United States v. Hugo Espinosa Chavez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: February 5, 2025
• Docket: 22-13769
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 22-13769 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 02/05/2025 Page: 1 of 3

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13769 ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus HUGO ESPINOSA CHAVEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00322-SDM-SPF-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 22-13769 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 02/05/2025 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 22-13769

Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Hugo Espinosa Chavez pled guilty to three offenses: produc- tion of child pornography, possession of child pornography, and travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) & (e), 2252(a)(4)(B), & 2423(b). The district court sen- tenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. On appeal, Mr. Espinosa Chavez contends that the district court erred by including in its judgment 13 standard conditions of supervised release that were purportedly not orally pronounced at the sentencing hearing. He also asserts that the district court did not have sufficient basis to impose those 13 conditions. We affirm. Mr. Espinosa Chavez’s first argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832, 837-39 (11th Cir. 2024). In Hayden we rejected a virtually identical claim in a case arising out of the Middle District of Florida. As for the second argument, the 13 standard conditions match those set out in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c). Of the 13 conditions, the only one Mr. Espinosa Chavez specifically challenges in his brief is the prohibition on owning, possessing, or having access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon. See Appellant’s Br. at 13. That prohibition, set out in § 5D1.3(c)(10), is a standard condition that is “presumed suitable in all cases.” See United States v. Asuncion v. Pimental, 290 F.3d 91, 94 (2nd Cir. 2002); United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 937 (5th Cir. 2003). See USCA11 Case: 22-13769 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 02/05/2025 Page: 3 of 3

22-13769 Opinion of the Court 3

also § 5D1.3(c) (“The following ‘standard’ conditions are recom- mended for supervised release. Several of the conditions are expan- sions of the conditions required by statute[.]”). “Nothing . . . requires a district court to make two separate explanations – one for the term of imprisonment and one for the term of supervised release.” United States v. Hamilton, 66 F.4th 1267,1275 (11th Cir. 2023). Moreover, we “have not held that the district court must articulate how each standard condition of su- pervised release is related to the sentencing factors, and the rele- vant statute and sentencing guideline impose no such require- ment.” United States v. Smith, 2024 WL 522 0968, at * 1 (11th Cir. Dec. 26, 2024). A district court “satisfies its obligation if the record estab- lishes that it has ‘considered the parties’ arguments and has a rea- soned basis for its sentencing decision,” id., and we are satisfied that the record here does that. The district court said it had considered the parties’ arguments, the Sentencing Guidelines, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the nature of the offenses (which it deemed serious) and Mr. Espinosa Chavez’s personal history and characteristics. Indeed, it discussed these matters over a number of pages. See Sent. Hearing Transcript at 36-46. We therefore re- ject the contention that the district court failed to sufficiently ex- plain its imposition of the standard condition set out in § 5D1.3(c)(10). AFFIRMED.