United States v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co.

31 C.C.P.A. 98, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 127
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedNovember 1, 1943
DocketNo. 4429
StatusPublished

This text of 31 C.C.P.A. 98 (United States v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 31 C.C.P.A. 98, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 127 (ccpa 1943).

Opinion

Garrett, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal by the Government from the judgment of the United States Customs Court, Second Division, sustaining two protests (consolidated for trial) made by the importer against the classification by the Collector of Customs at the port of Baltimore, Md., of merchandise, described in the invoice as hand knitted infants’ woolen sacque sets, and awarding importer refund of a portion of the duties assessed and collected as a result of such classification.

Two samples representative of the imported merchandise were introduced in evidencó as Collective Exhibits 1 and 2. Of these; Collective Exhibit 2 seems to have been taken from the importation. It is stated to be the official sample. It consists of a sacque, bootees, and cap (infants’ size) which as a “set” (in which form it is stated to be always sold) constitutes a complete suit of knitted or crocheted infants’ outerwear. The material is wool or in chief value of wool. The yarns in the bodies of the respective units of the official sample are blue in color, but those comprising the edges are white. The edges were knit in scalloped form as a part of the suit and had no prior separate existence. According to the testimony of the importer’s witness they serve to prevent the raveling or breaking of the bodies of the units. The stitching in yoke, body, and edge, respectively, of the sacque is of different kinds.

The controversy here involves the character of the edges, and as presented before us is limited to the question of whether in a tariff sense they constitute trimmings.

The collector classified the merchandise under paragraph 1529 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 which provides for a large number of articles including “edgings, trimmings, fringes, gimps, and ornaments; * * * all the foregoing, and fabrics and articles wholly or in fart thereof * * * 90 per centum ad valorem.” [Italics supplied.]

In its protests the importer made alternative claims, but that finally relied upon and sustained by the trial court is that the merchandise is properly dutiable under paragraph 1114 (d) of the act as modified by the British Reciprocal Trade Agreement, T. D. 49753 (74 Treas. Dec. 253), as “Hand knitted infants’ woolen sacque sets,” at' 50 per centum ad valorem plus 50 cents per pound.

Paragraph 1114 (d) as it appears in the Tariff Act of 1930 reads:

(d) Outerwear and articles of all kinds, knit or crocheted, finished or unfinished, wholly or in chief value of wool, and not specially provided for, valued at not more than $2 per pound, 44 cents per pound and 45 per centum ad valorem; valued at more than $2 per pound, 50 cents per pound and 50 per centum ad valorem.

[100]*100The British Trade Agreement modified the subparagraph in certain particulars. The clauses here pertinent read:

*******
Infants’ outerwear valued at more than $2 per pound:
Made or cut from Jersey fabric knit in plain stitch on a circular machine_500 per lb. and 25% ad val.
Other_50$ 'per lb. and 50% ad val.

The claim of the importer is under the provision which we have italicized.

As has been indicated, the sole question, as tbe case has been presented before us, is whether the above described scalloped edges of the articles constitute trimmings in the sense of paragraph 1529 (a). If they do, the completed articles obviously are in part of trimmings and the collector’s classification should be upheld, and the judgment of the trial court reversed. If not, the judgment sustaining the importer’s claim should be affirmed.

In view of the record and briefs before us it is proper to say that the Government contended below that the edges were in fact coAmred by at least one of three of the things named eo nomine in paragraph 1529 (a), to Avit: trimmings, edgings, or ornaments, but upon the record the trial court declined to consider whether or not the suits were composed in part of edgings or ornaments, and in the appeal to us no claim was made that the scalloped edges were ornaments within the tariff meaning of the term “ornaments,” as used in paragraph 1529 (a). One of the Government’s assignments of error before us was to the effect that if the scalloped edges were found not to be trimmings they should be held to be edgings, but during the oral argument counsel for the Government expressly Avithdrew that assignment of error.

The importer called as a witness Mrs. Sarah B. Chamlliss, general manager of importer’s infants’ wear department and buyer of infants’ wear, who prepared the memorandum for the order of the merchandise in question. She testified; in substance, that she had herself made infants’ suits like those involved; that they are made .“with a crochet needle and yarn”; that she was familiar with trimmings, having dealt with and sold them; that the scalloped edge had to be on the garment for a finish, “Otherwise the edge would be too weak and the garment .would break, and would not give satisfactory wear”; that “the scalloping is put on there to reinforce the edge”; that if not scalloped it would be necessary to use “an edge or binding”; that the edge is not fancy but “a plain edge as you get with a needle * * * as plain

an edge as you can possibly imagine”; that it is less expensive to make it as described than it would be to impose a plain binding, and that the scalloped edges are not trimmings as the term “trimmings” is commonly understood.

[101]*101Tbe witness also produced some infants’ bootees that were introduced as Illustrative Exhibits A and B, respectively, which she described as being trimmed. Of Exhibit A, she said:

This is trimmed in three different manners; it has an addition of lace, it has embroidery, and has an extra crochet of contrasted material which is superfluous to the garment, it is not necessary.

Exhibit B was also described by the witness as having an embellishment around the upper edge of the body “not necessary to the body of the garment.”

The Government called as a witness the examiner who passed upon the importation. His testimony is summarized in the Government’s brief before us as follows, the record pages being omitted:

Edward I. Stofman, who was the Examiner, had held that position for three years, haying passed on textiles, wool and cottons * * *. Although he was graduated at the Philadelphia Textile School, his familiarity with the meaning of the term “trimmings” originated with his customs work and not with his scholastic education * * *. His advisory classification in the instant case was dictated by the scalloped edge effect on the garments in Collective Exhibit 2. The white material is contrasted with the blue and constitutes the scallop. It is a different type of work than that in the body of the garment. In the Examiner’s opinion the garment would be complete without this so-called edging, and the edging gives it an ornamental effect. It serves no practical or utilitarian purpose. There would have to be some kind of binding on the edge but that does not require so extensive a piece of material. As the garment shows, the edging embellishes and gives the garment an ornamental character * * *.

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31 C.C.P.A. 98, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 127, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-hochschild-kohn-co-ccpa-1943.