UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Criminal Action No. 24-401 (JDB) BENCE HORVATH, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On September 4, 2024, a grand jury returned a four-count indictment charging Bence
Horvath with conspiracy to violate U.S. export control laws and related offenses stemming from
his attempt to export radios from the United States to Russia without a license. Before the Court
is Horvath’s motion to dismiss the indictment in its entirety for failure to state an offense. For the
reasons explained below, the Court will deny Horvath’s motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
The Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), an agency within the Department of
Commerce, oversees the nation’s export control system. As is relevant here, the Export Control
Reform Act of 2018 (“ECRA”), 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801–4852 (2018), delegates to the BIS the authority
to regulate exports of certain categories of items and information. See generally 50 U.S.C.
§§ 4814–15; 15 C.F.R. § 730.1 et seq. (2025) (the Export Administration Regulations (“EARs”)).
ECRA also makes it a crime to willfully “violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause
a violation of” ECRA or “any regulation, order, license, or other authorization issued” pursuant to
ECRA, including the EARs. 50 U.S.C. § 4819(a)(1), (b); see Indictment [ECF No. 7] ¶ 17.
Although ECRA only permits regulation “to the extent necessary” to protect U.S. national
security or to “further significantly” U.S. foreign policy goals or international obligations, id.
1 § 4811(1), the EARs have a wide ambit, generally regulating “any item warranting control that is
not exclusively controlled for export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) by another [federal]
agency,” 15 C.F.R. § 730.3. The EARs provide that the export, reexport, and in-country transfer
of certain items is prohibited without a BIS license or exemption. See id. § 736.2(b). As part of
its regulatory efforts, BIS assigns each export an Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”);
using the ECCNs, BIS places certain categories of items on the Commerce Control List (“CCL”),
which is a list of items subject to the EARs. See Indictment ¶¶ 15–16; 87 Fed. Reg. 22130 (Apr.
14, 2022).
During the relevant period of September 2022 to May 2023, the EARs contained “a series
of stringent export controls that restrict[ed] Russia’s access to the technologies and other items
that it need[ed] to sustain its attack on Ukraine,” including the requirement to secure a BIS license
prior to exporting goods on the CCL from the United States to Russia. See Indictment ¶ 16; 15
C.F.R. § 746.8 (“Sanctions against Russia and Belarus”). The parties agree that during the relevant
period, the exports at issue—three types of two-way, portable radios—had ECCNs of 5A992.c and
were on the CCL. See Indictment ¶¶ 9, 18–19; Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Indictment [ECF No.
20-1] (“Mot.”) at 5–6.
Bence Horvath is a non-U.S. citizen believed to reside in Spain. Indictment ¶ 1. 1 During
the relevant period, Horvath operated the Spanish global trading and supply chain management
company Blacksaphir Capital SL; assisted with the day-to-day procurement activities of
Budaphone, a Moscow-based Russian company that procures mobile radio communications; and
served as the director of “Russian Company 1,” a Moscow-based telecommunications company
1 “When considering a motion to dismiss an indictment, a court assumes the truth of th[e indictment’s] factual allegations.” United States v. Ballestas, 795 F.3d 138, 149 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 n.16 (1952)).
2 that has contracted directly with several Russian government entities. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6, 8, 21, 26. 2
Horvath’s relative, Co-conspirator 1, also “operated, controlled, and directed Budaphone, Russian
Company 1, and Blacksaphir.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 26. Budaphone and Russian Company 1 have the same
phone number and physical address. Id. ¶ 8.
During this period, Horvath, Co-conspirator 1, and Co-conspirator 2—a Latvian citizen
who had “provided freight handling and logistics services for Budaphone”—allegedly “purchased
goods from” U.S. Company 1, “provid[ed] false and misleading information” to “intentionally
conceal[] from the United States Government” and U.S. companies “the true nature of the ultimate
end use and the true identities of the ultimate end users of the goods,” and “attempted to cause the
goods to be exported from the United States to individuals and entities located in Russia” without
a license. See id. ¶¶ 4, 21, 23–24, 26–27.
The indictment alleges that the parties committed several overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy. In some instances, Horvath planned multi-step shipping routes between the United
States and Russia to obfuscate the radios’ ultimate destination. See generally id. ¶¶ 28–32. In
January 2023, for example, Horvath emailed Co-conspirator 2 that his “goods [we]re in Dubai
inside [the] Free Trade Zone,” he sought to buy the goods for Serbian Company 1, and “[a]fter
that, [h]e would like to sell [the goods] to [Russian Company 1] and ship to Moscow.” Id. ¶ 32.
Another time, Horvath emailed Co-conspirator 1 to propose “accelerat[ing] [the procurement]
process” by selling U.S. Company 1 radios to “a Spanish company,” which the government
contends was Blacksaphir. Id. ¶ 28. The Spanish company, Horvath explained in his e-mail,
would subsequently sell the radios to Hungarian Company 1, which would sell them to Serbian
Company 1, which would sell them to Russian Company 1 in Moscow. See id. ¶¶ 28–29.
2 Where relevant, the Court uses the same pseudonyms as the indictment.
3 In other transactions, Horvath was straightforward in his desire to ship the radios to Russia.
In March 2023, Horvath attempted to purchase radios and accessories from U.S. Person 1, who
worked for U.S. Company 1. See id. ¶¶ 33–34. U.S. Person 1 asked for the end user information
and stressed that Horvath must “comply” with United States export laws “or there [would be] no
radios.” Id. ¶ 36. Horvath admitted that the radios would “go[] to Moscow for public safety use”
and that “[t]he end user is the Moscow Police.” Id. ¶ 37. When Horvath asked, “[d]o you think
we can still buy this stuff, or we give up?” U.S. Person 1 responded, “No Chance.” Id. ¶¶ 37–38.
Not too long after, Horvath again tried to purchase radios from U.S. Person 1. This time,
Horvath told U.S. Person 1 that the radios would be shipped to Spain. Id. ¶ 41. But when U.S.
Person 1 mentioned that the radios would be shipped from South Africa, Horvath asked whether
the parties could “try to ship that radios strait [sic] to Moscow” since South Africa “does not follow
sanctions.” Id. ¶¶ 46–47. Horvath agreed to purchase the radios, and on March 31 he gave
Blacksaphir’s Spanish address for billing and Co-conspirator 2’s Latvian freight forwarder as the
address for shipping. Id. ¶ 45. On April 2, U.S. Person 1 sent Horvath a confirmation for three
sales orders (one for each type of radio) that totaled $84,530. Id. ¶ 48. On April 3, Horvath
requested U.S. Person 1’s bank account information for payment, and around April 24, Blacksaphir
transferred $97,664 to U.S. Person 1’s business bank account. Id. ¶¶ 49–51.
In May 2023, U.S. Customs and Border Protection detained a shipment of U.S. Company
1’s radios from the United States to the Latvian freight forwarder. Id. ¶ 52. The shipment
contained an invoice from a business owned by U.S. Person 1 with the billing address as
Blacksaphir and the shipping address as the freight forwarder. Id. Although the shipment’s sales
order provided for 200 radios rather than the 170 included in the April 2 sales order, the total price
of the shipment was $97,664—the same amount as Blacksaphir’s April 24 payment. Id.
4 Authorities arrested Horvath in August 2024. See Arrest Warrant [ECF No. 5] at 1. The
grand jury returned a four-count indictment in September, charging Horvath with conspiracy to
unlawfully export goods to Russia and to defraud the United States, attempted smuggling of goods
to Russia via Latvia, attempted unlawful export of goods to Russia via Latvia, and international
money laundering. See Indictment ¶¶ 21–59. Horvath has filed a motion to dismiss, which the
parties have fully briefed. See Mot.; Gov’t Resp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Indictment [ECF No. 21]
(“Opp’n”); Def. Bence Horvath’s Reply [ECF No. 22] (“Reply”). 3 The motion is now ripe for
decision.
LEGAL STANDARDS
“An indictment need only contain a ‘plain, concise and definite statement of the essential
facts constituting the offense charged.’” United States v. Safavian, 429 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158
(D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)). An indictment is “sufficiently specific where it (1)
contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs the defendant of those charges so
that he may defend against them, and (2) enables him ‘to plead acquittal or conviction in bar of
future prosecutions for the same offense.’” Id. (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87,
117–18 (1974)).
A criminal defendant may move to dismiss an indictment in its entirety or as to certain
charges prior to trial if there is a “defect in the indictment,” such as the “failure to state an offense.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v); see United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002). But this
is a limited ground for seeking relief. “An indictment returned by a legally constituted and
unbiased grand jury . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.”
3 Horvath requested oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 47(f). See Mot. Dismiss Indictment [ECF No. 20] at 1. Because the Court concludes that the parties’ briefings are sufficient to resolve the motion on the papers, the Court will deny the request. See LCrR 47(f) (granting a request for an oral hearing “shall be within the discretion of the Court”).
5 Safavian, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 158 (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956)).
Thus, only in “‘unusual circumstances’ is pretrial dismissal of the indictment possible on
sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds, and that is ‘where there are material facts that are undisputed
and only an issue of law is presented.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Yakou, 428 F.3d 241, 247
(D.C. Cir. 2005)); see also United States v. Ballestas, 795 F.3d 138, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(dismissing an indictment is disfavored because it “directly encroaches upon the fundamental role
of the grand jury” (quoting Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 53 F.3d 1349, 1360 (1st Cir. 1995))).
Finally, because the Fifth Amendment makes “[a]dherence to the language of the
indictment [] essential,” United States v. Akinyoyenu, 199 F. Supp. 3d 106, 110 (D.D.C. 2016)
(quoting United States v. Hitt, 249 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2001)), a court considers only “the
face of the indictment and, more specifically, the language used to charge the crimes,” id. (quoting
United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 60 (D.D.C. 2009) (emphases omitted)).
ANALYSIS
The grand jury charged Horvath with violations of four federal laws: conspiracy to
unlawfully export goods to Russia and to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. § 371), attempted
smuggling of goods to Russia via Latvia (18 U.S.C. § 554); attempted unlawful export of goods to
Russia via Latvia (50 U.S.C. § 4819(a)), and international money laundering (18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(2)(A)). To determine whether the indictment states an offense as to each charge, the
Court must determine whether the indictment contains “allegations [that], if proven, would be
sufficient to permit a jury to find that the crimes charged were committed.” United States v.
Bowdoin, 770 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75,
76 (1962)). In other words, the indictment must allege each element of each charged offense.
Here, Horvath challenges one element that each offense shares: that Horvath acted contrary
to U.S. law by intentionally seeking to export controlled items without a required BIS license, in 6 violation of 15 C.F.R. § 746.8(a). See Indictment ¶¶ 21, 54, 56, 59. 4 That regulation provides:
“[f]or the purposes of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section, commodities . . . classified
under ECCN[] 5A992 . . . do not require a license to or within Russia or Belarus for the following
civil end-users,” with a list including “joint ventures” between companies headquartered in country
groups that include Spain and Latvia. 15 C.F.R. § 748.6(a). 5 Subsection (a)(1) then provides that
“[a] license is required . . . to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or within Russia or
Belarus any item subject to the EAR and specified in any [ECCN] . . . on the CCL.” Id.
§ 746.8(a)(1).
The indictment adequately alleges Horvath violated § 746.8(a). The indictment alleges
that each type of radio at issue had an ECCN on the CCL, Indictment ¶¶ 9, 18–19; Horvath sought
to export the radios to Russia, id. ¶ 21; and the exemptions in paragraph § 746.8(a) were “not
applicable,” id. ¶ 18. These allegations include “the elements of the offense[s] charged and fairly
inform[] the defendant of those charges so that he may defend against them.” Safavian, 429 F.
Supp. 2d at 158. Indeed, Horvath has already identified possible defenses.
Horvath contends that the indictment’s statement that the exceptions are “not applicable”
is “legally incorrect.” Mot. at 6. But the government is allowed to make some legal conclusions
in an indictment, and “it is not necessary for the indictment to state exactly how [a defendant’s]
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (“two or more persons conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States”); id. § 554 (“Whoever fraudulently or knowingly exports or sends from the United States, or attempts to export or send from the United States, any [good] . . . contrary to any law or regulation of the United States . . .”); id. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (“Whoever . . . transfers . . . or attempts to . . .transfer . . . a monetary instrument or funds . . . from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States or to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United States. . . with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity . . .”); 50 U.S.C. § 4819(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for a person to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause a violation of this subchapter or of any regulation” issued under ECRA.). 5 Although the relevant substance of 15 C.F.R. § 746.8 has remained the same since the period of Horvath’s charged conduct, the section’s structure has changed. Compare 15 C.F.R. § 746.8(a), with 15 C.F.R. § 746.8 (Jan. 1, 2023), https://perma.cc/Y866-QH6X, and 15 C.F.R. § 746.8 (May 23, 2023), https://perma.cc/L8SZ-4JCT. The Court quotes from and cites to the sections of the C.F.R. as they existed during the period of Horvath’s charged conduct.
7 conduct satisfies each element of the offense.” United States v. Kelley, Crim. A. No. 22-408
(CKK), 2024 WL 4512395, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2024); see, e.g., United States v. Resendiz-
Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 109 (2007) (“[A]n indictment parroting the language of a federal criminal
statute is often sufficient.”); Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117–18 (collecting cases). Indeed, the inquiry
is “not whether [the indictment] could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it
contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, ‘and sufficiently apprises the
defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.’” Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 431
(1932) (quoting Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 290 (1895)). And here, it does.
Horvath also briefly claims (1) the indictment must (and failed to) allege the “five types of
facts” that 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(a) states “determine [one’s] obligations,” including license
requirements, under various EARs; and (2) U.S. Person 1, not Horvath, had the obligation to secure
the license under § 758.3(a). See Mot. at 9. Both arguments fail.
To start, the paragraph of § 736.2 to which Horvath points—§ 736.2(a)—does not state an
offense. It merely lists and briefly explains the types of general facts that pertain to a license
determination, such as the item’s ECCN and end user and destination. Section 746.8 then applies
these facts to explain when a license is required in the context of that section, with some of those
facts relevant to the underlying license requirement and others applicable to various exemptions.
See § 746.8. Indeed, § 736.2(a) itself directs readers to “see other parts of the EAR where the
license requirements and other restrictions are specified in greater detail.” And, as previously
explained, the indictment pleads the facts necessary to establish a violation of the license
requirement in § 746.8(a).
Looking further down in § 736.2, the indictment sufficiently alleges a violation of
§ 736.2(b)(6). See Indictment ¶ 21 (alleging Horvath acted “without having first obtained the
8 required licenses from BIS . . . in violation of . . . Sections 736.2 and 746.8”); id. ¶ 56 (similar).
Subsection 736.2(b) provides the EAR’s “ten general prohibitions.” 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b). Section
746.8 falls within “General Prohibition Six,” which states that a party “may not, without a license
or license exception . . . export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) any item subject to the EAR to a
country or region . . . that is embargoed by the United States or otherwise made subject to
controls”). Id. § 736.2(b)(6)(i); see also id. (referencing § 746.8). For the reasons that the
indictment alleges a violation of the narrower § 746.8(a), it thus also alleges a violation of
§ 736.2(b).
Turning to Horvath’s second brief argument, assuming arguendo that U.S. Person 1 had
the obligation to secure the license does not change the adequacy of the indictment as to the
charged conduct. Horvath had an independent obligation to comply with the EAR. See id. § 758.3
(“[a]ll parties that participate in transactions subject to the EAR must comply with the EAR”).
Horvath is charged with acting contrary to law by violating federal regulations that require an
export license. See Indictment ¶¶ 21, 54, 56, 59; see also 15 C.F.R. §§ 736.2, 746.8. The
indictment avers that Horvath “intentionally concealed . . . the true nature of the ultimate end use
and the true identities of the ultimate end users of the goods by providing false and misleading
information” to U.S. Person 1, which impeded U.S. Person 1’s ability to adequately assess whether
the exports required a license. See, e.g., Indictment at ¶¶ 22, 23(D). Then, Horvath attempted to
export those goods without a license. Id. ¶ 52. In other words, the indictment alleges that Horvath
knowingly concealed details relevant to the license analysis; based on that misrepresentation, the
parties to the transaction did not secure a license for the radios; and Horvath then knowingly
attempted to export the radios absent a license. That is sufficient to allege that Horvath acted
contrary to federal regulations requiring a license, which is all that the charged conduct requires.
9 Horvath’s final argument is that the indictment still fails to state an offense because its
factual allegations, accepted as true, demonstrate that Horvath met two exemptions to the license
requirement. In his view, the indictment thus fails to allege the element that he sought to export
controlled items contrary to law. See generally Mot. at 2–4; Reply at 1–2. 6 But see Indictment
¶ 18 (the license exemptions are “not applicable” to Horvath’s conduct). Horvath’s argument
again fails. The indictment does not plead facts demonstrating that Horvath met either exemption.
Both exemptions apply only to exports that are destined for certain end users. See 15 C.F.R.
§ 746.8(a); (permitting certain exports to Russia for enumerated “civil end-users”); id. § 740.19(a),
(b)(9), (c)(1)(i), (c)(i)(ii), (c)(2)(iii) (in a cross-reference from § 746.8(c)(7), permitting certain
exports “to and for the use of independent non-governmental organizations in . . . Russia” or to
eligible “individuals,” which exclude Russian government entities and officials). But Horvath
himself argues that the indictment does not identify the end users for the radios. See Mot. at 8
(“[T]he Indictment does not identify any end-user or end-use for the charged conduct, instead
vaguely alluding to unspecified ‘Russian end users.’”); see also Indictment ¶ 23(E) (exports “to
individuals and entities located in Russia”). The indictment cannot both fail to identify end users
and identify eligible end users for the purposes of meeting an exemption.
Furthermore, even considering the end users that the government and Horvath have
inferred from the indictment, the indictment does not plead facts that they are civil end users, non-
governmental organizations, or eligible individuals. Compare Indictment ¶ 37 (Horvath stating
for a contemporaneous transaction that “[t]he end user is the Moscow Police”), and Opp’n at 9
6 At times, Horvath also seems to frame his motion as arguing that the government has the burden to plead facts disproving the applicability of statutory and regulatory exemptions. See Mot. at 8; Reply at 11–12. This is a tenuous argument. See, e.g., United States v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410, 420–22 (2d Cir. 1987) (explaining framework for analyzing license exemptions). The Court will analyze the argument as Horvath most often and clearly frames it, which is “whether a license was required by law to export the two-way radios at issue in this case, based solely on the allegations within the four corners of the Indictment.” Reply at 2.
10 (“[I]f the Defendant’s words to his co-conspirator can be trusted, they were bound for the ‘Moscow
Police.’”), with 15 C.F.R. § 740.19(c)(1)(ii) (“the Russian Government” and “organizations
administered or controlled by the . . . Russian Government . . . are not eligible end users”), and id.
§ 740.19(c)(2)(iii) (defining “[i]neligible Russian Government officials” to include “employees of
the Ministry of Interior” and “offices, services, agencies and other entities organized under or
reporting to the federal government”); compare Mot. at 10 (assuming the “ultimate purchaser[s]”
were Budaphone and Russian Company 1), with Indictment ¶ 8 (alleging Russian Company 1,
which has the same phone number and address as Budaphone, has as its chief executive officer
“an employee of [Russia’s] Ministry of Internal Affairs” and “directly contracts with various
Russian government entities”), and § 740.19(c)(1)(ii), (c)(2)(iii). The indictment therefore does
not plead facts that Horvath met either exemption, and once again, the indictment adequately states
an offense as to each charge.
CONCLUSION
The indictment “contains the elements of the offense charged,” “fairly informs the
defendant of those charges so that he may defend against them,” and “enables him to plead
acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” Safavian, 429 F. Supp.
2d at 158 (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the indictment makes “allegations
[that], if proven, would be sufficient to permit a jury to find that the crimes charged were
committed.” Bowdoin, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 146. This case is thus not one of the limited and
“unusual circumstances” in which the Court may “directly encroach[] upon the fundamental role
of the grand jury” and dismiss the indictment. Ballestas, 795 F.3d at 148.
For these reasons, the Court will deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss. A separate Order
will issue on this date.
11 /s/
JOHN D. BATES United States District Judge
Dated: February 11, 2025