United States v. Huerta

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 25-1050
• Status: Published

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-1050 Document: 54 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 29, 2025 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 25-1050

NOAH HUERTA,

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:24-CR-00030-PAB-1) _________________________________

Dean Sanderford, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public Defender, with him on the Briefs), Office of the Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Craig Fansler, Assistant United States Attorney (Peter McNeilly, United States Attorney, Jess D. Mekeel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on the Brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff- Appellee. _________________________________

Before MATHESON, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

KELLY, Circuit Judge. _________________________________

Defendant-Appellant Noah Huerta entered a conditional plea of guilty to being

a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition, reserving the right to appeal the

district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and motion to suppress. 18 U.S.C. Appellate Case: 25-1050 Document: 54 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 2

§ 922(g)(1); I R. 9–22, 54–67, 102; III R. 5–6, 164–83. Exercising jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, but

reverse the denial of the motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.

Background

A. The Stop and Patdown of Mr. Huerta

On June 26, 2023, at around 4:20 a.m., a shooting occurred at a convenience

store in Denver, Colorado. III R. 105. Police identified a suspect, described as “a

light-skinned Black male who is bald with a thick beard and muscular build[.]” Id.

A security camera captured a photo of the suspect. I R. 30; III R. 106. Police located

the suspect’s vehicle, a black Ford Expedition, several hours later. III R. 23, 108–10,

114. The vehicle was unoccupied and parked on the street outside of an apartment

complex several miles from the shooting location. Id. at 23, 106–13. Members of

the Denver Police Department, including Detective Shurley, surveilled the vehicle

while uniformed officers waited nearby. Id. at 11–13, 24. The officers received an

email with the photo of the suspect. Id. at 25; I Suppl. R. 5.

At around 4:30 p.m., Detective Shurley observed a black sedan pulling up and

parking directly behind the Expedition. I R. 31; Ex. Z at 45:31–45:37. He radioed

that two Black females and “a [B]lack male [in] a white T-shirt, white hat [and] red

pants” exited the black sedan and “milled around a little bit” before entering the

complex. Ex. Z at 46:02–46:19, 46:40–46:46, 49:27–49:32. Shortly thereafter, the

group exited the complex and got into a white Dodge Durango SUV parked behind

the black sedan. Id. at 49:32–49:41, 53:32–53:44. Detective Shurley instructed the

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officers to “stop [the Durango] out of the area just to be on the safe side” because of

the “proximity of the target vehicle” and the fact that the Black male was “somewhat

similar in appearance” to the shooting suspect. Id. at 50:08–50:26.

Nearby officers saw the Durango pull up to a pump at a gas station. III R. 13,

40. They noticed that the Durango had expired license plates and decided to stop it.

Id. at 16. Officers Stuper and Parker pulled up behind the Durango in a marked

police car, but did not have their emergency lights or siren activated. Id. at 48–49,

52–53. The officers watched as the Durango’s driver and front seat passenger exited

the vehicle and walked toward the gas station’s convenience store. Id. at 49–50.

Less than thirty seconds later, Sergeant Lombardi and Officer Espinosa arrived

at the gas station in a marked car with its lights, but not siren, activated, and parked

directly next to the other police car. Id. at 16, 72–73; Ex. G at 00:00–00:40. By the

time they arrived, the Durango’s driver and front seat passenger were near the doors

of the convenience store. III R. 84; Ex. G at 00:35–00:47; Ex. 2 at 00:34–00:42. All

four officers then exited their vehicles. III R. 83. Sergeant Lombardi approached the

two near the store: the Durango’s driver, Ashleigh Hampton, and the front passenger,

Donta Marshall, Ms. Hampton’s husband. Id. at 84, 86; Ex. G at 03:07–03:10. Mr.

Marshall, a Black male, wore clothes matching Detective Shurley’s description and

was thought to be the one who looked “somewhat similar” to the suspected shooter.

III R. 49, 85–86; Ex. G at 03:02. But Mr. Marshall was not light skinned or bald, did

not have a “thick beard,” and had a tattoo on his face. III R. 52, 88; Ex. G at 03:02.

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Meanwhile, Officer Parker approached the back left door of the Durango as a

female, Crystal Gordon, exited. III R. 74; Ex. F at 00:25–02:12. As Officer Stuper

exited his vehicle, the back right door of the Durango opened. Ex. H at 00:19–00:32.

Due to the tint on the vehicle’s windows, he only then realized there was a fourth

occupant. III R. 17, 73–74. Officer Stuper immediately approached the Durango.

Ex. H at 00:19–00:32. While doing so, Mr. Huerta began to exit the vehicle with his

left hand somewhat near his waistband. III R. 17–18, 57; Ex. H at 00:25–00:34.

Officer Stuper instructed, “don’t reach for anything” and placed his hands on Mr.

Huerta’s shoulder and wrist as he exited the car. Ex. H at 00:32–00:36

Officer Stuper turned Mr. Huerta around, held his arms behind his back, and

placed handcuffs on him, with Officer Espinosa assisting. Id. at 00:39–00:55. Mr.

Huerta asked what was going on, but the officers told him to relax. Id. Officer

Stuper testified that Mr. Huerta tensed up and “started to turn his body, both left,

right and kind of lean towards the car.” III R. 20. Officer Espinosa similarly

testified that Mr. Huerta was “squirmish,” and that he tried to “cant his body away.”

Id. at 75–76. According to him, Mr. Huerta appeared not to be listening to the

officers’ commands. Id. at 76.

The officers saw that Mr. Huerta “had a pouch attached to his belt loop,” with

the pouch tucked into Mr. Huerta’s back right pocket. 1 Id. at 21. Officer Espinosa

1 The record is unclear as to when exactly the officers noticed the pouch. According to a police report, Officer Stuper observed a “bulge” in Mr. Huerta’s back right pocket and the pouch itself. I R. 32. However, he testified that he did not see the bulge as Mr. Huerta was exiting the car. III R. 20–21. In the body camera video, 4 Appellate Case: 25-1050 Document: 54 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 5

felt the exterior of the pocket and determined that there was a firearm magazine

inside. Id.; Ex. H at 01:04–01:25. The officers removed the pouch and severed it

from the belt loop. Ex. H at 01:34–01:56. Officer Espinosa asked Mr. Huerta if he

had a gun, which Mr. Huerta denied. Id. The officers patted down Mr. Huerta but

did not find a firearm. Id. at 02:00–02:15. Officer Stuper placed Mr. Huerta in the

back of his police vehicle because Mr. Huerta was “all over the place.” Id. at 02:53–

03:33.

Officer Stuper conducted name clearances on Mr. Huerta and Mr. Marshall

and saw that they both had violent felony convictions. I R. 33, 36–37. Meanwhile,

Officer Espinosa asked the driver, Ms. Hampton, for consent to search her vehicle.

III R. 78–79. Ms. Hampton consented, and Officer Espinosa found a nine-millimeter

handgun in the vehicle near Mr. Huerta’s seat. Id. The magazine found on Mr.

Huerta fit the recovered handgun. I R. 32.

B. Procedural Background

Mr. Huerta moved to suppress evidence of the magazine and firearm obtained

from the search, arguing that the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion that he was

armed and dangerous to justify the patdown that yielded the magazine. Id. at 9–22.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing and ruled from the bench. III R. 4–185.

The court decided that the totality of the circumstances established reasonable

suspicion that Mr. Huerta was armed and dangerous, justifying the patdown and

the pouch does not appear to be visible until after he turns Mr. Huerta around to physically restrain him. Ex. H at 00:25–00:45; Ex. G at 00:54–1:40. 5 Appellate Case: 25-1050 Document: 54 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 6

recovery of the magazine. Id. at 180–81. Though not raised or argued, the court also

ruled that even if the patdown was illegal, the firearm would have been inevitably

discovered as “the perfect circumstances for a protective sweep” existed. 2 Id. at 181–

82.

Mr. Huerta also moved, for preservation purposes, to dismiss the indictment,

arguing the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional under New York State

Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). I R. 54–67. The court denied

the motion. III R. 5–6, 182–83. Mr. Huerta now appeals from both denials to this

court. 3

Discussion

Mr. Huerta raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court

erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police lacked reasonable

suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. Aplt. Br. at 12. Second, he argues, for

preservation purposes, that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss

Although the district court did not explicitly mention the inevitable discovery 2

doctrine, the parties agree that this was such a ruling. Aplt. Br. at 26; Aplee. Br. at 35.

Mr. Huerta also moved, for preservation purposes, to dismiss the indictment 3

because the felon-in-possession statute is an alleged unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. I R. 48–52. The district court denied his motion, but he does not now appeal from that denial to this court. III R. 5–6. 6 Appellate Case: 25-1050 Document: 54 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 7

the indictment because § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to

him. Id. at 14.

A. Motion to Suppress

“When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the government, accept the district court’s finding of fact

unless clearly erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate determination of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Canada, 76 F.4th

1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 556 (2024) (quoting United

States v. Windom, 863 F.3d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 2017)). Mr. Huerta does not

contest the validity of the stop based on the Durango’s expired plates. See Aplt. Br.

at 12–14; III R. 174. Rather, he argues that the district court erred by (1) finding

there was reasonable suspicion to justify the patdown of Mr. Huerta and (2) holding

that the firearm would have been recovered under the inevitable discovery doctrine.

Aplt. Br. at 12–14.

For its part, the government argues that the patdown was supported by

reasonable suspicion that Mr. Huerta was armed and dangerous based on information

that the shooting suspect may have been in the Durango. Aplee. Br. at 17. The

government relies upon other factors to bolster its conclusion, including the

movements of the Durango’s occupants away from the vehicle, Mr. Huerta’s

movements and response to the officers, the location of the stop, and the officers’

original perception that only three, rather than four, persons occupied the Durango.

Id. at 17–22. The government also dismisses Mr. Huerta’s arguments as a divide and

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conquer strategy rather than an analysis based upon the totality of the circumstances.

Id. at 22–35. Finally, the government argues that the inevitable discovery doctrine

would apply based upon Mr. Huerta’s movements, Mr. Marshall’s distancing himself

from the Durango, and the criminal records of the occupants. Id. at 35–38. Mr.

Huerta has the better of the argument.

1. Reasonable Suspicion

Although the Fourth Amendment prohibits unlawful searches and seizures,

U.S. Const. amend. IV, an officer may conduct an investigatory stop, or “Terry stop,”

if he “has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity

‘may be afoot,’” United States v. Samilton, 56 F.4th 820, 827 (10th Cir. 2022)

(quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,

21 (1968). During a lawful stop, “an officer may conduct a limited protective search

(‘frisk’) if the officer harbors an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person

is armed and dangerous.” United States v. Hammond, 890 F.3d 901, 905 (10th Cir.

2018) (quoting United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1468 (10th Cir. 1996)). This

principle also applies during a valid traffic stop, thereby allowing an officer to order

all passengers out of the vehicle and then frisk a passenger provided there is

reasonable suspicion that the passenger is armed and dangerous. United States v.

Gurule, 935 F.3d 878, 885 (10th Cir. 2019).

Reasonable suspicion is “based on the totality of the circumstances, taking into

account an officer’s reasonable inferences based on training, experience, and

common sense.” United States v. Garcia, 751 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2014)

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(quoting United States v. Rice, 483 F.3d 1079, 1083 (10th Cir. 2007)). “We evaluate

each factor alleged to support an inference of reasonable suspicion separately and in

the aggregate.” Gurule, 935 F.3d at 885.

The primary purpose of a frisk is for officer safety. Id. Accordingly, we have

recognized that “the officer-safety rationale can overcome even ‘limited specific

information leading law enforcement to believe that an individual was armed or

dangerous.’” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Garcia, 751 F.3d at 1142). Still,

while the reasonableness standard is not onerous, it requires “more than an ‘inchoate

and unparticularized suspicion or hunch[.]’” Samilton, 56 F.4th at 827 (quoting

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)).

The district court found reasonable suspicion for the frisk based on the totality

of the circumstances, namely (1) the fact that officers had information that the

suspected shooter was in the Durango; (2) the fact that Mr. Marshall and Ms.

Hampton attempted to move away, or “separate” themselves, from the vehicle,

suggesting the presence of contraband, such as a firearm; and (3) the fact that Mr.

Huerta was “moving around” while the officers physically restrained him. III R.

180–81. We address these and other factors below.

a. The Suspected Shooter’s Presence in the Vehicle

A significant factor in this appeal is whether the officers reasonably suspected

that Mr. Marshall was the shooting suspect. Oral Arg. at 03:12–03:41. In the

absence of such reasonable suspicion, the officers would not have reasonably

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believed that there was a firearm in the Durango and consequently that Mr. Huerta

may have been armed and dangerous.

That belief was based on Detective Shurley’s instructions to the officers to

“stop this car out of the area just to be on the safe side” because of the “proximity of

the target vehicle” and the fact that Mr. Marshall was “somewhat similar in

appearance” to the suspected shooter. Ex. Z at 50:08–50:26. Mr. Huerta argues that

the detective’s statements amounted to nothing more than a “hunch” and therefore

did not give the officers reasonable suspicion to conclude Mr. Huerta was armed and

dangerous. Aplt. Br. at 16–20. He specifically argues these statements indicated that

Detective Shurley did not think that Mr. Marshall was the shooting suspect,

contending that the phrase “just to be on the safe side” is a phrase that one uses to

“rule out an unlikely possibility,” and that the phrase “somewhat similar” suggests

that there are both similarities and differences. Id. at 16–17. The government

contends that Mr. Huerta merely engages in “semantics.” Aplee. Br. at 23–26.

“Mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity

creates neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion.” Poolaw v. Marcantel, 565

F.3d 721, 737 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation modified); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444

U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (“The ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a

frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to

be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized

narcotics search is taking place.”). Any potential connection the group had to the

target vehicle was attenuated at best. After all, they arrived at and departed from the

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apartment complex in completely different cars than the Expedition. And Detective

Shurley’s broadcast gave no indication that the group was associated with the suspect

or the Expedition or interacted with the car in any way. That they merely parked

behind the target vehicle at an apartment complex in the daytime nearly twelve hours

after the shooting is not the sort of articulable and particularized suspicion required

to conclude that Mr. Marshall was the shooting suspect, or that Mr. Huerta was

armed and dangerous. Samilton, 56 F.4th at 827.

Nor does the mere fact that Mr. Marshall shared some basic similarities with

the suspect support this conclusion. See United States v. Jones, 998 F.2d 883, 885

(10th Cir. 1993) (finding no reasonable suspicion where officers stopped two Black

men in a black Mercedes solely based on a report that there were two armed Black

men in a black Mercedes in the area). Of course, both were Black men with facial

hair. But the shooting suspect was described as a “light-skinned Black male who is

bald with a thick beard and muscular build[.]” III R. 25, 105. In contrast, Mr.

Marshall was not bald, did not have a full beard, sported a notable tattoo on his face,

and was not light skinned. Id. at 51–52, 86–88. True, Mr. Marshall was wearing a

hat at the time, and the photo was perhaps “grainy,” as the government argues. Id. at

49, 85–86; Aplee. Br. at 28. But even a brief comparison of the photo of the suspect

— which the officers, including Detective Shurley, received — and Mr. Marshall

shows no resemblance between the two. I R. 30; I Suppl. R. 5; Ex. G at 03:02.

Detective Shurley’s instruction to the officers to pull over the Durango “just to

be on the safe side” underscores the lack of any reasonable suspicion that the

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shooting suspect was in that vehicle. See United States v. De La Cruz, 703 F.3d

1193, 1197–98 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding no reasonable suspicion to extend a stop

“just to be safe” because the officer “wasn’t a hundred percent sure” the defendant

was not the suspect). True, Officers Espinosa and Stuper testified that they heard

Detective Shurley’s message and interpreted it to mean that “the subject was possibly

inside [the] Durango[.]” III R. 13, 85–86. But “[t]he existence of reasonable

suspicion . . . is measured from the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer,

not from the subjective perspective of the particular officer on scene.” De La Cruz,

703 F.3d at 1197. And while we “defer to all reasonable inferences made by law

enforcement officers in light of their knowledge and professional experience

distinguishing between innocent and suspicious actions,” Gurule, 935 F.3d at 885

(quoting United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015)), that

deference is “not unlimited,” United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th

Cir. 2010). Indeed, “deference becomes inappropriate ‘when an officer relies on a

circumstance incorrigibly free of associations with criminal activity.’” United States

v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Santos, 403

F.3d 1120, 1133 (10th Cir. 2005)).

The district court described Detective Shurley’s broadcast as “rather tepid,”

and we agree. III R. 143. Perhaps, in other circumstances, his communications could

be enough to support the conclusion that Mr. Marshall was the shooting suspect. But

here, that possibility was based on nothing more than “an ‘inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion or hunch[.]’” Samilton, 56 F.4th at 827 (quoting White,

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496 U.S. at 329). Detective Shurley communicated his “hunch” to the officers,

which they then relied upon to believe Mr. Marshall was the shooting suspect. 4

Accordingly, even considering the attendant circumstances separately and in the

aggregate, reasonable suspicion is lacking to believe that Mr. Marshall was the

shooting suspect, let alone armed and dangerous. 5

b. The Passengers’ Decision to Exit the Vehicle

The district court also found reasonable suspicion based on Mr. Marshall’s and

Ms. Hampton’s decision to exit the vehicle. III R. 180. Officers Stuper and Espinosa

4 We are similarly unpersuaded by the government’s contention that our mistake-of-fact line of cases supports a finding of reasonable suspicion here. Oral Arg. at 18:06–18:41, 28:27–29:46; Aplee. R. 28(j) Letter at 1–2. The government points to United States v. Jacquez and United States v. Walraven, holding that mistaken information could support a finding of reasonable suspicion. 284 F. App’x 544, 547–48 (10th Cir. 2008); 892 F.2d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1989). To do so, the officers relying on such information must have acted reasonably under the circumstances and not on a mere hunch. Jacquez, 284 F. App’x at 547–48; see Walraven, 892 F.2d at 975. But as we have explained, Detective Shurley communicated exactly that — a mere hunch — which the officers then unreasonably relied upon to believe that Mr. Marshall was the shooting suspect. Aplt. Resp. to R. 28(j) Letter at 1 (“[T]he problem in this case is not that the detective gave the officers incorrect information. The problem is that the information he provided did not give the officers reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was the suspect.”). 5 As we observed at oral argument, although Mr. Huerta does not argue it, we think that the information the officers themselves had at the time they made the stop further weighs against a finding that they had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was the shooting suspect. Oral Arg. at 06:02–07:37. Officer Stuper testified that he heard Detective Shurley’s communications about the group arriving at and leaving the complex, meaning that he was aware of the attenuated connection between the Durango and the shooting suspect. III R. 27, 29–32, 34–36. Additionally, the officers had a photo of the shooting suspect, meaning they could have easily concluded upon arriving at the gas station that Mr. Marshall was not the suspect. Id. at 25–26, 86–88; I Suppl. R. 5. 13 Appellate Case: 25-1050 Document: 54 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 14

testified that, based on their training and experience, such actions were an attempt to

“separate” themselves from the car, suggesting the presence of possible contraband

and raising safety concerns for the officers. Id. at 16–17, 73. The district court

accordingly found that Mr. Marshall’s and Ms. Hampton’s actions were “red flags,”

as “they were not acting the way that people typically do . . . when they are stopped,”

and that their actions were an attempt to “distance themselves” from something

“potentially . . . illegal” inside. Id. at 179–80.

Mr. Huerta argues that “it was unreasonable” for the officers to reach this

conclusion because it was entirely innocent for the vehicle’s occupants to enter the

convenience store to make a purchase or use the restroom. Aplt. Br. at 20–22. He

argues that this is especially true here, where only the second police car had its lights

activated, and it arrived once Ms. Hampton and Mr. Marshall were close to the door

of the store. Id. at 21. We agree.

It may well be suspicious for a motorist to walk away from his or her vehicle

during an ordinary traffic stop. But this was not such a stop. When Officer Stuper

and Officer Parker pulled into the gas station behind the Durango, they did not have

their lights or sirens activated. III R. 48–49, 53. It was only several moments later,

when Officer Espinosa and Sergeant Lombardi arrived with their lights activated,

exited their car, and ordered Mr. Marshall and Ms. Hampton to stop that the officers

displayed any real show of authority. Id. at 16, 72–73; Ex. G at 00:25–00:40. But by

then, Mr. Marshall and Ms. Hampton had already exited the car and were

approaching the entrance of the gas station’s convenience store at a normal pace. III

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R. 84; Ex. G at 00:32–00:40; Ex. 2 at 00:34–00:37. Upon being asked to stop, they

immediately complied with the officers’ instructions. Ex. 2 at 00:37–01:10. In short,

nothing suggests that Mr. Marshall or Ms. Hampton believed that they had been

pulled over when they exited the vehicle. And under the circumstances, an

“objectively reasonable officer” would not have found it unusual that Mr. Marshall

and Ms. Hampton did what thousands of people do every day upon arriving at a gas

station — exit their vehicle and walk toward the station’s convenience store. De La

Cruz, 703 F.3d at 1197. For similar reasons, we are not persuaded by the

government’s contention that Mr. Huerta’s and Ms. Gordon’s decision to exit the

Durango was “unusual and suspicious,” especially as the body camera footage shows

they exited the Durango at approximately the same time as the officers exited their

vehicles. 6 Aplee. Br. at 31; Ex. G at 00:38–00:51; Ex. H at 00:19–00:37.

We also do not think that the officers’ training and experience can justify what

occurred here, as the government argues. Aplee. Br. at 30. Although “an officer

need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct” to satisfy the reasonableness

standard, Samilton, 56 F.4th at 828 (quoting Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1379), “there must be

a concrete reason to support [the non-innocent] interpretation,” Frazier, 30 F.4th at

6 The government also argues that the passengers “likely were aware of the first police car’s presence and interest in the Durango.” Aplee. Br. at 31. But the only evidence it cites for this conclusion is a statement made by Ms. Gordon after she exited the vehicle, wherein she asked the officers: “You turned around before we hopped out of the car, so what’s the real excuse?” Ex. F at 01:02–01:07; Aplee. Br. at 7 n.3. But it cites no evidence or circumstances suggesting that any of the other passengers were aware of the officers’ presence and interest in the Durango. 15 Appellate Case: 25-1050 Document: 54 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 16

1177. As we have explained, the occupants of the Durango exited their vehicle upon

arriving at a gas station and headed inside, and the officers gave them no cause to

believe that they were being stopped. Such conduct was “so innocent . . . as to be

innocuous.” Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1147. Therefore, it was not reasonable for the

officers to believe that such activity was suspicious, particularly given the fact that

they were operating on a mere “hunch” that the suspected shooter was in the vehicle.

Accordingly, this factor does not weigh in favor of a finding of reasonable suspicion

that Mr. Huerta was armed and dangerous.

c. Mr. Huerta’s Behavior

The district court also found the fact that Mr. Huerta was “moving around . . .

justified the officers in handcuffing him.” III R. 181. The court found that “his

movements” and the fact that he was “looking around” contributed to the officers’

“need to control him to ensure their safety” because they already had “reasonable

cause to believe he was armed and dangerous.” Id. Mr. Huerta challenges that

conclusion, arguing that his behavior and body language were not concerning. Aplt.

Br. at 22–24. Specifically, he claims that it is normal to appear nervous when being

handcuffed for no apparent reason and that he turned his body toward the car either

because the officers were pushing him or because he was turning to face the officers

to speak to them. Id. The government argues in response that Mr. Huerta’s

movements alone justified the frisk. Aplee. Br. at 32.

The body camera video shows that officers exited and approached the Durango

as Mr. Huerta exited the vehicle. Ex. G at 00:38–00:51; Ex. H at 00:37–00:50. He

16 Appellate Case: 25-1050 Document: 54 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 17

held a phone in his left hand and his right hand was visibly empty. Ex. H at 00:31–

00:35. As Mr. Huerta exited the vehicle, Officer Stuper grabbed him and, in a

manner of seconds, turned him around and placed his hands behind his back. Id. at

00:32–00:42. Given that Mr. Huerta appeared unaware of the stop, and how quickly

Officer Stuper physically restrained him, we do not think it is unusual that he would

be “squirmish,” particularly because he was already restrained. III R. 75–76.

Although Officer Espinosa testified that Mr. Huerta “was not listening” to their

commands, he also testified that Mr. Huerta did not react violently to the officers. Id.

at 76, 97. And although the officers testified that his behavior raised “red flags” that

he might “flee or fight,” and the government urges us to defer to those conclusions,

the officers restrained Mr. Huerta before he fully exited the Durango. Id. at 18, 76;

Aplee. Br. at 21–22.

The government also argues that Mr. Huerta made a “furtive” movement —

moving his right hand up toward his waistline — as he was exiting the vehicle.

Aplee. Br. at 21. But the government admits that this movement was “slight” and

“likely innocuous in hindsight.” Id. It was innocuous even in the moment. Officer

Espinosa testified that Mr. Huerta did not reach for anything. III R. 55. And the

body camera video does not show anything more than Mr. Huerta briefly placing his

left hand on his thigh as he was exiting the vehicle. Ex. H at 00:31–00:35.

Mr. Huerta’s behavior does not weigh in favor of a finding of reasonable

suspicion, particularly when considering the fact that the officers lacked reasonable

suspicion to believe that the shooting suspect was in the Durango.

17 Appellate Case: 25-1050 Document: 54 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 18

d. Other Factors

The government points to other factors that weigh in favor of a finding of

reasonable suspicion, but these arguments are unavailing. First, the government

argues that the stop occurred in a high-crime area. Aplee. Br. at 19; III R. 13–14.

While the time and place of a stop can be relevant to our reasonable-suspicion

analysis, they are insufficient on their own. United States v. Daniels, 101 F.4th 770,

782 (10th Cir. 2024).

Second, the government points to the fact that the officers initially thought

there were three individuals in the Durango, not four, and the fact they were

“scattered” at the time of the stop to support a finding of reasonable suspicion,

pointing to our holding in United States v. Hammond, 890 F.3d 901, 907 (10th Cir.

2018), for support. Aplee. Br. at 19–20. In Hammond, “the number of people in the

stopped vehicle [was] the same as the number of officers at the scene,” a factor that

weighed in favor of a finding of reasonable suspicion to justify a patdown. 890 F.3d

at 907. But in Hammond, the officers already knew that the frisked suspect was a

gang member and a suspect in a prior weapons possession case, and had recently

been arrested in connection with another weapons case. Id. at 907–08. He was also

wearing colors that “loudly display[ed] his affiliation with a gang involved in an

ongoing feud.” Id. at 908. No similar facts are present here.

Other factors also militate against these concerns, including the fact that the

stop occurred at a gas station in the daytime in a busy area, and the fact that, as stated

above, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that the shooting suspect was in the

18 Appellate Case: 25-1050 Document: 54 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 19

Durango. III R. 37, 113; Daniels, 101 F.4th at 782 (finding the fact that a stop

occurred in a parking lot that was “well-lit,” “densely populated,” and “heavily

trafficked” weighed against a finding of reasonable suspicion, even though the stop

was in a “high-crime” area).

In sum, even when considering the attendant circumstances individually and in

the aggregate, and in the light most favorable to the district court’s decision, the

record does not support the “minimal level of objective justification” required under

the reasonableness standard to believe Mr. Huerta was armed and dangerous.

Daniels, 101 F.4th at 775–76 (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7).

2. Inevitable Discovery

In the alternative, the district court ruled sua sponte that the officers would

have discovered the firearm in the Durango absent the patdown because “perfect

circumstances” existed for a protective sweep. III R. 182. Mr. Huerta argues there

was no evidence in the record to suggest the officers were considering a protective

sweep, and that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that one of the passengers

was armed and dangerous. Aplt. Br. at 26–27. We agree.

Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence otherwise obtained in

violation of the Fourth Amendment may still be admitted if it “ultimately or

inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” United States v. Christy,

739 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444

(1984)). The government bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the evidence would have been inevitably or ultimately discovered

19 Appellate Case: 25-1050 Document: 54 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 20

without the Fourth Amendment violation. Id. A lawful protective sweep requires

“reasonable suspicion that a suspect poses a danger and may gain immediate access

to a weapon.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1307.

The district court cited to the fact that at least one of the Durango’s occupants

could have reoccupied the car and accessed a weapon as evidence that “perfect

circumstances” for a protective sweep existed. III R. 182. But the record suggests

otherwise, as Officer Espinosa testified that he only asked for Ms. Hampton’s

consent to search the vehicle because the patdown of Mr. Huerta yielded a loaded

magazine. Id. at 100. In any event, as we have explained, the officers lacked

reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Huerta — or any of the other passengers —

was armed and dangerous. We therefore reject the government’s argument that the

officers would have searched the vehicle anyway based on the circumstances

discussed above. Aplee. Br. at 36–37. Similarly unpersuasive is the government’s

argument that the officers would have searched the car because there were multiple

parolees in the Durango, id. at 38; I R. 33–34, 36–37, as a suspect’s criminal record

or history is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion, Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906.

Therefore, the district court erred in holding that the officers would have inevitably

discovered the firearm in the Durango.

For these reasons, the district court erred in denying Mr. Huerta’s motion to

suppress evidence of the magazine and handgun obtained during the stop.

20 Appellate Case: 25-1050 Document: 54 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 21

B. Motion to Dismiss the Indictment

Finally, Mr. Huerta argues, for preservation purposes, that his conviction must

be reversed because § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional facially and as applied to him

under Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). Aplt. Br. at 27–31.

Mr. Huerta acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by this court’s more recent

precedential decision in Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 2025)

(holding Rahimi did not abrogate constitutionality of 922(g)(1)). Aplt. Br. at 27–28.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Huerta’s motion to dismiss

the indictment.

We REVERSE the district court’s denial of Mr. Huerta’s motion to suppress

and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM its

ruling on the motion to dismiss the indictment. The motion to schedule oral

argument is DENIED as moot.