USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 1 of 7
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-11045 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
HIAWATHA LAQUINTA SCOTT, III, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 4:23-cr-00044-MW-MAF-1 ____________________
Before LUCK, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Because of his prior convictions, Hiawatha Scott, III’s 300- month prison sentence included a fifteen-year mandatory mini- mum under the Armed Career Criminal Act and a twenty-five-year USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 2 of 7
2 Opinion of the Court 24-11045
mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. section 841. Scott appeals his sentence because the district court, rather than a jury, found that his prior convictions were committed on separate occasions, in violation of Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). But be- cause, as part of his guilty plea, Scott freely admitted that his prior convictions were committed on separate occasions, there was no Erlinger error. We affirm his sentence. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Scott was indicted on two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (counts one and four), two counts of distribu- tion of five grams or more of methamphetamine (counts two and five), two counts of distribution of fifty grams or more of meth- amphetamine (counts three and six), and possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine (count 7). The indictment listed as “[e]nhanceable [p]rior [c]onvictions” fel- ony battery, twice selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of a place of worship, and attempted first degree murder. The prior convictions, the indictment alleged, were “committed on occasions different from one another.” Scott’s Guilty Plea Scott pleaded guilty to the indictment. In his statement of facts, Scott agreed that he had “prior convictions” for felony bat- tery, twice selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of a place of worship, and attempted first degree murder. These convictions, he admit- ted, “occurred on separate occasions from each other.” USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 3 of 7
24-11045 Opinion of the Court 3
During the plea colloquy, the district court confirmed that Scott had read and understood his statement of facts: The court: The plea agreement, the supplement to the plea agreement, and the statement of facts, did you read all three of those documents line by line, word for word? Scott: Yes, sir. The court: Did you go over them with your lawyer ...? Scott: Yes, sir. The court: Did she answer any and all questions you had regarding those documents? Scott: Yes, sir. The court: Do you have any questions for either [your attorney] or myself regarding those documents at this time? Scott: No, sir.” And the district court confirmed that Scott agreed with everything in the statement of facts: The court: You signed off on the statement of facts. By signing off on the statement of facts, are you agreeing the government could prove those facts beyond a reasonable doubt if you went to trial? Scott: Yes, sir. USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 4 of 7
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The district court then accepted the guilty plea, explaining that it found “the facts the government [wa]s prepared to prove have been admitted by [Scott] here in open court, and [he] further admitted those facts by signing off on the statement of facts.” Scott’s Sentencing Following the guilty plea, the probation office prepared a presentence report. The report explained that, based on his prior convictions, Scott was subject to a fifteen-year mandatory mini- mum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. And he qualified for a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence un- der 21 U.S.C. section 841. The report described four of Scott’s prior convictions. On November 10, 2000, Scott committed a felony battery when he “forcibly abducted and battered” his then-girlfriend and struck her friend. Twice, on May 2, 2001, Scott “delivered cocaine.” First, to one individual and then later that day “to different individuals.” And, on July 30, 2001, Scott “intentionally, from a premeditated de- sign attempted to effect the death of Jarrell Luther with a hand- gun.” Scott objected to the enhancement under the Act, arguing his selling cocaine and attempted murder convictions occurred on the same occasion. The district court overruled Scott’s objection and sentenced him based on the mandatory minimum enhance- ments in the Act and section 841 to 300 months imprisonment. USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 5 of 7
24-11045 Opinion of the Court 5
STANDARD OF REVIEW We review constitutional errors de novo. United States v. Har- ris, 741 F.3d 1245, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014). DISCUSSION Typically, when a defendant is convicted of possessing a fire- arm as a felon, the maximum sentence is fifteen years of prison time. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8). But the fifteen-year maximum be- comes a mandatory-minimum sentence if the defendant has three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” Id. § 924(e)(1). Similarly, distributing or possessing with the intent to distrib- ute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine normally comes with a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). But if a defendant has two “or more prior con- victions for a serious drug felony or serious violent felony,” the mandatory minimum pops up to twenty-five years. Id. Under sec- tion 841, “prior convictions [that] resulted from acts forming a sin- gle criminal episode . . . should be treated as a single conviction.” United States v. Rice, 43 F.3d 601, 603 n.1, 605 (11th Cir. 1995). In Erlinger, the Supreme Court held that offenses committed on separate occasions, which “‘increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed[,]’ must be re- solved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt” or “freely admitted in a guilty plea.” 602 U.S. at 834 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). Relying on Erlinger, Scott contends USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 6 of 7
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that, before the district court could impose the mandatory mini- mum sentences, a jury finding was required to establish that his prior convictions were committed on separate occasions.1 But be- cause Scott “freely admitted in his guilty plea” that his prior con- victions were committed on separate occasions, we conclude there was no Erlinger error. See id. “A plea of guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful sentence.” United States v. Broce,
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USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 1 of 7
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-11045 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
HIAWATHA LAQUINTA SCOTT, III, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 4:23-cr-00044-MW-MAF-1 ____________________
Before LUCK, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Because of his prior convictions, Hiawatha Scott, III’s 300- month prison sentence included a fifteen-year mandatory mini- mum under the Armed Career Criminal Act and a twenty-five-year USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 2 of 7
2 Opinion of the Court 24-11045
mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. section 841. Scott appeals his sentence because the district court, rather than a jury, found that his prior convictions were committed on separate occasions, in violation of Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). But be- cause, as part of his guilty plea, Scott freely admitted that his prior convictions were committed on separate occasions, there was no Erlinger error. We affirm his sentence. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Scott was indicted on two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (counts one and four), two counts of distribu- tion of five grams or more of methamphetamine (counts two and five), two counts of distribution of fifty grams or more of meth- amphetamine (counts three and six), and possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine (count 7). The indictment listed as “[e]nhanceable [p]rior [c]onvictions” fel- ony battery, twice selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of a place of worship, and attempted first degree murder. The prior convictions, the indictment alleged, were “committed on occasions different from one another.” Scott’s Guilty Plea Scott pleaded guilty to the indictment. In his statement of facts, Scott agreed that he had “prior convictions” for felony bat- tery, twice selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of a place of worship, and attempted first degree murder. These convictions, he admit- ted, “occurred on separate occasions from each other.” USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 3 of 7
24-11045 Opinion of the Court 3
During the plea colloquy, the district court confirmed that Scott had read and understood his statement of facts: The court: The plea agreement, the supplement to the plea agreement, and the statement of facts, did you read all three of those documents line by line, word for word? Scott: Yes, sir. The court: Did you go over them with your lawyer ...? Scott: Yes, sir. The court: Did she answer any and all questions you had regarding those documents? Scott: Yes, sir. The court: Do you have any questions for either [your attorney] or myself regarding those documents at this time? Scott: No, sir.” And the district court confirmed that Scott agreed with everything in the statement of facts: The court: You signed off on the statement of facts. By signing off on the statement of facts, are you agreeing the government could prove those facts beyond a reasonable doubt if you went to trial? Scott: Yes, sir. USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 4 of 7
4 Opinion of the Court 24-11045
The district court then accepted the guilty plea, explaining that it found “the facts the government [wa]s prepared to prove have been admitted by [Scott] here in open court, and [he] further admitted those facts by signing off on the statement of facts.” Scott’s Sentencing Following the guilty plea, the probation office prepared a presentence report. The report explained that, based on his prior convictions, Scott was subject to a fifteen-year mandatory mini- mum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. And he qualified for a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence un- der 21 U.S.C. section 841. The report described four of Scott’s prior convictions. On November 10, 2000, Scott committed a felony battery when he “forcibly abducted and battered” his then-girlfriend and struck her friend. Twice, on May 2, 2001, Scott “delivered cocaine.” First, to one individual and then later that day “to different individuals.” And, on July 30, 2001, Scott “intentionally, from a premeditated de- sign attempted to effect the death of Jarrell Luther with a hand- gun.” Scott objected to the enhancement under the Act, arguing his selling cocaine and attempted murder convictions occurred on the same occasion. The district court overruled Scott’s objection and sentenced him based on the mandatory minimum enhance- ments in the Act and section 841 to 300 months imprisonment. USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 5 of 7
24-11045 Opinion of the Court 5
STANDARD OF REVIEW We review constitutional errors de novo. United States v. Har- ris, 741 F.3d 1245, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014). DISCUSSION Typically, when a defendant is convicted of possessing a fire- arm as a felon, the maximum sentence is fifteen years of prison time. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8). But the fifteen-year maximum be- comes a mandatory-minimum sentence if the defendant has three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” Id. § 924(e)(1). Similarly, distributing or possessing with the intent to distrib- ute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine normally comes with a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). But if a defendant has two “or more prior con- victions for a serious drug felony or serious violent felony,” the mandatory minimum pops up to twenty-five years. Id. Under sec- tion 841, “prior convictions [that] resulted from acts forming a sin- gle criminal episode . . . should be treated as a single conviction.” United States v. Rice, 43 F.3d 601, 603 n.1, 605 (11th Cir. 1995). In Erlinger, the Supreme Court held that offenses committed on separate occasions, which “‘increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed[,]’ must be re- solved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt” or “freely admitted in a guilty plea.” 602 U.S. at 834 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). Relying on Erlinger, Scott contends USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 6 of 7
6 Opinion of the Court 24-11045
that, before the district court could impose the mandatory mini- mum sentences, a jury finding was required to establish that his prior convictions were committed on separate occasions.1 But be- cause Scott “freely admitted in his guilty plea” that his prior con- victions were committed on separate occasions, we conclude there was no Erlinger error. See id. “A plea of guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful sentence.” United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989) (emphasis added). Thus, “a valid guilty plea ‘forgoes not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitu- tional guarantees.’” Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 182 (2018) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–29 (2002)). Here, Scott “freely admitted in a guilty plea” that he had the requisite number of qualifying convictions for both enhancements. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834. He pleaded guilty to an indictment that alleged he “had at least three previous convictions for a violent fel- ony, a serious drug offense, or both committed on occasions different from one another.” (emphasis added). The indictment listed the
1 Erlinger only discussed the “separate occasions” requirement in the Armed Career Criminal Act. Section 841’s text does not include a “separate occa- sions” requirement. But Rice read one in—or something like it. For the sake of argument, we assume that Erlinger would apply to our judicially imposed “separate occasions” requirement in section 841. We make that assumption because, even if Erlinger applied to the section 841 enhancement, the outcome would be the same here. USCA11 Case: 24-11045 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 7 of 7
24-11045 Opinion of the Court 7
cocaine sales, the attempted murder, and the felony battery as “[e]nhanceable [p]rior [c]onvictions.” In his statement of facts, Scott admitted that he had been convicted of felony battery, selling cocaine, and the attempted mur- der. And he agreed that “[t]he convictions . . . occurred on separate occasions from each other. During his plea colloquy, Scott confirmed that his prior con- victions were part of “the facts the government [wa]s prepared to prove,” he agreed “the government could prove those facts beyond a reasonable doubt,” and he “admitted” to them “in open court” and “by signing off on the statement of facts.” Because Scott “freely admitted in a guilty plea” that he committed his prior con- victions on separate occasions, no jury finding was required under Erlinger. Scott tries to get around this conclusion by arguing that he only admitted that his convictions were separate—not his offenses. But this argument fails. Scott’s guilty plea accepted the allegations in the indictment, which included that his prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another.” Because Scott admitted as part of his plea that his prior convictions were committed on occasions different from one another, the district court did not err in imposing the mandatory minimum sentences. AFFIRMED.