United States v. Hill

25 F. 375, 1885 U.S. App. LEXIS 2263
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts
DecidedNovember 14, 1885
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 25 F. 375 (United States v. Hill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Hill, 25 F. 375, 1885 U.S. App. LEXIS 2263 (circtdma 1885).

Opinion

Nelson, J.

This is an action upon the bond given by the defendant Hill, as the clerk of the United States district court of this district, and is submitted to the decision of the court, upon an agreed statement of facts, the material parts of which are as follows: The defendant Hill was appointed clerk of the district court on the fifth day of .February, 1879, and duly qualified as clerk, and the defendants gave the bond, a copy of which is annexed to the declaration. As clerk ho has made half-yearly returns of feos and emoluments received by liim, but he has not included in the same the amounts received by him for the naturalization of aliens in the district court. It has been the custom in the United States courts in this district, for a long time, not less than 45 years before the dale of the writ in the present action, and known and approved by the judges, for the clerk to charge one dollar as a foe for a declaration of intention to become a citizen, and two dollars as a fee for a final naturalization añd certificate thereof; and the clerk of the district court has never included these in the fees and emoluments returned by him, and. this has been known to the judges, to whom the accounts have been semi-annually exhibited, and by whom they were passed without objection in this particular. Following this custom, and believing and being informed that those fees formed no part of the emoluments to be returned to the government, the defendant Hill has not included these amounts in his accounts, and this was known to the judge when his accounts were examined, and he made on each the certificate required by law; and his accounts so made out up to July 1, 1884, have been examined and adjusted by the accounting officers of the treasury department. The clerks of the several courts of the state of Massachusetts made similar charges for like services, and made no returns to the treasurers of the counties of the fees so received until the passage of the statute of the state of 1879, c. 800. Section 883, Rev. St., reads as follows:

“Every district attorney, clerk o£ a district court, clerk of a circuit court, and marshal shall, on the first days of January and July in each year, or within thirty days thereafter, make to the attorney general, in such form as he may prescribe, a written return for the half year ending on said days, [376]*376respectively, of all the fees and emoluments of his office, of every name and character, and of all the necessary expenses of his office, including necessary clerk hire, together with the vouchers for the payment of the same for such last half year. He shall átate separately in such returns the fees and emoluments received or payable under the bankrupt act; and every marshal shall state separately therein the fees and emoluments received or payable for services rendered by himself personally, those received or payable for services rendered by each of his deputies, naming him, and the proportion of such fees and emoluments which, by the terms of his service, each deputy is to receive. Said returns shall be verified by the oath of the officer making them.”

The position of the government is that the sums received from naturalization were “fees and emoluments,” within the meaning of section 833, which the clerk was bound to include in his returns. The ground taken is that these sums were charged and received for services rendered by the clerk in his official capacity, and he is therefore bound to account for them, whether they were chargeable under section 828, which prescribes the fees of the clerks, or not.

To determine the soundness of this proposition it is necessary to recur to former as well as to the existing legislation of congress upon the subject, and especially to the action of the courts and of the executive departments of the government. By the act of March 3, 1791, (1 St. 217, § 1,) the compensation of the clerks was fixed at five dollars a day for attending court, and their travel. To this was added, by the act of May 8, 1792, (1 St. 277, § 3,) such fees as were allowed in the supreme courts of the state, with a provision that for discharging duties not performed by the clerks of the state courts, and for which the laws of the state made no allowance, the court might allow a reasonable compensation. Under these acts the clerks were allowed to retain all their fees, and were not required to render any account of them to the government. The first law requiring returns to be made was the act of March 3, 1841, (5 St. 427.) This act established the compensation of clerks of courts at $4,500 a year, above clerk hire and office expenses, payable from fees only, and required them to pay the overplus into the public treasury, under such rules and regulations as might be prescribed by the secretary of the treasury. The next in order of time was the act of May 18, 1842, (5 St. 483.) That act required the clerks to make to the secretary of the treasury semi-annual returns, embracing all the fees and emoluments of their office, of every name and character, distinguishing those received or payable under the bankrupt act from those received or payable for any other services. It authorized the clerk of the district court to retain from the fees and emoluments of his office, above office expenses and clerk hire, as his personal compensation, $3,500 a year, and required him to pay-the surplus into the treasury. It has been stated that the provision in this act as to bankruptcy fees was inserted to change the law, as ruled by Judge Storv, that under the act of March 3, 1841, the clerks were not bound to account for fees earned under the bankrupt act of August 19,1841. The act of March [377]*3773,1849, (9 St. 395, § 4,) establishing the department of the interior, transferred the supervision of the accounts of clerks to the secretary of the interior. Until the act of February 20, 1853, (10 St. 161,) the official fees of the clerks remained, in substance, as fixed by tlie acts of 1791 and 1792. The act of 1853 was the first uniform statute regulating the foes of the clerks and other officers of tlie courts throughout the United States. It established tlie present fee-bill, and is reproduced in sections 828-857, Rev. St. Its provisions in regard to returns to be made by the clerks were the same as in the act of 1842, except that they were to bo made to the secretary of the interior, as directed by the act of 1848, instead of to the secretary of the treasury. Since the act of June 22,1870, creating the department of justice, the returns have been made to the attorney general, and supervision of these accounts lias been exercised by that officer of the government.

Upon an examination of the statute it will be seen that it applies to taxable costs in all ordinary litigation, whether at law or in equity or admiralty, and undoubtedly governs the taxation in all such actions, suits, and proceedings, civil and criminal, in personam and in rem, in the courts of the United States. But it has not usually been considered, at least in this district, as applying to certain special and peculiar cases, of which the courts have jurisdiction, where only the party asking for the right or privilege is before the court, and from the nature of the case, no costs are taxable as in ordinary litigated suits. Of such a character are proceedings under the naturalization laws, under the shipping commissioner’s act, and applications to be admitted to practice as an attorney. Thus Judge Sttepley early refused to allow the clerk to tax costs by the fee-bill on applications under the shipping commissioner’s act of June 7, 1872, (17 St. 272; Rtev. St.

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Bluebook (online)
25 F. 375, 1885 U.S. App. LEXIS 2263, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-hill-circtdma-1885.