United States v. Hill

260 F. Supp. 139
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedSeptember 29, 1966
DocketCrim. 36501
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 260 F. Supp. 139 (United States v. Hill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Hill, 260 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Cal. 1966).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

YOUNGDAHL, District Judge.

This case came before the undersigned, the defendant having waived jury trial, under a four-count indictment charging him with willful and knowledgeable evasion of income tax for the years 1959, 1960, 1961 and 1962. All the facts were stipulated, including the findings of fact set forth by Judge Carter in a pre-indictment civil proceeding wherein the defendant moved for the suppression and return of certain of his records and for a temporary restraining order against the Internal Revenue Service. Hill v. United States, Civil No. 3057, S.D.Cal., June 24, 1964. Judge Carter’s findings in pertinent part are appended to this memorandum as Appendix A and are to be considered as a portion thereof. Also appended hereto as Appendix B are the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of this Court.

In this case the only issue upon which the Court must rule is a motion by the defendant for the suppression and return of certain business records and information obtained from the defendant, an oral surgeon, in alleged violation of his constitutional rights under the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution of the United States. Other matters in this criminal tax fraud case have been settled by stipulation. This very issue was previously decided adversely to defendant in the pre-indictment civil proceeding before Judge Carter in 1964. His finding that no constitutional rights had been violated was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 346 F.2d 175 (1965). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 382 U.S. 956, 86 S.Ct. 433, 15 L.Ed.2d 361 (1965).

Now the government has begun a criminal prosecution and the defendant has again moved to suppress. The present motion must be considered in the light of Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964); and Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966). These cases were decided subsequent to Judge Carter’s 1964 findings.

In Escobedo the Court stated, “We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory— when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession — our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.” 378 U.S. at 492, 84 S.Ct. at 1766.

The defendant urges that the entire inspection of his financial dealings by the Internal Revenue Service was not investigatory but accusatory in nature. Furthermore, the defendant asserts, because the process had become accusatory and because the Internal Revenue agents failed in their affirmative duty to issue the constitutional warnings required by Miranda, a large part of the records and information turned over by him to the Internal Revenue Service should be suppressed and returned.

The facts pertinent to the instant case begin on June 12, 1963, when Internal Revenue Agent Corwin B. DeVotie, in the course of making a civil audit of defendant’s 1961 tax return, telephoned the defendant and arranged a meeting at the defendant’s dental offices for June 17, 1963, in order to discuss this return. At the meeting Agent DeVotie introduced himself, presented his credentials, and received certain of the defendant’s professional records which had been previously requested in the telephone conversation. Agent DeVotie proceeded to examine these records in one of the defendant’s offices while the latter tended patients and generally conducted his normal affairs in other rooms on the same premises. The agent noted certain understatements of income but did not mention them to the defendant.

*141 At all times during this initial meeting and his subsequent contacts with the Internal Revenue Service, defendant was as helpful as possible, volunteering information and records and orally expressing his desire to be cooperative.

On October 18, 1963, the pair met in the defendant’s offices, at which time Agent DeVotie asked defendant Hill to explain certain discrepancies between his 1962 return, on the one hand, and his 1960 and 1961 returns, on the other. In response defendant stated in effect that he had been waiting for this momentJ to come and that he was glad that it was? out in the open. Several days later, defendant voluntarily surrendered additional documents to Agent DeVotie. Shortly after this meeting, Agent DeVotie referred the matter to his superiors with the suggestion that the possibility of tax fraud existed. 1

On January 8, 1964, Special Agent Edwin H. Wordell of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service was assigned to the case. A few days later, he conferred with Agent DeVotie in order to familiarize himself with the case,

Following a telephone call to defendant on January 21, 1964, Agent DeVotie presented Agent Wordell to the defendant in his dental offices the next day. Agent Wordell was introduced as a Special Agent of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service and his credentials were examined by the defendant who again expressed his willingness to cooperate with the investigation. Upon request defendant voluntarily turned over certain records to Agent Wordell for further examination at the Internal Revenue Service offices in San Diego.

On February 26, 1964, at Agent Wordell’s invitation, the defendant came to the Internal Revenue Service offices in San Diego and was orally warned of his constitutional rights as set forth in Miranda.

It must be decided by this Court whether the Miranda warnings given on February 26 were given too late — that is, should the constitutional warnings required by Miranda have been given prior to February 26.

This Court is convinced that the Miranda case does not apply to this situation and that none of the defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated.

Defendant’s entire case is based on the premise that the shadowy boundary be-tween “investigatory” and “accusatory” was crossed by the government before February 26, 1964. Since Escobedo was handed down in 1964, there has been much discussion and confusion over the interpretation of these two terms. Defendant in the instant case attempts to pinpoint the shift to “accusatory” by presenting evidence concerning the intent of the Internal Revenue Service as dis-played in certain of its manuals, inter-office manuals, and the testimony on cross-examination of the two agents. It is urSed that the process became accusatory not later than the October 18, 1963, “confession” of defendant,

On the other hand, the government, making use of the testimony of the agents, contends that the process was investigatory at least until February 26, 1964; that at the outset the investigation was civil in nature; and that the Internal Revenue’s activities after October 18 were aimed at corroboration of Prior disclosures and a decision as to whether to prosecute,

The utilization since Escobedo

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Bluebook (online)
260 F. Supp. 139, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-hill-casd-1966.