F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 1 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 98-4035 v. (D. Utah) JOSE WILFRED HERNANDEZ- (D.C. No. 97-CR-042-02-C) GONZALES,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the *
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Defendant Jose Wilfredo Hernandez-Gonzales appeals his conviction by a
jury for possession and transfer of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and
aiding and abetting such possession and transfer, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On January 29, 1997, Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales was a passenger in his own
car, which was driven by Jesus Alberto Tobar, a/k/a David Monterrossa. A third
man, Cristo Ernesto Rivas, was also a passenger in the car. As they drove north
on Interstate 15 near Nephi, Utah, en route from Los Angeles, Utah Highway
Patrol Sergeant Paul Mangelson stopped the car because the windows were tinted
darker than permitted under Utah law.
When Sgt. Mangelson asked Mr. Tobar for his license and registration, Mr.
Tobar produced neither and stated that the car belonged to a “friend.” He did not
inform Sgt. Mangelson that the car belonged to Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales, who
was sitting in the rear seat of the car. Sgt. Mangelson testified that he smelled
burnt marijuana and air freshener in the vehicle, and he observed a can of air
freshener on the car floor next to Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s foot, as well as
another air freshener canister, and a pager. The trooper then asked all three men
-2- to exit the vehicle, and he frisked each one. He found a small plastic baggie
containing a substance he suspected to be marijuana in Mr. Rivas’ pants pocket.
Sgt. Mangelson testified that he asked Mr. Tobar for permission to search
the car, and Mr. Tobar consented. His search of the car revealed additional
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. In the trunk of the car the officer found, inter
alia, a can of Fix-a-Flat and two screwdrivers. There were virtually no other
personal belongings or luggage in the car. The officer found registration
materials in the glove compartment indicating that the car belonged to Mr.
Hernandez-Gonzales and his sister. The officer further noted that the three to
four-year-old car had over 102,000 miles on it. When searching the engine area
of the car, Sgt. Mangelson found four separately wrapped packages containing
more than 700 grams of methamphetamine taped inside the car’s air filter. The
wrapping included layers of cayenne pepper and mustard. The three men were
then arrested.
Following their arrest, Sgt. Mangelson found a wallet lying on the ground
near where the three men had stood while the search took place. In it was a
phone number with a Utah area code, which police personnel eventually identified
as belonging to a Scott Hamilton. Mr. Tobar said the wallet was his.
While the three men were being detained in the Juab County Jail, they all
initially denied any knowledge of the drugs. Mr. Tobar then asked Sgt.
-3- Mangelson and special agent Bruce Provost of the Utah Bureau of Investigation if
it would be better for the other two if he alone took responsibility for the drugs.
He then told the officers that he alone knew that the drugs were in the car, and
that Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales and Mr. Rivas knew nothing about them. The next
day, Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales asked the same hypothetical question–would the
others go free if one of them took full responsibility for the methamphetamine.
Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales had $317 in his possession when he was arrested, Mr.
Tobar had $28 and Mr. Rivas had $2.00.
Mr. Tobar and Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales were each indicted on one count of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and aiding and
abetting. They filed motions to suppress, which were denied. Mr. Tobar
ultimately pled guilty and was sentenced to 120 months. Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales
has consistently maintained he knew nothing about the methamphetamine. He
pled not guilty and proceeded to trial. The jury found him guilty, and he was
sentenced to a term of 168 months. This appeal followed.
Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales argues: 1) the trial court gave the jury an “anti-
deadlock” instruction which improperly coerced the jury into finding him guilty;
2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; 3) the trial court erred
in refusing to grant him a continuance so he could attempt to secure Mr. Tobar’s
-4- testimony; 4) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress; and 5) his
trial counsel was ineffective.
DISCUSSION
I. Anti-Deadlock Instruction
Trial to the jury lasted two days. The jury then commenced deliberations,
and it deliberated for 22 hours, including until 11:30 p.m. on Thursday, December
11. When it returned at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, December 12, to resume its
deliberations, the court gave the jury the following “anti-deadlock” instruction:
I thought that this instruction maybe can help you. You’ve now been out altogether about 21 or 22 hours, so I’d ask you to listen to me very carefully if you would. This is an important case. The trial has been expensive in time, effort and money to both the defense and the prosecution. If you should fail to agree upon a verdict, the case is left open and must be tried again. Obviously, another trial would only serve to increase the costs to both sides, and there’s no reason to believe that the case can be tried again by either side better or more exhaustively that it’s been tried before you. It’s your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view toward reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. Remember, you are not advocates; you are not partisans; you are judges of the facts. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if you’re convinced it’s erroneous, but do not surrender your honest opinion–your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
-5- I’m going to ask you to retire once again, continue your deliberations with these additional comments in mind, to be applied of course in conjunction with all of the instructions I have previously given you.
R. Vol. IV, at 472-73. Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s counsel objected to the
instruction as given, arguing that it should have included the statement that
“should you still remain unable to reach a unanimous conclusion, then that will be
your conclusion.” Id. at 470. The judge refused to modify it.
The jury resumed its deliberations. At 11:30 a.m., juror number 12,
Ms. Emeline Lines, complained about some health problems she had been
experiencing and voiced doubts about her ability to continue to serve. 1 The judge
urged her to return to the jury room. At 12:30 p.m., the jury returned a guilty
verdict.
We urge caution in the use of Allen instructions like the one given in this
case. 2 United States v. Rodriguez-Mejia , 20 F.3d 1090, 1091 (10th Cir. 1994).
“We review whether an Allen instruction was erroneously given on a case-by-case
basis with a view towards determining whether the instruction had a coercive
effect on the jury.” Id. Factors relevant to determining whether the instruction
was coercive include “(1) [t]he language of the instruction; (2) its incorporation
1 Ms. Lines had apparently made similar complaints the day before.
The so-called Allen instruction derives its name from jury instructions 2
approved in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
-6- with other instructions; and (3) the timing of the instruction, for example, whether
given before the jury has commenced deliberations and whether given before the
jury has reached an impasse or deadlock.” United States v. Porter , 881 F.2d 878,
888 (10th Cir. 1989) (footnotes omitted).
Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales argues that the wording and the timing of the
Allen instruction impermissibly coerced the jury into returning a guilty verdict.
We disagree. We have previously approved virtually identical language. See
Rodriguez-Mejia , 20 F.3d at 1091-92; United States v. Butler , 904 F.2d 1482,
1487-88 (10th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, as in Rodriguez-Mejia , the instruction
was directed at the entire jury, not just the minority, thereby reducing further the
possibility of coercion. See Rodriguez-Mejia , 20 F.3d at 1092; see also United
States v. Meuli , 8 F.3d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1995). The instruction also
emphasized, as in Rodriguez-Mejia , that the jurors should not surrender their
honest convictions. We therefore perceive no error in the language of the
instruction.
We further hold that there was no error in the timing of the instruction.
“We have held on many occasions that, while not preferred, it is not error to give
an Allen instruction after deliberations have begun but before the jury declares
deadlock.” Rodriguez-Mejia , 20 F.3d at 1092; see also United States v. Smith ,
857 F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1988) . We decline to speculate that the jury
-7- necessarily felt coerced simply because they reached a verdict two hours after the
Allen anti-deadlock instruction was given.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales argues there was insufficient evidence to support
his conviction for possession and transfer or aiding and abetting the possession
and transfer of the methamphetamine. “We review claims of insufficiency of the
evidence by ‘review[ing] the record de novo and ask[ing] only whether, taking the
evidence–both direct and circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom–in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v.
Flores , 149 F.3d 1272, 1276-77 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Voss ,
82 F.3d 1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir. 1996)), cert. denied , 1999 WL 8590 (Jan. 11,
1999) (No. 98-7192).
Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales was charged with knowing and intentional
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and with aiding and
abetting Mr. Tobar’s knowing and intentional possession of methamphetamine
with intent to distribute. The government accordingly had to prove “beyond a
reasonable doubt the following elements: ‘(1) the defendant knowingly possessed
the illegal drug; and (2) the defendant possessed the drug with the specific intent
-8- to distribute it.’” United States v. Reece , 86 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted). To prove the aiding and abetting charge, the government had
to show that Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales
willfully associate[d] himself with the criminal venture and [sought] to make it succeed through some action on his part. The government must prove more than mere presence at the scene of the crime even if coupled with knowledge that the crime is being committed. However, participation may be established by circumstantial evidence, and the evidence may be of relatively slight moment.
United States v. McDonald , 150 F.3d 1301, 1305 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting United
States v. Esparsen , 930 F.2d 1461, 1470 (10th Cir. 1991)).
The sheer volume of the methamphetamine in the car is strong evidence of
the intent to distribute element. See United States v. Gay , 774 F.2d 368, 372
(10th Cir. 1985) (“The quantity of the drug possessed is a circumstance which
may permit the inference that the possessor intended to sell, deliver, or otherwise
distribute.”). The main issue is whether, in light of Mr. Tobar’s claim that he
alone knew of the drugs and Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s claim that he did not
know of them, the evidence supports the conviction for knowing possession of the
methamphetamine.
“Possession may be actual or constructive.” United States v. Carter , 130
F.3d 1432, 1441 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1856 (1998). In this
case, the question is whether Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales had constructive
possession of the methamphetamine in his car. “Generally, a person has
-9- constructive possession when he or she knowingly holds ownership, dominion or
control over the object and premises where it is found.” United States v.
Valadez-Gallegos , No. 98-2017, 1998 WL 879735, at *7 (10th Cir. Dec. 17,
1998). “To prove constructive possession when there is joint occupancy of a
vehicle, the government must present direct or circumstantial evidence to show
some connection or nexus individually linking the defendant to the contraband.”
Id.
The evidence presented to the jury in this case established the following:
Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales was the registered owner of the vehicle; when it was
stopped, the driver told Sgt. Mangelson, in Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s presence,
that the car belonged to a “friend,” and neither Mr. Tobar nor Mr. Hernandez-
Gonzales ever informed the officer that Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales was the
registered owner; Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales was traveling along a known drug
corridor (Interstate 15) from a known drug source city (Los Angeles); Mr.
Hernandez-Gonzales had no luggage and virtually no supplies, although he was
making a fairly long trip; the car contained two air fresheners, which drug
traffickers commonly use to mask the odor of drugs, as well as a pager; the
occupants of the car told the officer they were going to visit an uncle, whose
name and address they were all unable to provide; while Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales
had told his wife he was going to Utah to purchase a car, he never informed the
-10- police officer of this intention; 3 Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales had $317 when arrested,
presumably an insufficient amount with which to buy a car; and the three to four-
year-old car had exceptionally high mileage.
Given that we must view this evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, and considering what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the
evidence, we hold that a reasonable jury could have convicted Mr. Hernandez-
Gonzales of possession with intent to distribute beyond a reasonable doubt.
Additionally, the same evidence could reasonably support the aiding and abetting
conviction.
III. Continuance
On the first day of trial, Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s counsel informed the
court that, although he had not previously tried to secure the attendance of Mr.
Tobar at trial, Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales had now changed his mind and wanted
Mr. Tobar to testify in person about his statement to police personnel taking full
Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s wife testified that she and Mr. Hernandez- 3
Gonzales were experiencing financial difficulties and that Mr. Tobar had, by himself, taken the car for approximately two hours prior to the departure to Ogden. Defense counsel emphasized this testimony to the jury, arguing it gave Mr. Tobar ample opportunity to himself place the methamphetamine in the car, without Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s knowledge. Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s wife never informed anyone of that event until she was called to testify at trial.
-11- and sole responsibility for the methamphetamine. 4 Mr. Tobar was incarcerated in
California on murder and attempted murder charges. The court signed a writ of
habeas corpus ad testificandum. When the U.S. Marshal’s office told the court
that it would take days, perhaps a week, to bring Mr. Tobar to Utah from
California, Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s counsel then said, “If it’s possible to bring
Tobar in from California next week, I understood earlier from Your Honor’s clerk
that there may have been a day next week that Your Honor might have had a half-
a-day available.” R. Vol. II, at 79. In response, the court stated that “I can’t do
that to the jury. We’re going to have–the case is going to go.” Id.
On the second day of trial, the marshal’s office reported that it would be
unable to secure Mr. Tobar’s presence at trial. The court therefore held that Mr.
Tobar was unavailable, and the Mr. Tobar’s hearsay statement would be
admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 804. Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales did not
object to that ruling.
4 Apparently, defense counsel had known for several weeks that the government would object to any attempt to introduce Mr. Tobar’s statement as hearsay. But defense counsel made no effort to obtain Mr. Tobar’s presence so he could testify in person because Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales did not want Mr. Tobar to testify and defense counsel was worried about impeachment of Mr. Tobar and possible negative effects from his testimony. On the first day of trial, however, Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales changed his mind and decided he wanted Mr. Tobar to testify.
-12- He argues on appeal that the court erred in failing to grant what he views as
his request for a continuance. We agree with the government that Mr. Hernandez-
Gonzales did not clearly request a continuance, and we perceive no error in the
court’s failure to sua sponte grant a continuance. See United States v. Harvey ,
959 F.2d 1371, 1377 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant had waived his claim
that the court erred in failing to grant a continuance “because he never asked the
district court for a continuance”). Moreover, Mr. Tobar’s statement was admitted,
so the jury heard his claim that he alone was responsible for the
Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales also argues that the court erred in admitting his
own statement to Trooper Provost asking whether the others would go free if one
of the three men arrested took full responsibility for the drugs. The court ruled
that the statement was not a confession, but rather a voluntary statement, and
admitted it. Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s expressed objection to the admission of
the statement was that the government did not disclose that the statement had
been made, and that it intended to use it at trial, until December 5, a few days
before the trial. We agree with the district court that it was a voluntary statement,
not a confession, and was admissible. Moreover, we hold that it was not
prejudicial to Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales, inasmuch as, unlike Mr. Tobar’s similar
question which was immediately followed by his acceptance of full and sole
-13- responsibility for the drugs, Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s statement is as easily
construed as simply a question about the effect of Mr. Tobar’s confession. 5 The
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the statement.
IV. Motion to Suppress
Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales argues that the district court erred in adopting the
report of the magistrate judge recommending the district court hold that the search
of Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s vehicle was lawful and recommending that the
district court deny his motion to suppress the methamphetamine. We agree with
the government that Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales has waived this claim because he
failed to object to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. See United
States v. One Parcel of Real Property , 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)
(noting our “‘firm waiver rule’ that ‘provides that the failure to make timely
objections to the magistrate’s findings or recommendations waives appellate
review of both factual and legal questions’”) (quoting Moore v. United States ,
950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991)). Moreover, Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales does
not cite to the record in support of his otherwise conclusory assertion that the
search of his car was invalid.
5 The government’s theory about Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s hypothetical question, which Agent Provost articulated to the jury, was that the three men agreed among themselves that Mr. Tobar would take responsibility for the drugs.
-14- V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales argues that his counsel, who also
represents him on appeal, was ineffective at trial. We have held that
“‘[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral
proceedings, not on direct appeal. Such claims brought on direct appeal are
presumptively dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed.’” United States v.
Gell-Iren , 146 F.3d 827, 831 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Galloway ,
56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). The reason for that practice is to
permit the development of a factual record and to permit the district court to
examine the merits of the issue in the first instance. See id. There has been no
finding by the district court on Mr. Hernandez-Gonzales’s trial counsel’s
effectiveness. We therefore decline to consider this issue on direct appeal, and
dismiss this claim without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson Circuit Judge
-15-