United States v. Hoffman

560 F. Supp. 2d 772, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46220, 2008 WL 2439676
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJune 12, 2008
DocketCivil 08-1316 (DSD/SRN)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 560 F. Supp. 2d 772 (United States v. Hoffman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Hoffman, 560 F. Supp. 2d 772, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46220, 2008 WL 2439676 (mnd 2008).

Opinion

ORDER

DAVID S. DOTY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction and for appointment of a receiver. Based upon a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and for the following reasons, the court grants plaintiffs motion.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural Posture

On May 13, 2008, plaintiff United States of America filed this civil action under the antifraud injunction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1345 1 , against defendants James Warren Hoffman; Teresa Gay Hoffman; Accredited Financial Services, Inc.; Encore Acquisitions, LLC; Bessord Partnership, LLC; Heartland Consulting; GRD Management; Chad Wegscheider; Patrick Dols; Minnesota One Mortgage, Inc.; Wegs Enterprise, LLC; Wegs Properties, LLC; Wissota Property Management, LLC; and KMC Properties, LLC. The United States alleged that defendants were committing large-scale mail, wire and bank fraud through a property purchasing and selling scheme and moved for an ex parte temporary restraining order (“TRO”). The court granted the TRO on May 13 and scheduled a hearing for a preliminary injunction on May 23, 2008. After extending the TRO until June 13, 2008, the court heard argument on the United States’ motion for preliminary injunction and appointment of a receiver on June 2, 2008.

*775 II. Findings of Fact

The findings of fact here or in the subsequent legal analysis as well as any conclusions of law forming part of the court’s determination of the propriety of a preliminary injunction in this case are subject to the general rule that “ ‘the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the merits.’ ” Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981)).

The United States presented evidence detailing defendants’ fraudulent schemes related to the purchase and sale of real property, and the court accepts the following as its findings of fact:

• Beginning in June 2006, James and Teresa Hoffman created entities to purchase apartment buildings, convert them into condominiums and sell the individual condominiums for sizable profit.
• To finance the venture, the Hoff-mans—along with Chad Wegscheider and Patrick Dols—fraudulently obtained mortgages from financial institutions and mortgage lenders in the names of third parties. The Hoffmans directed the third party buyers to cooperating mortgage brokers to apply for mortgages. Often, the buyers met with Wegscheider and Dols, each of whom facilitated the processing of the buyers’ loan applications.
• The loan applications in question contained multiple material false statements, including inflation of the buyers’ income and bank account balances, failure to list other properties being purchased at or near the time of the current property, failure to disclose other mortgages or liabilities and false characterization of the source of down payment provided at closing. The Hoffmans, for example, occasionally gave buyers the money for their down payment while the loan application failed to reflect such outside involvement.
• The Hoffmans used this method on at least three occasions, representing more than fifty condominium units, from January to August 2007. They also employed this method to structure the purchase of a single-family residence in Willmar, MN, and to protect their own home from foreclosure in August 2006—fraudulently obtaining $219,000 in the process.
• Generally, the Hoffmans inherited or placed renters in the condominium units, received their rental payments and then paid the rent to third-party buyers to be applied as mortgage payments. The Hoffmans and others have routinely diverted portions of such rental payments, often causing the third-party buyers to become delinquent on the mortgage payments.
• The United States believe that the amount traceable to defendants’ fraudulent activities is approximately $5.5 million.

Based upon these facts, the United States argues that the court should order a preliminary injunction to prevent the immediate and irreparable harm resulting from defendants’ ongoing mail, wire and bank fraud. The United States also seeks appointment of a receiver to take control of defendants’ businesses and protect innocent third parties.

DISCUSSION

I. Preliminary Injunction

The court examines four factors when considering whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief. See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 112-14 (8th Cir.1981); Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blay- *776 lock, 115 F.Supp.2d 1108, 1116 (D.Minn.2000). Those factors are (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant in the absence of relief, (2) the balance between that harm and the harm that the relief would cause to the other litigants, (3) the likelihood of the movant’s ultimate success on the merits and (4) the public interest. See Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 112-14. The movant bears the burden of proof concerning each factor. See Gelco v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir.1987). No single factor is determinative. See Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113. Instead, the court considers the particular circumstances of each case, remembering that the primary question is whether the “balance of equities so favors the movant that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until the merits are determined.” Id. If the threat of irreparable harm to the movant is slight when compared to likely injury to the other party, the movant carries a particularly heavy burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits. See ASICS Corp. v. Target Corp., 282 F.Supp.2d 1020, 1025 (D.Minn.2003).

A. Threat of Irreparable Harm

Plaintiffs must first establish that irreparable harm will result without injunctive relief and that such harm will not be compensable by money damages. See Blaylock, 115 F.Supp.2d at 1116. Possible or speculative harm is not enough. See Graham Webb Int’l v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 17 F.Supp.2d 919, 924 (D.Minn.1998). Rather, the party seeking the injunctive relief must show a significant risk of harm exists. Johnson v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 351 F.Supp.2d 929, 945 (E.D.Mo.2004). The absence of such a showing alone is sufficient to deny a preliminary injunction. See Gelco, 811 F.2d at 420.

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560 F. Supp. 2d 772, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46220, 2008 WL 2439676, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-hoffman-mnd-2008.