United States v. Howe

CourtDistrict Court, D. Idaho
DecidedJanuary 26, 2021
Docket2:19-cv-00421
StatusUnknown

This text of United States v. Howe (United States v. Howe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Howe, (D. Idaho 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. 2:19-cv-00421-DCN

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER v.

EBENEZER K. HOWE IV, and PHI DEVELOPMENT LLC,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court are Defendant Ebenezer Howe’s Motion to Reconsider (Dkt. 60) and Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 61). Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Court will rule on Howe’s objections without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). Upon review, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES both motions. II. BACKGROUND On April 10, 2020, United States Magistrate Judge Candy W. Dale issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) in this case. Dkt. 47. In her Report, Judge Dale recommended: (1) that Defendant Ebenezer Howe’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 11) be DENIED; (2) that Howe’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (Dkt. 20) be DENIED; and (3) that Howe file an Answer to the Complaint. Id. at 15. On April 22, 2020, Howe timely filed objections to Judge Dale’s Report. Dkt. 49. On September 23, 2020, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order

adopting Judge Dale’s Report in its entirety and ordering Howe to answer the Complaint. Dkt. 59. On October 6, 2020, Howe filed a Motion to Reconsider. Dkt. 60. This motion is directed at the Court’s order adopting Judge Dale’s Report. On October 21, 2020, Howe filed a Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 61. The Court will address each in turn.

III. ANALYSIS A. Motion to Reconsider (Dkt. 60) 1. Legal Standard Although Howe does not cite any legal standard to support revisiting or rescinding the Court’s prior order, because he is asking the Court to review an interlocutory order, his

request is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Courts have inherent power to modify their interlocutory orders before entering a final judgment. Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1943). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), 60(b). The Court, therefore, construes Howe’ Motion as one brought pursuant to Rule

54(b), which allows an order to be revised at any time under the Court’s inherent authority. City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (“As long as a district court has jurisdiction over the case, then it possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.”) While courts have the inherent authority to review interlocutory orders at any time prior to entry of final judgment, to determine the merits of a request to reconsider an

interlocutory order, both this Court and district courts throughout the Ninth Circuit are frequently guided by substantially the same standards as those used to reconsider final orders pursuant to Rule 59(e). See Dickinson Frozen Foods, Inc. v. FPS Food Process Sols. Corp., 2020 WL 2841517, at *10 (D. Idaho June 1, 2020). Under Rule 59 reconsideration may be warranted: (1) because of newly discovered evidence; (2) because the Court

committed clear error or the order was manifestly unjust; or (3) due to an intervening change in the law. Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Regardless of the standard or rule under which they are brought, “motions for reconsideration are generally disfavored, and may not be used to present new arguments or

evidence that could have been raised earlier.” Am. Rivers v. NOAA Fisheries, No. CV-04- 00061-RE, 2006 WL 1983178, at *2 (D. Or. July 14, 2006) (citing Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991)). 2. Discussion In his prior objections to Judge Dale’s Report, Howe outlined numerous objections.

Dkt. 49. Many of Howe’s objections overlapped with each other and/or contained similar legal principles. Many were simply frivolous. In an effort to be efficient, the Court began its decision by noting that Howe’s arguments generally fell into two categories and that it would address those two categories of arguments rather than Howe’s myriad claims. The Court explained why it was doing this, but noted that “inevitably, Howe will take issues with the Court’s summary and/or efforts to group his arguments and claim that the Court failed to appreciate certain, specific arguments.” Dkt. 59, at 3 n.2. The Court explained that

its efforts to group objections were not an “affront on Howe’s rights” but reflected its efforts to “distill Howe’s various arguments down to salient legal principles in an effort to move this case towards resolution.” Id. The Court also noted that it was not its duty to “address each and every argument raised by a party.” Id. In his motion to reconsider, Howe outlines seven issues arising from the Courts prior

order that must be addressed. Issues 1, 4, 5, and 6, focus on Howe’s claims that the undersigned “ratified” Judge Dale’s erroneous rulings and that these should be reconsidered. Then, as predicted, Howe asserts in issues 2, 3, and 7, that the undersigned impermissibly failed to appreciate and address each of his arguments in its prior ruling. The Court will address these two groups of arguments in turn.

a. Ratification of Judge Dale’s Erroneous Rulings In its prior decision, the Court considered all of the arguments Howe now re-raises. Whether that was in a manner satisfactory to Howe will be addressed in the following paragraph, but the fact that Howe does not agree with the Court’s conclusions is of little consequence because the purpose of reconsideration motions “is not to give an unhappy

litigant one additional chance to sway the judge.” Garcia v. Bitter, 195 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (emphasis in original); accord Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming denial of Rule 59(e) motion which “presented no arguments that had not already been raised in opposition to summary judgment”); Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995) (“A motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court to rethink what the court has already thought through—rightly or wrongly.”) (cleaned up).

In her Report, Judge Dale analyzed all of Howe’s arguments. The Court then analyzed Judge Dale’s conclusions, Howe’s objections, and the Government’s responses. The Court then went back and considered the original briefing and motions that Judge Dale relied upon. Ultimately, the Court adopted Judge Dale’s Report. Howe has not pointed to any of the enumerated reasons warranting reconsideration of these decisions. He has not

presented new evidence and he does not claim there has been a change in intervening law. He does claim that there has been manifest injustice (although he does not use this term), but his arguments are unavailing.

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