United States v. Hopper

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: September 21, 2004
• Docket: 02-6122
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 United States v. Hopper No. 02-6122 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0319P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0319p.06 _________________ OPINION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________ FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. James K. Hopper _________________ appeals his jury conviction of conspiracy to possess red phosphorous knowing and intending that it would be used to UNITED STATES OF AMERICA X manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Plaintiff-Appellee, - §§ 846 and 843, and of conspiracy to manufacture - methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841. - No. 02-6122 Hopper also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion v. - for a new trial based upon newly-discovered evidence. For > the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the judgment of the , district court. JAMES K. HOPPER, - Defendant-Appellant. - I. N Appeal from the United States District Court On January 8, 2002, Hopper was named in a four-count for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga. superseding indictment charging him with various controlled No. 01-00191—R. Allan Edgar, Chief District Judge. substance offenses. The jury found Hopper not guilty of the offense of knowingly and intentionally manufacturing Argued: August 10, 2004 methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and of knowingly and intentionally possessing Decided and Filed: September 21, 2004 the materials necessary to manufacture methamphetamine with the intent that it would be used to manufacture Before: KEITH, MARTIN, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges. methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6). However, the jury found him guilty of conspiring to possess _________________ red phosphorous knowing and intending that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. COUNSEL §§ 843(a)(6) and 846, and of conspiring to manufacture 500 grams or more of a substance containing methamphetamine ARGUED: Charles P. Dupree, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846. Appellant. Steven S. Neff, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES The following evidence adduced at trial demonstrated ATTORNEY, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee. Hopper’s involvement in his conspiracy convictions. ON BRIEF: Charles P. Dupree, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant. Paul W. Laymon, Jr., ASSISTANT UNITED In early 1999, Charles “Bobo” Brooks, after learning the STATES ATTORNEY, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for amount of money that could be made from the selling of red Appellee. phosphorous–an ingredient necessary to manufacture

1 No. 02-6122 United States v. Hopper 3 4 United States v. Hopper No. 02-6122

methamphetamine–began purchasing it from a company the manufacturing process.1 Easterly testified that he again named Pyrotek. Before his arrest, Brooks had purchased traveled to Gissendanner’s home to cook more approximately sixty pounds of red phosphorous for forty-five methamphetamine and saw Hopper there with his son. dollars per pound and had sold it for up to sixteen hundred Easterly testified that Hopper remained in a different room dollars per pound. The police arrested Brooks in August with his son, while the other men manufactured 1999, and he was ultimately convicted of conspiracy to methamphetamine. Following a traffic stop, Easterly was manufacture methamphetamine. arrested in April 2000 when the police discovered thirty-six grams of methamphetamine on his person. Easterly pleaded Upon Brooks’s arrest, the police interviewed Hopper at his guilty and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. residence in November 1999 to discuss his connection with Brooks and his involvement with the sale or distribution of Before his arrest, however, Easterly had introduced Hopper red phosphorous. Detective Tommy Farmer testified that at to James Marter and Mitchell Bivens. Marter and Bivens this initial interview Hopper admitted that he bought red subsequently purchased red phosphorous from Hopper. phosphorous from Brooks and that he sold it at a profit to Hopper introduced Marter to Gissendanner, and Marter began people who were involved in the manufacturing of purchasing red phosphorous from Gissendanner. Marter methamphetamine. Brooks’s testimony at Hopper’s trial testified that he observed Gissendanner and Hopper corroborated this statement, as he testified that he sold in total manufacturing methamphetamine in Hopper’s garage and that “a few pounds, 10 maybe” of red phosphorous to Hopper, he would help Gissendanner, Gissendanner’s son, and Hopper charging him approximately $1000 per pound “so he could with their “cooks.” Marter testified that on one occasion he make a profit.” Hopper was not arrested or charged with any had Gissendanner and Gissendanner’s son complete the crime after this initial interview. manufacturing process for him and that he then shared with them the methamphetamine that resulted. Marter also Before learning how to manufacture methamphetamine, testified that he observed Easterly manufacturing William Easterly sold the controlled substance to Hopper. methamphetamine in Hopper’s garage. Both Marter and After learning how to manufacture methamphetamine, Bivens were arrested and pleaded guilty to controlled Easterly bought red phosphorous from Hopper, later learning substance offenses. that Hopper had acquired the red phosphorous from Brooks. After Brooks’s arrest, Hopper and Easterly drove to the On June 13, 2001, Detective Farmer again visited Hopper’s Atlanta home of Jackie Gissendanner, who sold red residence to assist a case agent from the Department of phosphorous and who apparently wanted to learn how to manufacture methamphetamine. On one visit, Easterly manufactured methamphetamine on Gissendanner’s premises 1 with the assistance of Gissendanner and Hopper. Easterly W hile Easterly testified that he did so with Hopper’s permission and assistance, Hopper testified that he did not give Easterly permission to also “cooked” methamphetamine in Hopper’s garage and cook methamphetamine in his garage. Hopp er, however, also testified testified that while Hopper was not “the cook,” he did aid in that because “there [is] a possibility to everything,” there wa s a po ssibility that Easterly was indeed manufacturing methamphetamine in his garage. Inconsistently, Hopp er’s later testimony states that when he discovered that Easterly was manufac turing methamphetamine on his property he “r[an] him off.” Hopper maintained, however, that he was not present during the manufac turing process. No. 02-6122 United States v. Hopper 5 6 United States v. Hopper No. 02-6122

Children Services, who had received an anonymous call insufficient evidence in the light “most favorable to the reporting “allegations of domestic violence, lack of United States and determine whether any rational trier of fact supervision, and possible drug activity,” as well as medical could have found the elements of the offense beyond a neglect. During this second visit to Hopper’s residence, reasonable doubt.” United States v. Couch, 367 F.3d 557, Detective Farmer noticed an odor that he knew to be 560 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). associated with the manufacturing of methamphetamine. Detective Farmer noticed in plain view in the garbage a bottle Notably, Hopper mischaracterizes the nature of the of fuel line antifreeze and some coffee filters, both of which evidence against him relating to the charge of conspiracy to are used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine. At that manufacture methamphetamine. Hopper argues that “[h]e did point, Detective Farmer requested, and received, permission not participate in large cooks or donate his chemicals for a to search the premises.2 Detective Farmer noticed in the portion of the yield, and no one has said he did anything detached garage a large bottle of hydrogen peroxide and some based on the success of a future production or sale.” Hopper muriatic acid–both used to manufacture methamphetamine. also notes that Marter “never claimed that Hopper ever Behind the garage, Detective Farmer noticed a “burn pile,” cooked with him.” Our review of Marter’s trial testimony which he knew from experience was a common way that indicates that although Hopper did not actually manufacture people destroyed the evidence of methamphetamine the methamphetamine himself because he did not know how production. Finally, Detective Farmer noticed that beside the “to cook,” it does indicate that he readily helped in other barn area there was a worn path leading into the woods. This ways, such as “get[ting] acetone, clean[ing] jars,” and path led to an area where Detective Farmer located two “filter[ing] dope off.” Moreover, similar evidence indicating garbage bags, which essentially contained the remains of a that Hopper actively assisted in the manufacturing process is methamphetamine lab. Hopper was indicted in October 2001, reflected in Easterly’s testimony. Easterly testified that and arrested in December 2001. A second-superseding Hopper “helped [him] if [he] needed some help” by “get[ting] indictment was issued in January 2002, and Hopper was Coleman fuel or coffee filters or making the aluminum balls convicted of two of the offenses contained in the superseding to go in the muriatic acid.” Under these facts, we hold that indictment in February 2002. Thereafter, Hopper filed a any rational trier of fact could conclude that the United States motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, has met its burden of proving that Hopper conspired to which the district court denied. This timely appeal followed. manufacture methamphetamine. See id.3

II. 3 Hopper also argues that bec ause there was insufficient evidence to Hopper argues that insufficient evidence supports his support the distinguishing element between his conviction of conspiracy conviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine to manu facture methamph etamine and his conviction for conspiracy to in violation of U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841. We review a claim of possess red phospho rous–i.e., the agreement to manufacture methamphetamine–the charge of conspiracy to possess red phosphorous knowing and intending that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine becomes a lesser-included offense of co nspiracy to 2 manufacture methamphetamine. Given our holding that sufficient Although Ho ppe r testified that he did not give perm ission to evidence suppo rts Hopper’s conviction for conspiracy to manufacture Detective Farmer to search the premises, the district judge, after an methamphetamine, we find it unnecessary to address this argument evidentiary hearing, denied Hop per’s motion to suppress evidence, because it is dependent upon the success of his claim of insufficient finding D etective Farm er’s account o f the events fully cred ible. evide nce. No. 02-6122 United States v. Hopper 7 8 United States v. Hopper No. 02-6122

III. of itself sufficient to convict him of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. We now turn to Hopper’s argument that the jury instructions were erroneous. Hopper argues that the Third, Hopper argues that the district court erred in not instructions were erroneous in that they allowed the jury to making a unanimity instruction. Hopper “neither requested conclude that evidence sufficient to convict him of conspiracy nor received an enhanced unanimity instruction.” Tosh, 330 to possess red phosphorous was sufficient in and of itself to F.3d at 842. Most generously construed, Hopper argues that convict him of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. the specific identity of his co-conspirators is an element of the Additionally, Hopper argues, citing no precedential support, crime of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and, as that the district court erred by not instructing the jury that it such, must be unanimously found by the jury. We addressed had to agree unanimously as to the identity of his co- a similar argument in United States v. Humphrey, 287 F.3d conspirators. We find these arguments unpersuasive. 422 (6th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2002). In First, we note that Hopper made no objections to the jury Humphrey, we noted: “the specific unanimity instruction instructions, nor did he specifically request a unanimity sought by Humphrey is generally required only in one of instruction. Thus, we are limited to plain-error review. three circumstances: when the nature of the evidence is United States v. DeJohn, 368 F.3d 533, 540 (6th Cir. 2004). particularly complex; when there is a variance between the Also, in addressing this argument, we assume that the jury indictment and the proof adduced at trial; or when there is followed the instructions as given. United States v. Tosh, 330 some tangible evidence of jury confusion, as when the jury F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A jury’s verdict represents a has asked questions of the court.” Id. finding that a crime was committed as alleged in the indictment . . . . [T]he court must assume that the jurors were As in Humphrey, none of these circumstances exists in this diligent in following the precise instructions given to them.” case. Id. at 440. Hopper points to no evidence indicating that (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). the jury was confused, and if anything, its finding of not guilty on two of the four counts contained in the indictment Second, we reject Hopper’s argument that the jury indicates that it understood its duties under the instructions. instructions were erroneous in that they allowed the jury to Moreover, as we found in Humphrey, the district court conclude that evidence sufficient to convict him of conspiracy “provided a thorough instruction on what constitutes a to possess red phosphorous was sufficient, in and of itself, to conspiracy.” Id. at 439. Under these circumstances, we find convict him of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. Hopper’s argument that the jury instructions were erroneous The district court clearly instructed the jury on the nature of without merit. the two different offenses and the facts that the jury had to find to convict Hopper of each, independent conspiracy IV. charge. The district court instructed the jury on each count contained in the indictment and separately discussed each Finally, we turn to Hopper’s argument that the district court element that the United States had to prove beyond a erred in denying his motion for a new trial. On May 30, reasonable doubt. The instructions as given simply did not 2002, Hopper filed a motion for a new trial based on newly- allow the jury to conclude that evidence sufficient to convict discovered evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Hopper of conspiracy to possess red phosphorous was in and Procedure 33. The motion argued that he discovered No. 02-6122 United States v. Hopper 9 10 United States v. Hopper No. 02-6122

evidence after trial indicating that the trial testimony of Moreover, any use of these statements, given Wooten’s Marter and Easterly may have been untruthful. The motion testimony at trial, would be cumulative and merely was supported by the unsworn statements of four prisoners, impeachment evidence. See O’Dell, 805 F.2d at 640. Under each indicating that Marter had stated in conversations with these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its them that he and Easterly were testifying in order to reduce discretion in denying Hopper’s motion for a new trial. their sentences and that Marter was willing to lie if necessary to receive a reduction. On June 18, 2002, the district court For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the denied the motion finding that the evidence was only district court. impeachment evidence and that even if the testimony of Marter were disbelieved, it “would not likely have produced an acquittal.” A motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence should be granted when the defendant has demonstrated that “(1) the new evidence was discovered after trial; (2) the evidence could not have been discovered earlier with diligence; (3) the evidence is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) the evidence would likely produce an acquittal.” United States v. O’Dell, 805 F.2d 637, 640 (6th Cir. 1986). We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 382 (6th Cir. 1997). The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Hopper’s motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Hopper has not demonstrated that the “new” evidence was discovered only after trial and that it could not have been discovered earlier with diligence. Indeed, Hopper called one of these inmates, James Wooten, whose statement was attached to his motion for a new trial, to testify at his trial. Wooten testified to matters that form the basis of Hopper’s newly-discovered evidence claim—Marter told him that he was going to testify against Hopper to receive a sentence reduction and indicated his willingness to lie in the process. Even though the other inmates whose statements were attached to Hopper’s motion for a new trial did not testify at trial, Wooten’s testimony indicates that this evidence was discoverable to Hopper through due diligence.