United States v. Heliberto Gomez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: 25-4329
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4329 Doc: 29 Filed: 04/24/2026 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4329

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

HELIBERTO FIGUEROA GOMEZ, a/k/a Greivin Armindo Juares Mazariegos,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Roderick Charles Young, District Judge. (3:25-cr-00031-RCY-1)

Submitted: February 27, 2026 Decided: April 24, 2026

Before HARRIS and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Joseph S. Camden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Lindsey Halligan, United States Attorney and Special Attorney, Todd W. Blanche, Deputy Attorney General, Robert K. McBride, First Assistant United States Attorney, James Reed Sawyers, Assistant United States Attorney, Carla Jordan-Detamore, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Heliberto Figueroa Gomez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He was sentenced to time served and one year of

supervised release. On appeal, he argues that the imposition of a term of supervised release

without adequate explanation rendered his sentence procedurally unreasonable. The

Government contends that any shortcoming in the district court’s explanation was

harmless. We affirm.

“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an

abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of ‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside,

or significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212

(4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). In evaluating the

procedural reasonableness of a sentence, we “determin[e] whether the district court

committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range,

failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain the chosen

sentence.” Id. (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). “A sentencing court’s explanation is sufficient

if it, although somewhat briefly, outlines the defendant’s particular history and

characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact, but as part of its analysis of the [18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)] factors.” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 519 (4th Cir. 2017)

(citation modified). In other words, the court “must conduct an individualized assessment”

by applying the § 3353(a) factors “to the particular defendant” being sentenced. Nance,

957 F.3d at 212-13 (citation modified).

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In determining whether there has been an adequate explanation, “we do not evaluate

a [district] court’s sentencing statements in a vacuum.” United States v. Gaspar, 123 F.4th

178, 183 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). Rather, we “may discern the court’s rationale

from the context surrounding its explanation.” Id. (citation modified). Moreover, a

“district court[] need not spell out [its] responses to [the] defendant[’s] arguments”

provided that the context “make[s] it patently obvious that the district court found the

defendant’s arguments to be unpersuasive.” United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d at 773, 782

(4th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). “Engaging counsel in a discussion about the merits of

an argument in favor of a particular sentence, for example, may be sufficient to permit a

reviewing court to infer that a sentencing court gave specific attention to a defendant’s

argument.” United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation

modified).

A district court “ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release in a case

in which supervised release is not required by statute and the defendant is a deportable

alien who likely will be deported after imprisonment.” USSG § 5D1.1(c). However, the

district court should “consider imposing a term of supervised release on such a defendant

if the court determines it would provide an added measure of deterrence and protection

based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” Id. cmt. n.5.

In United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416 (4th Cir. 2015), we held that our

review for procedural reasonableness of the imposition of supervised release in an illegal

reentry case should include consideration of whether the sentencing court “(1) is aware of

Guidelines section 5D1.1(c); (2) considers a defendant’s specific circumstances and the

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§ 3553(a) factors; and (3) determines that additional deterrence is needed.” Id. at 424

(citing United States v. Alvarado, 720 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2013)).

Here, the record shows that the district court was aware of USSG § 5D1.1(c), as the

provision was referenced in the presentence report—which the court adopted—and

because the court engaged in a discussion about the provision at Gomez’s sentencing

hearing when Gomez objected to the imposition of a term of supervised release. The

district court recognized USSG § 5D1.1(c) provides that supervised release ordinarily

should not be imposed on a removable alien but, in accord with USSG § 5D1.1 cmt. n.5,

the court noted that Gomez had entered the country illegally more than once and was a

recidivist returnee. We have reviewed the court’s exchange with counsel concerning the

imposition of a term of supervised release and its statements in imposing Gomez’s

sentence. We conclude that the court sufficiently stated that it was imposing a term of

supervised release as a deterrent. See USSG § 5D1.1 cmt. n.5; Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d

at 423-25.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED