaims (document n o . 3 3 ) .

9 Importantly, however, the Hulicks did not file any cross-claims

against the co-defendant, the NHDES. Nor did the NHDES file any

cross-claims against the Hulicks.

S o , while the Hulicks’ earlier references to the alleged

unenforceability of the NHDES’s lien and their claimed

entitlement to “summary judgment” on all “claims” asserted by

NHDES against them were curious, there was no need to address

them. But, in light of the pending motion, clarification is

probably appropriate: The NHDES has asserted no legal claims

against the Hulicks; the Hulicks have asserted no legal claims

against the NHDES. Because the NHDES has no claim pending

against the Hulicks and the Hulicks have no claim pending against

the NHDES, summary judgment in favor of or against the Hulicks is

not an issue. The Hulicks are not entitled to “summary judgment”

on their general assertions in legal memoranda, untethered to an

actual claim, that the NHDES’s lien against their home is invalid

and/or otherwise unenforceable.

Conclusion

The Hulicks’ motion for clarification (document n o . 81) is

granted in part.

10 The government does not dispute Hulick’s assertion that he cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as a responsible person with regard to Maine Aviation. Hulick is, then, entitled to summary judgment on the government’s claim that he is liable for Trust Fund Recovery Penalties relating to that company.

Because Hulick is entitled to summary judgment on the government’s claim that he is liable for the TFRP assessment for Maine Aviation, the only assessment that remains at issue in this case is the one levied on February 3, 1997, in the amount of $485,713.43, relating to Precision Valley Aviation, Inc., for the tax periods ending June 30, 1994. Accordingly, the issues to be resolved at trial will focus on the nature and scope of Hulick’s role at Precision Aviation and whether he is a “responsible person” as to that company, under 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a).

The Hulicks’ assertion that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security’s “claim” against them is plainly incorrect given that the NHDES has asserted no claims against them.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe' /District Judge January 18, 2012

11 cc: Andrea A . Kafka, Esq. Patrick B . Gushue, Esq. Daniel E . Will, Esq. Joshua M . Wyatt, Esq. Richard J. Lavers, Jr., Esq.