United States v. Hirsch, Stein & Co.

8 Ct. Cust. 121, 1917 CCPA LEXIS 63
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 14, 1917
DocketNo. 1818
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 8 Ct. Cust. 121 (United States v. Hirsch, Stein & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Hirsch, Stein & Co., 8 Ct. Cust. 121, 1917 CCPA LEXIS 63 (ccpa 1917).

Opinion

Martin, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court;

The merchandise consists of sheet glue packed in bags, imported under the tariff act of October 3, 1913. It is conceded to be dutiable under paragraph 34 of that act at 1 cent per pound if “valued not above 10 cents'per pound” and at 15 per cent ad valorem if “valued above 10 cents per pound and not above 25 cents per pound.” The value of the glue per pound was not specified by the importers in the invoice or entry. In both of these the value of the importation was stated in gross. The sole question in the case relates to the method of calculation which should be pursued in order to ascertain the value [122]*122of the glue per pound for the purpose of classifying it Under the foregoing provisions.

The gross weight of the glue and bags was 21,977 pounds. The net weight of the glue was 21,527 pounds, the bags and other tare, if any, weighing 450 pounds. The total dutiable value of the importation, including both glue and bags, was $2,171. It is therefore manifest that if the total dutiable value, viz, $2,171, be divided by the gross weight in pounds, viz, 21,977 pounds, in order to determine the value of the glue per pound, the value would be fixed at less than 10 cents per pound, and the applicable rate of duty would be 1 cent per pound. On the other hand, if the total dutiable value be divided by the net weight of the glue in pounds, viz, 21,527 pounds, the resulting value would be more than 10 cents per pound, and the applicable rate of duty would be 15 per cent ad valorem.

The collector adopted the second method of calculation, that is to say, he divided the total dutiable value by the net weight of the glue, and accordingly found the value of the glue to be more than 10 cents per pound. Duty was thereupon assessed at the rate of 15 per cent ad valorem.

The importers filed their protest, and addressed their claim to the collector as follows:

(3) That you have erroneously divided the net weight of the glue into the total dutiable value for the purpose of ascertaining the value per pound, or by other improper and erroneous methods have determined said value to be in excess of 10 cents per pound.
(4) That said glue is invoiced, bought, and sold upon the basis of gross weight, or “gross for net,” and that the value per pound, ascertained by dividing the total dutiable value by gross weight as returned by the United States weigher, is not over 10 cents per pound.

The Board of General Appraisers in a majority decision sustained the contention of the importers, saying:

We do not think that the collector was warranted in thus dividing the gross amount of the appraised value by the ascertained net weight of the glue, for the reason that the gross appraised value did not represent the value of the glue but the value of the glue plus the cost of packing. If protestants had purchased the glue at 98 marks per kilogram or 115.6 crowns per 100 kilograms, packing extra, then the collector’s course in ascertaining the net value of the glue would have been the correct one.

The Government appeals from this decision.

It appears in the record that the importers purchased the merchandise abroad at a gross price in its packed condition, and that the weight and value thereof were accordingly invoiced and entered in gross. The entry, however, also disclosed the separate value of the bags, and their separate weight was,duly reported by the weigher. The appraiser approved the entered value,- and made the following indorsement thereon, viz, "Glue val. not over 10 c. lb. 1 c. lb.” It is manifest, however, that this entry was designed by the appraiser [123]*123as an advisory classification only, and not as an independent appraisal of value. It is disclosed by the record that the appraiser and the collector disagreed concerning the method to be pursued in determining the value of the glue for purposes of classification, the appraiser adopting the method contended for herein by the importers, ■ the collector adopting that contended for by the Government. The data for the respective methods of calculation, therefore, are not really in dispute in the case, but only the question as to which method shall be adopted as the correct one.

Upon this view of the facts we think that the present issue is identical with that decided by this court in the case of United States v. Francklyn (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 54; T. D. 33306). The importation in that case was cement packed in barrels, imported under the tariff act of 1909, and dutiable at $5 per ton if valued above $10 and not above $15 per ton, or at $10 per ton if valued above $15 and not above $30 per ton. Following a long-established ¿ustoms practice the court in that case held that in determining the value of the cement per ton for purposes of classification under these provisions the total dutiable value of the cement and barrels should be taken as the dividend, and the net weight in tons of the cement alone should be taken as the divisor. The resulting quotient was held to be the value of the cement per ton within the purview of the statute. This conclusion was based upon subsection 18 of section 28 of the tariff act of 1909, which provided that whenever imported merchandise was subject to an ad valorem rate of duty, or to a duty based upon or regulated in ■any manner by the value thereof , the duty should be assessed upon the actual market value thereof in the principal markets of the country of exportation at the time of exportation, and that such actual market value should be held to be the price at which such merchandise was freely offered for sale to all purchasers in said markets, in the usual wholesale quantities, including the value of all cartons, cases, crates, boxes, sacks, barrels, etc., and other containers and coverings, and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States. The section further provided that the word “value,” whenever used in the act, or in any law relating to the appraisement of imported merchandise, should be construed to signify value as above defined. In accordance with these provisions the “value” per ton of the imported cement, upon which its classification for duty depended, was held to mean the value per ton of the cement as proportionately enhanced or increased by the value of its coverings.

The court, by Montgomery, Presiding Judge, said:

The opinion, of the board was in accord with the foregoing, but the collector’s action was reversed by the board on grounds not stated in the opinion, presumably on the [124]*124ground that the proper divisor to be used in ascertaining the rate would be the weight of the cement with the coverings added. We think this was not permissible. The coverings were not dutiable by weight, as is provided in certain paragraphs of the act, notably paragraphs 86, 219, 248, and 292. Under section 2898, Revised Statutes, the weight of coverings is allowed as tare. Under subsection 18 the value of the coverings is added to the per se value of the cement and enhances the value of the cement itself, and is, in the absence of express provision, not to be considered in determining the weight. It stands for this purpose on the same footing as the “ other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States.”

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Bluebook (online)
8 Ct. Cust. 121, 1917 CCPA LEXIS 63, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-hirsch-stein-co-ccpa-1917.