United States v. Henry

Supreme Court

United States v. Henry

84 U.S. 405, 21 L. Ed. 673, 17 Wall. 405, 1873 U.S. LEXIS 1376

DecidedNovember 17, 1873

StatusPublished

This text of 84 U.S. 405 (United States v. Henry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Henry, 84 U.S. 405, 21 L. Ed. 673, 17 Wall. 405, 1873 U.S. LEXIS 1376 (1873).

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Opinion

Mr. Justice MILLEB,

delivered the opinion of the court.

There is no question but that the claimant’s case comes within the strict letter of the joint resolution.

The counsel for the United States, however, argues that the joint resolution can only have application to the case of an officer duly commissioned and entitled by law to be mustered into service as such, officer,, and that the finding of the court shows that the claimant, was not entitled to be mustered in when he accepted his commission and offered himself for that purpose.

This'would raise a very interesting question, and one which might not be easy of decision, if the record in this case fairly presented it. There is undoubtedly strong reason why Congress should have provided full pay for an officer who, holding a commission from the proper source, was given command and actually served as such officer, and had his rank recognized by-' all 'his superiors, though in point of *408 fact not mustered in as such or entitled to be; and it is certain he would not be entitled to such pay without the enabling act. But we do not find in the record the evidence, or any finding of the court that the claimant was not entitled to be mustered into the service. The finding of the Court of Claims on that subject is as follows :

“Upon receipt of the commission from the governor of Ohio the claimant presented himself -for muster, as second lieutenant, to the proper mustering officer of his division, but was refused such muster, the mustering officer alleging that Company D, to which the claimant was assigned, was reduced below the minimum number, and that, therefore, he was not entitled to be mustered.”

Counsel for the government, assuming that what the mustering officer alleged is to be treated here as an established fact, further assumes that that fact brings his case within the language of section twenty of the act of March 3d, 1863, to wit: “ That whenever a regiment is reduced below the minimum number allowed by law, no officers shall be appointed in such regiment beyond those necessary for the command of such reduced number.”

But the argument is open to more than one fatal objection.

1. The claimant having shown that he was regularly commissioned and served as a lieutenant, and.was, without fault of his, refused a muster, so that he comes within the literal terms of the joint resolution; if any fact is relied onto defeat his claim, it should be specifically found and stated by the Court of Claims. This is not done by a finding of that court that the mustering officer alleged that Company I) was reduced below the minimum number. If the fact that the company was below the minimum was important in the case, it should have been found as a fact by the court, and not stated merely as the alleged reason of the officer for refusing to muster in the claimant. The muster-roll of the company was within the control of the government, and would have settled the fact., one way or the other, beyond dispute.

2. The act relied on by counsel forbids the appointment of officers in a regiment, wheu.it is reduced below the mini *409 mum number allowed by law, beyond those necessary for the command of such reduced number.

It is quite consistent with a reduction of Company D below the minimum for a company, that the regiment was not below the minimum for a regiment. Indeed, it is unreasonable to suppose that because a single company is reduced below the minimum, that the regiment is for that reason to be so treated, and to have no more officers appointed in it until that company is filled up.

There is no finding, nor any allegation, in the present case, that the regiment was below the minimum, and, therefore, this act does not apply. Nor are we pointed by coum sel to any law or regulation of the service which fixes what is the minimum of a regiment of volunteer infantry. Nor does the Court of Claims find any facts from which, if we had such a law or regulation before us, we could decide whether this regiment, or, indeed, this company, was in fact below the minimum as established by law at the time the claimant offered himself for muster.

Under these circumstances, the judgment of the Court of Claims must be

Affirmed.

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Mr. Justice MILLEB,

delivered the opinion of the court.

There is no question but that the claimant’s case comes within the strict letter of the joint resolution.

The counsel for the United States, however, argues that the joint resolution can only have application to the case of an officer duly commissioned and entitled by law to be mustered into service as such, officer,, and that the finding of the court shows that the claimant, was not entitled to be mustered in when he accepted his commission and offered himself for that purpose.

This'would raise a very interesting question, and one which might not be easy of decision, if the record in this case fairly presented it. There is undoubtedly strong reason why Congress should have provided full pay for an officer who, holding a commission from the proper source, was given command and actually served as such officer, and had his rank recognized by-' all 'his superiors, though in point of *408 fact not mustered in as such or entitled to be; and it is certain he would not be entitled to such pay without the enabling act. But we do not find in the record the evidence, or any finding of the court that the claimant was not entitled to be mustered into the service. The finding of the Court of Claims on that subject is as follows :

“Upon receipt of the commission from the governor of Ohio the claimant presented himself -for muster, as second lieutenant, to the proper mustering officer of his division, but was refused such muster, the mustering officer alleging that Company D, to which the claimant was assigned, was reduced below the minimum number, and that, therefore, he was not entitled to be mustered.”

Counsel for the government, assuming that what the mustering officer alleged is to be treated here as an established fact, further assumes that that fact brings his case within the language of section twenty of the act of March 3d, 1863, to wit: “ That whenever a regiment is reduced below the minimum number allowed by law, no officers shall be appointed in such regiment beyond those necessary for the command of such reduced number.”

But the argument is open to more than one fatal objection.

1. The claimant having shown that he was regularly commissioned and served as a lieutenant, and.was, without fault of his, refused a muster, so that he comes within the literal terms of the joint resolution; if any fact is relied onto defeat his claim, it should be specifically found and stated by the Court of Claims. This is not done by a finding of that court that the mustering officer alleged that Company I) was reduced below the minimum number. If the fact that the company was below the minimum was important in the case, it should have been found as a fact by the court, and not stated merely as the alleged reason of the officer for refusing to muster in the claimant. The muster-roll of the company was within the control of the government, and would have settled the fact., one way or the other, beyond dispute.

2. The act relied on by counsel forbids the appointment of officers in a regiment, wheu.it is reduced below the mini *409 mum number allowed by law, beyond those necessary for the command of such reduced number.

It is quite consistent with a reduction of Company D below the minimum for a company, that the regiment was not below the minimum for a regiment. Indeed, it is unreasonable to suppose that because a single company is reduced below the minimum, that the regiment is for that reason to be so treated, and to have no more officers appointed in it until that company is filled up.

There is no finding, nor any allegation, in the present case, that the regiment was below the minimum, and, therefore, this act does not apply. Nor are we pointed by coum sel to any law or regulation of the service which fixes what is the minimum of a regiment of volunteer infantry. Nor does the Court of Claims find any facts from which, if we had such a law or regulation before us, we could decide whether this regiment, or, indeed, this company, was in fact below the minimum as established by law at the time the claimant offered himself for muster.

Under these circumstances, the judgment of the Court of Claims must be

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

84 U.S. 405, 21 L. Ed. 673, 17 Wall. 405, 1873 U.S. LEXIS 1376, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-henry-scotus-1873.