United States v. Hinds County

District Court, S.D. Mississippi·Decided July 29, 2022·No. 3:16-cv-00489·Unknown

Opinion

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No. 3:16-CV-489-CWR-RHWR UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. HINDS COUNTY, ET AL., Defendants.

ORDER

Before CARLTON W. REEVES, District Judge. After nearly a decade of investigation and litigation regarding conditions at Hinds County’s Raymond Detention Center (RDC), see Docket No. 3-4 (2014 Grand Jury Report), the fac- tual and procedural history of this case is well-known. For to- day’s purposes, a brief summary of the present situation will suffice. In 2016, the United States Department of Justice brought this action to end unconstitutional conditions of confinement at

RDC and two other facilities that comprise the Hinds County jail system. The parties entered into a Consent Decree—and later, a Stipulated Order—to correct the problems. The County managed to turn the tide at the Work Center. Through its efforts, the County transformed the Work Center into “a functional jail for the citizens of Hinds County.”1 Docket No. 100 at 8 (citing the Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 29). The story was not the same at RDC. Despite promises to com- ply with this agreement, the County continually failed to abide by the Consent Decree’s provisions. Conditions there remained unchanged. As a result, in November 2021 the Court issued an Order to Show Cause directing the County to “explain why it should not be held in civil contempt and why a receivership should not be created to operate RDC.” Id. at 28. The County responded with more promises. It vowed to cor- rect the deficiencies at RDC if only the Court would extend the compliance deadline to July 1, 2022. See Docket No. 105 at 5 (“The County thus respectfully requests this Court give them until July 1, 2022 to prove they can make even more sig- nificant, positive change at RDC before the Court decides whether to take the drastic, extraordinary steps it is consider- ing taking.”). Quoting Robert Frost, the County declared “we ‘have promises to keep and miles to go before we sleep.’” Id. at 4. Rather than work to remedy the situation, though, the County moved to terminate or modify the Consent Decree un- der the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Docket No. 111.

1 The third facility, the downtown jail, closed in 2020. 2 On February 4, 2022, disturbed by the record number of as- saults, fires, and deaths, including murders, suicides, and overdoses, this Court issued its First Order of Contempt. Docket No. 126. The Order identified “more than two dozen provisions [of the Consent Decree] where the County is simply non-compliant with a Court Order.” Id. at 20. On February 14, 2022, the parties commenced a two-week trial regarding the appropriate remedy for the finding of con- tempt against the County, and to address the County’s PLRA motion. The United States urged for appointment of a re- ceiver, arguing that “[c]ontinuing remedial efforts short of re- ceivership will only lead to further confrontation, delay, and serious harm to the people confined to the Jail.” Docket No. 138 at 89. Taking the opposite position, the County contended that the Consent Decree should be “terminated and dissolved in its entirety.” Docket No. 140 at 29. The United States, the County submitted, “failed to prove either that the County failed to reasonably respond to any substantial risk of serious harm or that the prospective relief in the Consent Decree meets the PLRA’s . . . requirements.” Id. at 28-29. There was no need for further oversight or supervision, the County claimed. After the February 2022 proceedings, the Court again found the County in contempt. Docket No. 165. The Second Order of Contempt centered on the County’s decision to house de- tainees in A-Pod, in violation of the Stipulated Order. See Docket No. 165. This, despite Sheriff Tyree Jones admitting that the unit was unsafe. See id. at 5. The Order emphasized that “[i]mposition of ‘an appropriate sanction for that con- tempt’ is again reserved pending the PLRA termination 3 motion.’” Id. at 18 (citing Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford En- ters., 826 F.2d 392, 398 (5th Cir. 1987) (collecting cases)). The County has asked the Court to reconsider that Order.2 Docket No. 171. The United States opposes reconsideration. Next came this Court’s Order on the PLRA motion. In April, the County’s motion to modify or terminate was substantially granted. The Order revised the Consent Decree, excising those provisions that exceeded the constitutional minimum. See Docket No. 169 (“The New Injunction”). The New Injunc- tion removed the Work Center from the scope of remedial re- lief and dramatically scaled back the provisions applicable to RDC.3 Having given the County until July 1, 2022 to purge itself of contempt, per the County’s request, the Court held a final mit- igation hearing on July 19, 2022. The undersigned invited the County to argue its motion for reconsideration and welcomed any evidence that would ameliorate its record of non-compli- ance. After the better half of a day, the parties rested. After ample time and opportunity, regretfully, it is clear that the County is incapable, or unwilling, to handle its affairs. The County’s motion for reconsideration is denied. Additional in- tervention is required. It is time to appoint a receiver. I. Legal Standard “There can be no doubt that the paramount duty of the federal judiciary is to uphold the law. That is why, when a state fails

2 The County has not sought reconsideration of the First Order of Con- tempt. 3 Both parties have expressed their disagreement with aspects of the New Injunction by appealing the order. 4 to comply with the Constitution, the federal courts are com- pelled to enforce it.” Newman v. State of Ala., 466 F. Supp. 628, 635 (M.D. Ala. 1979). The Fifth Circuit has recognized the availability of receiver- ships “in the context of ensuring a governmental entity’s com- pliance with court orders.” Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, 703 F.3d 296, 306 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). “There can be little question . . . that receiverships are recognized equita- ble tools available to the courts to remedy otherwise uncor- rectable violations of the Constitution or laws.” Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F.3d 1088, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2010). When determining whether to appoint a federal receiver to manage a state facility, a court considers the following factors: (1) Whether there is a grave and immediate threat or actuality of harm . . . ; (2) Whether the use of less extreme measures of remediation have been exhausted or prove fu- tile; (3) Whether continued insistence [upon] com- pliance with the Court’s orders would lead only to confrontation and delay; (4) Whether there is a lack of leadership to turn the tide within a reasonable period of time; (5) Whether there is bad faith; (6) Whether resources are being wasted; and (7) Whether a receiver is likely to provide a rel- atively quick and efficient remedy. 5 Plata v. Schwarzenegger (“Plata I”), No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932253, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005) (collecting cases), aff’d, Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). The Fifth Circuit has identified similar factors in the context of “appoint[ing] a receiver to take possession of the judgment debtor’s property for preservation.” Santibanez v. Wier McMahon & Co., 105 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1997). Factors such as “‘a valid claim by the party seeking the appointment;’” “’imminent danger’” to the property at issue; “‘lack of less drastic equitable remedy;’” and “‘likelihood that appointing the receiver will do more harm than good’” parallel those used in the jail receivership analysis. Id. at 241-42 (quoting Aviation Supply Corp. v. R.S.V.I.

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