F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 6 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 00-8003 v. (D.C. No. 99-CR-31-5) (Wyoming) GUILLERMO HERNANDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Guillermo Hernandez pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute marijuana, using a telephone to facilitate a controlled
substance offense, and distributing marijuana. He appeals his sentence, and we
affirm.
* After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. The conspiracy charge to which Mr. Hernandez pled guilty alleged that he,
his sister Araceli Hernandez, and others conspired to distribute marijuana in
Casper, Wyoming, from January 1 to March19, 1999. Mr. Hernandez and Ms.
Hernandez allegedly received quantities for resale and distributed the drug to
others. The substantive counts arose from a telephone conversation between Mr.
Hernandez and his sister in which she asked him to provide her a quarter pound of
marijuana for sale to another person, and from the actual distribution of the
marijuana to that person.
At sentencing, the government argued that Mr. Hernandez’ base offense
level should include as relevant conduct marijuana he had allegedly possessed
with intent to distribute approximately two years earlier in Casper. In support of
its position, the government presented evidence from Chad Campbell, who had
lived with Mr. Hernandez for four or five months in the spring of 1997. Mr.
Campbell testified that during this time he observed one-pound blocks of
compressed marijuana in the freezer unit of the refrigerator in the residence they
shared, that the amount fluctuated as Mr. Hernandez sold this marijuana, and that
he himself sold small quantities of it on occasion and gave the proceeds to Mr.
Hernandez. Mr. Campbell further stated that he had earlier possessed eight
pounds of marijuana in blocks at another residence and that that quantity was very
similar to the amount he observed in Mr. Hernandez’ freezer.
-2- The district court credited Mr. Campbell’s testimony and concluded that
eight pounds of marijuana should be included as relevant conduct in calculating
Mr. Hernandez’ total offense level. As a result, Mr. Hernandez had a total
offense level of 10 and a criminal history category of III, for a sentencing range
under the Sentencing Guidelines of ten to sixteen months. The judge’s thirteen-
month sentence fell in the middle of the applicable range.
On appeal Mr. Hernandez argues that the court erred by including the eight
pounds of marijuana for sentencing purposes, contending that Mr. Campbell’s
estimate of drug quantity lacked sufficient indicia of reliability because his
recollection was admittedly blurred by his use of drugs and alcohol during the
relevant time, and that the earlier alleged acts were too remote and dissimilar to
justify an enhancement as relevant conduct under the Guidelines.
We review fact findings on drug quantities and relevant conduct under the
clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Richards, 27 F.3d 465, 468 (10th Cir.
1994). Whether the activity at issue qualifies as relevant conduct, however, is a
question of law we review de novo. United States v. Svacina, 137 F.3d 1179,
1182 (10th Cir. 1998). “The government must prove the existence of the
additional quantities by a preponderance of the evidence.” Richards, 27 F.3d at
468. Drug quantities may be established on the basis of estimates so long as they
have some basis of support in the record and sufficient indicia of reliability. Id.
-3- at 469.
We turn first to Mr. Hernandez’ argument that the amount attributable to
his earlier sales was not supported by sufficient indicia of reliability because Mr.
Campbell was admittedly using drugs and alcohol during that period. “The
credibility of a witness at sentencing is for the sentencing court, who is the trier
of fact, to analyze. Applicable case law permits the sentencing court to accept
estimates on quantities based on information with a minimum indicia of
reliability.” United States v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572, 578 (10th Cir. 1994). We
will not disturb the lower court’s assessment of Mr. Campbell’s credibility.
Mr. Hernandez also argues that his earlier drug activity does not qualify as
relevant conduct. A defendant’s base offense level can be determined on the
basis of conduct other than the offense of conviction if that conduct is “part of the
same course of conduct . . . as the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3(a)(2). “[T]he analysis of same course of conduct focuses on whether there
is a pattern of criminal conduct,” which is determined by several factors,
including “similarity, regularity, temporal proximity, the nature of the defendant’s
acts, [and] his role.” Svacina, 137 F.3d at 1183 (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the earlier drug sales took place in the same location and were very similar
in nature. Mr. Hernandez’ role as a middleman in those transactions was likewise
very similar to his role in the offense of conviction. While the earlier conduct
-4- was separated by a gap of almost two years, we have held that temporal proximity
is not dispositive, see United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir.
1993), and have concluded that conduct is relevant even when separated by a gap
much longer than that present here, see id. at 979-80. Accordingly, the court did
not err in determining that Mr. Hernandez’ prior drug activity was relevant
conduct.
Mr. Hernandez argues that his thirteen-month sentence was
disproportionate to that of his sister, who pled guilty to the same offense and was
sentenced to six months’ incarceration. “In imposing a sentence, the district court
shall consider, inter alia, ‘the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct.’” United States v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1271 (10th Cir. 1997).
The record indicates that Ms. Hernandez had a base offense level of 4 and a
criminal history category of III, for a sentencing range of 0-6 months. Mr.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 6 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 00-8003 v. (D.C. No. 99-CR-31-5) (Wyoming) GUILLERMO HERNANDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Guillermo Hernandez pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute marijuana, using a telephone to facilitate a controlled
substance offense, and distributing marijuana. He appeals his sentence, and we
affirm.
* After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. The conspiracy charge to which Mr. Hernandez pled guilty alleged that he,
his sister Araceli Hernandez, and others conspired to distribute marijuana in
Casper, Wyoming, from January 1 to March19, 1999. Mr. Hernandez and Ms.
Hernandez allegedly received quantities for resale and distributed the drug to
others. The substantive counts arose from a telephone conversation between Mr.
Hernandez and his sister in which she asked him to provide her a quarter pound of
marijuana for sale to another person, and from the actual distribution of the
marijuana to that person.
At sentencing, the government argued that Mr. Hernandez’ base offense
level should include as relevant conduct marijuana he had allegedly possessed
with intent to distribute approximately two years earlier in Casper. In support of
its position, the government presented evidence from Chad Campbell, who had
lived with Mr. Hernandez for four or five months in the spring of 1997. Mr.
Campbell testified that during this time he observed one-pound blocks of
compressed marijuana in the freezer unit of the refrigerator in the residence they
shared, that the amount fluctuated as Mr. Hernandez sold this marijuana, and that
he himself sold small quantities of it on occasion and gave the proceeds to Mr.
Hernandez. Mr. Campbell further stated that he had earlier possessed eight
pounds of marijuana in blocks at another residence and that that quantity was very
similar to the amount he observed in Mr. Hernandez’ freezer.
-2- The district court credited Mr. Campbell’s testimony and concluded that
eight pounds of marijuana should be included as relevant conduct in calculating
Mr. Hernandez’ total offense level. As a result, Mr. Hernandez had a total
offense level of 10 and a criminal history category of III, for a sentencing range
under the Sentencing Guidelines of ten to sixteen months. The judge’s thirteen-
month sentence fell in the middle of the applicable range.
On appeal Mr. Hernandez argues that the court erred by including the eight
pounds of marijuana for sentencing purposes, contending that Mr. Campbell’s
estimate of drug quantity lacked sufficient indicia of reliability because his
recollection was admittedly blurred by his use of drugs and alcohol during the
relevant time, and that the earlier alleged acts were too remote and dissimilar to
justify an enhancement as relevant conduct under the Guidelines.
We review fact findings on drug quantities and relevant conduct under the
clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Richards, 27 F.3d 465, 468 (10th Cir.
1994). Whether the activity at issue qualifies as relevant conduct, however, is a
question of law we review de novo. United States v. Svacina, 137 F.3d 1179,
1182 (10th Cir. 1998). “The government must prove the existence of the
additional quantities by a preponderance of the evidence.” Richards, 27 F.3d at
468. Drug quantities may be established on the basis of estimates so long as they
have some basis of support in the record and sufficient indicia of reliability. Id.
-3- at 469.
We turn first to Mr. Hernandez’ argument that the amount attributable to
his earlier sales was not supported by sufficient indicia of reliability because Mr.
Campbell was admittedly using drugs and alcohol during that period. “The
credibility of a witness at sentencing is for the sentencing court, who is the trier
of fact, to analyze. Applicable case law permits the sentencing court to accept
estimates on quantities based on information with a minimum indicia of
reliability.” United States v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572, 578 (10th Cir. 1994). We
will not disturb the lower court’s assessment of Mr. Campbell’s credibility.
Mr. Hernandez also argues that his earlier drug activity does not qualify as
relevant conduct. A defendant’s base offense level can be determined on the
basis of conduct other than the offense of conviction if that conduct is “part of the
same course of conduct . . . as the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3(a)(2). “[T]he analysis of same course of conduct focuses on whether there
is a pattern of criminal conduct,” which is determined by several factors,
including “similarity, regularity, temporal proximity, the nature of the defendant’s
acts, [and] his role.” Svacina, 137 F.3d at 1183 (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the earlier drug sales took place in the same location and were very similar
in nature. Mr. Hernandez’ role as a middleman in those transactions was likewise
very similar to his role in the offense of conviction. While the earlier conduct
-4- was separated by a gap of almost two years, we have held that temporal proximity
is not dispositive, see United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir.
1993), and have concluded that conduct is relevant even when separated by a gap
much longer than that present here, see id. at 979-80. Accordingly, the court did
not err in determining that Mr. Hernandez’ prior drug activity was relevant
conduct.
Mr. Hernandez argues that his thirteen-month sentence was
disproportionate to that of his sister, who pled guilty to the same offense and was
sentenced to six months’ incarceration. “In imposing a sentence, the district court
shall consider, inter alia, ‘the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct.’” United States v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1271 (10th Cir. 1997).
The record indicates that Ms. Hernandez had a base offense level of 4 and a
criminal history category of III, for a sentencing range of 0-6 months. Mr.
Hernandez’ base offense level was 10 because it included prior relevant conduct.
His sister’s base offense level was not similarly enhanced because it did not
include any prior relevant conduct. The disparity in their sentences reflected Mr.
Hernandez’ more extensive criminal conduct and was therefore not unwarranted.
Finally, Mr. Hernandez contends that remarks made by the district court
during the course of the proceedings revealed a bias against him that prejudiced
-5- the court’s relevant conduct determination. 1 At sentencing, the court observed
that Mr. Hernandez’ troubles began with his use of marijuana and alcohol during
his teen years, required him to receive drug and alcohol counseling while in
prison, stated the court’s belief that Mr. Hernandez had intelligence and industry,
and encouraged Mr. Hernandez to make something of his life after his release
from incarceration. After sentence had been imposed, the court referred to
testimony from Mr. Campbell describing the extensive drinking and drug abuse
Mr. Campbell had observed and taken part in during his senior trip to Mexico.
The court stated:
That’s why this Court is disturbed that a lot of people do not appreciate the magnitude of the risk they subject their children to when they allow them to travel to a country as lawless as Mexico. It’s one thing to go to Mexico when you go with your parents. There’s some protection from the lawless elements within that society. There are whole states in the Republic of Mexico that are controlled by the cartels. Now, that isn’t very diplomatic of me to say, but it is the unvarnished truth.
App., vol. IV at 58.
Mr. Hernandez contends the above remarks reveal that the court stereotyped
him and lumped him in with lawless Mexican nationals and that the court’s
underlying prejudice affected its sentencing determination. A judge’s opinion
1 Mr. Hernandez refers us to comments made by the court both at a hearing held April 14, 1999, and at his sentencing hearing on January 11, 2000. The transcript of the April 14 hearing is not included in the record on appeal and we therefore address only the court’s remarks at sentencing.
-6- formed on the basis of facts introduced in the course of the proceedings at issue
does not support a claim of bias or prejudice unless it displays a “deep-seated . . .
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” United States v.
Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1277 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). The record is clear that the judge’s comments were in
response to the testimony of Mr. Campbell rather than an extrajudicial source.
Moreover, they did not display a deep-seated antagonism making fair judgment
impossible. To the contrary, the record as a whole reveals that the judge held a
generally favorable view of Mr. Hernandez as a person with potential who had a
problem with drugs and alcohol. Accordingly we see no ground for requiring
resentencing.
Mr. Hernandez’ sentence is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour Chief Judge
-7-