Opinion by Judge CLIFTON; Dissent by Judge BERZON.
OPINION
CLIFTON, Circuit Judge.
Herman Patayan Soriano appeals his convictions for possession of stolen mail and receipt of a stolen United States Treasury check, and also the sentence that resulted. Soriano challenges his convictions on the ground that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found during a search of a motel room where he and his girlfriend resided. Soriano’s girlfriend signed a consent form allowing the warrantless search. The issue on appeal is whether the district court clearly erred in finding that her consent was voluntary, notwithstanding a threat made to her by one of the police officers on the scene that her children could be taken away if she did not sign the form. If the conviction stands, Soriano challenges the sentence he was given on the ground that the district court erred in calculating the appropriate loss amount for sentencing purposes. We reject both challenges and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 7, 2000, officers from the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) were contacted by a bank regarding a possibly altered check that had been presented to a teller. Based on a description of the man who was trying to cash the check, LAPD officers arrested Keenan San Yung French., French told the officers [967]*967that Soriano gave him the stolen check and that Soriano was staying in Room 228 at a certain motel. He also told the police that stolen checks, credit cards, and drug paraphernalia could be found in that motel room and that the checks had been stolen from the mails at various residences in the Los Angeles area.
The LAPD officers contacted the United States Postal and Inspection Service (“US-PIS”) for assistance in responding to this apparent mail theft scheme. Based on the tip from French, but without a warrant, LAPD and USPIS officers went to the motel to investigate Soriano and search his room. LAPD Detective Manente was informed by the surveillance team that a woman left Room 228 and was headed to the lobby. Detective Manente approached her in the lobby and identified himself as a police officer, informing her that he was there with other officers conducting an investigation involving Soriano. The woman identified herself as Hiroe Mukai and told the detective that she, Soriano, and their two children resided in Room 228, and that she had come to the lobby to pay the rent. Manente asked for her consent to search the room, telling her that she had a right to refuse consent, but that if she did, he would obtain a search warrant. Mukai indicated that she was concerned about her two small children, who were still in the room. Manente then left Mukai with several other police officers, and three postal inspectors joined them in the lobby.
Postal Inspector Callas approached Mu-kai, who was sitting on a couch, and sat down in a chair next to her. He explained that he was a federal agent and that they had received information that there was stolen mail in Room 228. He placed a consent form on the table and asked for her cooperation. Mukai repeatedly told him that she did not know what to do. Inspector Callas told her that she was not a suspect in the crime, but that Soriano was, and again asked for her cooperation. He also told her that if she did not consent, the officers would seek to obtain a search warrant to search the room.
LAPD Officer Shanahan, who was standing nearby, then told Mukai that if she did not sign, she might be arrested and her children would be placed in custody with social services. Inspector Callas interrupted Shanahan and told Mukai that the only way for her children to be taken from her and placed with social services would be if she were arrested, but that they did not have any reason to suspect that Mukai was involved. Callas explained that since she was not at risk of being arrested, her children were thus not at risk. Callas then told Mukai again that she had the right to refuse consent. He also read the consent form to her because he did not know if she could read English. Mukai stated again that she did “not know what to do.” She finally signed the consent form about ten minutes after Shana-han’s threat. During this entire time, which lasted roughly 30 minutes, a total of six to seven officers were in the lobby, including Officer Shanahan, who remained present after articulating the threat.
The search of the motel room revealed stolen mail, numerous altered checks, bank account and credit card information pertaining to various other people, counterfeit INS documents, and a stolen United States Treasury check in the amount of $1,138. Postal inspectors also recovered solvents, such as acetone, used to chemically alter checks so that payees and amounts could be changed.
Following a two-count indictment for possession of stolen mail, 18 U.S.C. § 1708, and receipt of a stolen Treasury check, 18 U.S.C. § 510(b), Soriano moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the [968]*968search, arguing that Mukai’s consent was invalid because of threats and intimidation. At the suppression hearing, the district court heard testimony from Mukai, Detective Manente, and Postal Inspectors Callas and Walters. Mukai testified that she was scared and gave consent only because she wanted to prevent her children from going to a social worker. The district court concluded that Mukai had been threatened, but that her consent was voluntary. The court reasoned that although Officer Shan-ahan uttered a threat to the custody of her children, Inspector Callas interrupted and took time to clarify to Mukai that (a) she was not a suspect, (b) she had an unqualified right to refuse consent, and (c) her children would need to be taken into custody “only if she was arrested,” which was not going to happen since she was not a suspect. The court noted that Mukai thought her decision through for 5 to 10 minutes following Inspector Callas’s explanation. Thus, the court concluded that, in the “totality of the circumstances, the government has met its burden of proof [that] Mukai’s consent was free and voluntary.”
At trial, the government introduced physical evidence from Soriano’s motel room, including personal checks, credit card applications, personal identification information, chemicals used to alter checks, and a United States Treasury check. The government established that Soriano had not been given permission to possess the undelivered mail and that the $1,138 Treasury check had been altered to change the payee. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts.
At sentencing, Soriano objected to the calculation of the loss amount in the Pre-Sentence Report as $15,484.62, derived by adding up the face amounts of the 20 checks found in the motel room. He argued that the loss amount should have excluded several of the checks, including a $9,661 check made out to French. Although the district court did not accept all of the recommendations of the Pre-Sen-tence Report, it did find that the $9,661 check payable to French was in Soriano’s possession. The net result was a loss amount of $12,932.62, resulting in a base offense level of 11 and a Guideline range of 8-14 months. Soriano was sentenced to 14 months, to be followed by three years of supervised release.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Suppress
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a suppression motion. United States v. Jones, 286 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir.2002). The district court’s underlying factual finding that a person voluntarily consented to a search is reviewed for clear error. Id.
It is well settled that “a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Whether consent to search was voluntarily given is “to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Id. It is the government’s burden to prove that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1327 (9th Cir.1997). “On appeal, evidence regarding the question of consent must be viewed in the light most favorable to the fact-finder’s decision.” United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 622 (9th Cir.1990).
Our cases have identified five factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of consent to a search. They are: “(1) whether defendant was in custody; (2) whether the arresting officers had [969]*969their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings were given; (4) whether the defendant was notified that she had a right not to consent; and (5) whether the defendant had been told a search warrant could be obtained.” Jones, 286 F.3d at 1152 (citing United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir.1989) (distilling from the case law the five factors now widely used)); accord United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.2000) (citing the five factors); United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir.2000) (same); Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d at 1327 (same). No one factor is determinative in the equation. Castillo, 866 F.2d at 1082. It is not necessary to check off all five factors, but “many of this court’s decisions upholding consent as voluntary are supported by at least several of the factors.” Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d at 1327 n. 3. Nevertheless, these factors are only guideposts, not a mechanized formula to resolve the volun-tariness inquiry. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 224, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (rejecting “talismanie definition of ‘voluntariness’ mechanically applicable” to all situations); see also United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 533 (9th Cir.1995) (“although we have established these factors to aid in the decision making process, the full richness of every encounter must be considered ... Every encounter has its own facts and its own dynamics. So does every consent”).
1. The threat that Mukai might lose her children
We will review these five factors in the context of this case below, but there was a more important factor in the particular circumstances of this case, so we begin with that. It was the threat to take away Mukai’s children which provides the most serious basis for questioning the voluntariness of Mukai’s consent to the search. If that threat had remained unabated, Mu-kai’s consent could properly be set aside as involuntary. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963) (all of the officers on the scene told defendant that her infant children would be taken from her if she did not cooperate; held, confession was not voluntary but coerced); United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir.1981) (confession rendered involuntary by, inter alia, police officer’s unmitigated statements that defendant would not see her child “for a while” if she did not cooperate, and, referring specifically to her child, that she had “a lot at stake”).
Under the totality of the circumstances, however, it was not clear error for the district court to conclude that Mukai’s consent was voluntary. While a court must look at the “possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents,” the court must also look at the “reasonableness of that fear.” United States v. Castrillon, 716 F.2d 1279, 1283 n. 1 (9th Cir.1983) (citing Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041). Specifically, the court must determine whether “a person in [Mukai’s] position would reasonably have feared” her children being taken into custody in light of the totality of the officers’ conduct. Castrillon, 716 F.2d at 1283 n. 1 (“To look only to Castrillon’s subjective fears, without considering the reasonableness of his alleged state of mind, would unduly hamper application of the totality of the circumstances test.”).
It was not clear error for the district court to find that Mukai’s fear for losing custody of her children, while perhaps reasonable at the time when Shanahan made the threat, was not reasonable and did not negate the voluntariness of her consent at the time that consent was given. Several minutes elapsed between Shanahan’s threat and Mukai’s signing of the consent form. By that time, Inspector [970]*970Callas had clarified that Mukai’s children would only be taken away if Mukai was arrested, and since she was not a suspect, that was not a reasonable possibility. As the district court emphasized, the entire episode lasted some 30 minutes. Although Mukai stated several times that she was “not sure what to do,” the district court found that she seemed to carefully think the situation through before ultimately signing the consent form.
To the extent that reasonable minds could differ on whether Mukai reasonably feared for her children such that her consent must be deemed involuntary, we cannot reverse the finding of the district court here under clear error review. United States v. Garcia, 135 F.3d 667, 671 (9th Cir.1998) (“ ‘Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.’ ”) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). So long as reasonable minds could differ, we cannot say that one of those minds is clearly erroneous.
The conclusion in the dissent that the district court’s determination was clearly erroneous is simply based on a different evaluation of the evidence. The element it emphasizes as critically important is the fact that “the threat came from the only uniformed officer in the group immediately surrounding Mukai,” post at 976. Thus, it may have appeared to Mukai “that it was Shanahan, the uniformed police officer, rather than Callas, the plain clothes postal inspector, who was calling the shots,” post at 977-978. But we do not believe that the evidence was such that the district court could not reasonably make a different finding. To begin with, anyone who has watched television shows or movies about police officers would likely infer that uniformed officers are subordinate to other officers not in uniform, because that is how they are routinely depicted. In this case, Callas was a federal agent and specifically identified himself to Mukai as such. A federal agent is ordinarily viewed as having more authority than a local police officer, certainly more than the usual uniformed patrol officer. In addition, Callas cut Shanahan off in mid-sentence and continued to do the talking thereafter. That Shanahan continued to stand nearby does not cut the other way. To the contrary, that Shanahan remained silent and in the same place, about twelve feet from where Mukai was seated, while Callas did the talking and was much closer to Mukai, suggests Shanahan’s own acceptance of the situation — Callas was in charge, and Mu-kai could see that. After evaluating this and other evidence, the district court found that Mukai’s consent was voluntary. That finding was not clearly erroneous.
2. The customary five factors
Nor was the district court’s determination that Mukai’s consent was voluntary inconsistent with the other circumstances of the encounter, notably the five factors identified in other cases and described above. As we noted, these factors are guideposts to consider in assessing the voluntariness of consent, not a checklist of requirements to be satisfied. Most support the district court’s determination.
First, regarding whether the person giving consent was in custody, here Soriano concedes that Mukai was not. The dissent, citing United States v. Ocheltree, 622 F.2d 992, 994 (9th Cir.1980), argues that the threat of custody can be more coercive than actual custody. But that was not likely the case here. Soriano has not tried to argue that Mukai’s consent was involuntary because of any threat of custody. The threat of arrest here was ephemeral, certainly nothing like the [971]*971threat in Ocheltree. In this case, after Shanahan’s threat, Mukai was specifically told multiple times that she was not a suspect. It was not put to her that she would be arrested unless she gave her consent to a search of the room. By contrast, we observed in Ocheltree that the “only reasonable construction” that the person involved there, who was at an airport, could put on the federal agent’s statement was that he would be retained in custody and not be permitted to board his plane unless he gave consent to a search of his briefcase. Id. at 994 (noting that if defendant was allowed to leave pending a search warrant, he would be able to destroy the evidence, thus creating the “clear implication” to the suspect that if he did not consent, he would be detained until a search warrant could be obtained). That was not the situation Mukai faced.
Second, whether the officers had guns drawn, here they did not.1
Third, as for Miranda warnings, here Miranda warnings were inapposite since Mukai was not in custody. See United States v. Ritter, 752 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir.1985) (“It would ... make little sense to require that Miranda warnings, which advise one of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, be given by police before requesting consent.”).
Fourth, regarding notice of the right not to consent, here Mukai was informed in clear and thorough detail by Inspector Callas — both before and after the Shana-han threat — that she had the right to refuse consent. And “[k]nowledge of the right to refuse consent is highly relevant in determining whether a consent is valid.” Childs, 944 F.2d at 496; see also United States v. Meza-Corrales, 183 F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir.1999) (same). The fact that Mukai was “confused” and “did not know what to do” does not, as Soriano insists, equate to not understanding that she had the right to refuse — she just did not know whether to exercise that right.
The fifth factor, whether Mukai was told that a search warrant could be obtained, does provide some basis to question the voluntariness of Mukai’s consent. In Cor-mier, we noted that when the consenting party is not in custody, as with Mukai here, “the application of the fifth factor ... hinges on whether a suspect is informed about the possibility of a search warrant in a threatening manner.” 220 F.3d at 1112; see also United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir.1994) (threatening a defendant with a search warrant intimates that “withholding of consent would ultimately be futile”). Here, multiple officers, including Callas, told Mukai that if she did not give consent to the search, their next step would be to obtain, or to seek to obtain, a search warrant. The parties dispute whether these statements were made in a threatening manner. Even assuming, however, that some of the statements were made in a threatening manner so as to imply the futility of withholding consent, when probable cause to justify a warrant exists, the weight of the fifth factor is significantly diminished. See Meza-Corrales, 183 F.3d at 1125; Kaplan, 895 F.2d at 622.
[972]*972Based on the information from French, there appears to have been sufficient grounds to establish probable cause for a search warrant of the motel room. French provided the police with detailed information about Soriano’s illegal activity and the evidence that could be found in the motel room. “Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). It is well-settled that “the determination of probable cause is based upon the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the search.” Bishop, 264 F.3d at 924 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317). “When a search warrant is based solely on an informant’s tip, [as in this case,] the proper analysis is whether probable cause exists from the totality of the circumstances to determine a sufficient level of reliability and basis of knowledge for the tip.” Bishop, 264 F.3d at 924; see also United States v. Elliott, 322 F.3d 710, 715 (9th Cir.2003).
We will start with reliability. When considering reliability, “[t]he courts may employ a number of methods to determine if an informant’s information is reliable. It may be demonstrated ... by admission against penal interest,” for example. Bishop, 264 F.3d at 925. Here, after French was arrested for trying to pass an altered check, he divulged information which exposed himself to responsibility for other crimes and for potential charges of conspiracy. His statements amounted to admissions of criminal activity and could be deemed reliable on that basis. See United States v. Estrada, 733 F.2d 683, 686 (9th Cir.1984) (“ ‘Admissions of crimes, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility — sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search’ ”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 850, 105 S.Ct. 168, 83 L.Ed.2d 103 (1984) (quoting United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971)). Although it is not clear from the record, even if we assume that French had been offered favorable treatment in exchange for his statements, this would not render them per se unreliable. See Harris, 403 U.S. at 583-84, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (“That the informant may be paid or promised a ‘break’ does not eliminate the residual risk and opprobrium of having admitted criminal conduct.”). Even if favorable treatment had not been offered to him, French was presumably motivated to provide information after his arrest out of hope that his cooperating would result in more lenient treatment for himself by the authorities. He could not achieve that goal if he gave false information, so the circumstances in which he provided the information further served to corroborate its reliability. See United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 693 (D.C.Cir.1979) (an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because “should he lie to the police,” he “risks disfavor with the prosecution”), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 1659, 64 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980); cf. United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2d Cir.1991) (“Though the informant ... had not previously been relied on ..., a face-to-face informant must ... be thought more reliable than an anonymous ... tipster [because] the former runs the greater risk that he may be held accountable if his information proves false.”).2
[973]*973The dissent cites to a line of cases where a suspect’s statements implicating a third-party were deemed “inherently unreliable” as “self-exculpatory” or “blame-shifting” statements, as opposed to self-inculpatory statements. Post, at 980-81 (citing Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599-600, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986); and United States v. Hall, 113 F.3d 157 (9th Cir.1997)). But this case is not like those, where the suspects did not incriminate themselves as to anything more than the officers already had. Having been caught for a criminal offense, the suspects were simply trying to shift the primary responsibility to others. Here, French was picked up for trying to pass one altered check, but told the police about much, much more. In telling about Soriano, he admitted his own involvement to having opened bank accounts and deposited altered checks on multiple occasions, well beyond the specific violation for which he had been arrested. His statement also potentially put himself into a conspiracy with Soriano that extended to a scheme of widespread theft and alteration of checks, including theft from the U.S. mail. Although he may have painted Soriano as the mastermind, it is undeniable that French implicated himself in criminal activity well in excess of what the police had him for at that time: the one episode of passing an altered check, plus potentially whatever evidence they might have obtained from searching his motel room (unrelated to activity with Soriano).3 This case is therefore unlike a case like Hall, where a suspect was arrested on various drug charges and pointed the police to his dealer, without inculpating himself in any additional criminal activity. See Hall, 113 F.3d at 159. Although French, like Hall, was caught “red-handed,” id., French gave up a lot more than the police had against him, thereby rendering his statements self-in-culpatory admissions of criminal activity.
The dissent also focuses on the fact that French was arrested for forgery, a crime of dishonesty, and argues that such a record of dishonesty requires that there be additional corroboration before probable cause can be established. See Elliott, 322 F.3d at 714-16; see also United States v. Reeves, 210 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.2000). In those cases, the informants were persons with prior records involving crimes of dishonesty. The informant in Elliott was described as having a criminal history including “fourteen prior convictions ... and an arrest for forgery, a crime of dishonesty -” 322 F.3d at 714. The informant in Reeves had previously been convicted of falsely reporting a crime. 210 F.3d at 1045. In contrast, there is no indication that French had a prior criminal record, or [974]*974any history of unreliability in reporting criminal acts suggesting “the possibility that he would lie to the police to frame an innocent man.” Id. Perhaps more to the point, information from dishonest informants may still provide a basis for probable cause. Such turned out to be the case in Elliott and Reeves, in both of which convictions were ultimately affirmed. The reliability under these circumstances of the admission by French of his own criminal activity, even though of a dishonest nature, overcomes any doubt raised by the fact that he was involved in a dishonest crime. The Supreme Court did not say that admissions of crimes, except dishonest ones, carry their own indicia of reliability. Harris, 403 U.S. at 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075.
Because of the nature of what French told the police and the circumstances in which he made his statement, we conclude that the reliability component to the probable cause inquiry was satisfied. That brings us to consider the basis of the informant’s knowledge.
“When considering basis of knowledge, courts look for how the informant came by his or her knowledge.” Bishop, 264 F.3d at 925 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, French tipped the authorities quite specifically based on first-hand observations, providing them with Soriano’s name, exact motel and room number, and what items would be found in the room, viz., stolen checks, credit cards and drug paraphernalia. These detailed, first-hand observations satisfy the basis of knowledge component. See id. (basis of knowledge established by informant’s information, which “was not based on hearsay, but came from first-hand knowledge”); Estrada, 733 F.2d at 686 (basis of knowledge established when informant “admitted to extensive involvement in the criminal scheme with appellants and based his statements on personal knowledge and observation”).
Thus, the information received from French “suffices for the practical, common-sense judgment called for in making a probable-cause determination.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 244, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Because it is reasonable to conclude that the officers could have obtained a search warrant for the motel room, their statements to that effect to Mukai did not serve to invalidate her consent to the search here.
Since we conclude that the finding of the district court that Mukai voluntarily consented to the search was not clearly erroneous, the motion to suppress was properly denied and the convictions must be affirmed.
B. Sentencing Enhancement
A district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir.2000). Factual findings, such as whether Soriano possessed the $9,661 check, are reviewed for clear error. Id. Since the factual finding here does not have a disproportionate effect on the sentence — including the $9,661 check made only a two-level difference — the facts must be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 832-33 (9th Cir.1999); see also Munoz, 233 F.3d at 1126-27.
Soriano argues that the district court clearly erred by attributing the $9,661 cheek to him, resulting in an upward adjustment of five levels instead of three levels. We disagree. Soriano first notes that the check was not presented as evidence at trial, but cites no authority for why it had to have been. Since it was only relevant to the loss amount for sentencing [975]*975purposes, not to guilt, it was not clear error to take it into account only at the sentencing phase. See Munoz, 233 F.3d at 1127. Soriano also notes that the check did not have his fingerprints, but does not cite any authority for the proposition that a person’s fingerprints must be found on an object for it to be deemed within his possession. That is not the law. The check was found in Soriano’s motel room, and it was not clear error to infer that Soriano was responsible for it. He also attempts to disclaim responsibility for the check by arguing that the check was made payable to French. But if Soriano was selling or altering checks, they would naturally be made payable to his customers (or their fictitious names). Indeed, two other checks made payable to French were found in Soriano’s wallet.
Soriano also suggests that the check could have been in French’s belongings, insinuating that French may have visited the room near the time of arrest. But that does not make the finding that Soriano possessed the check clearly erroneous. The government established that there were various alteration chemicals found in Soriano’s room, that the check was stolen from the mails, that it had been altered to change the payee and the amount, and that two other checks made out to French were found in Soriano’s wallet. These circumstances were enough to conclude, by a preponderance of evidence, that Soriano possessed the check, even if French had been a guest in the room. It was, therefore, not clear error for the district court to attribute the check to Soriano.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Soriano’s motion to suppress, and thus affirm his conviction. We also affirm his sentence based on the district court’s computation of the loss amount.
AFFIRMED.