United States v. Hawley

17 C.C.P.A. 110, 1929 CCPA LEXIS 28
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals·Decided June 12, 1929·No. No. 3068·Published

Opinion

Bland, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The collector of customs at the port of Galveston charged $11.80 for inspector’s services for overtime while the steamship Huguenot [111] was unlading a cargo of creosote oil in bulle at Galveston. Appellees, Hawley & Letzerich, protested the charge and on the protest styled themselves “Hawley & Letzerich, customs brokers and forwarders.” The protest is in the following language:

R. W. Humphreys, Esq.,
Collector of Customs, Galveston, Tex.
Sir: In re S. S. Huguenot, arrived Galveston September 18, 1926, with creosote oil in bulk, discharged at Pier 33 during the day and part of the night of September 18/19th, we paid for inspector’s services for overtime and at night covering the discharge of this cargo through a pipe line $11.80.
Under the authority contained in the Tariff Act of 1922, section 514, we hereby beg to protest against the assessment of overtime for night or Sunday work upon a cargo of this kind discharged in the way in which this cargo was discharged.
Entry was promptly made for this cargo as being free of duty under paragraph 1549 of the said tariff act.
Said entry was accepted, and we understand the entry has been tentatively liquidated by you as being free of duty.
In T. D. 36330, question 151/2-160, the department held as follows:
“The department is of the opinion that a customs inspector should not be assigned to the unlading of a vessel at night when no inspector is assigned to such vessel by day, and that in general the discharge of free cargo in bulk should be under the supervision of the district inspector, with no charge for unlading at night.”
If it should be held by you that this decision of the Secretary does not apply to creosote oil because that is not unconditionally free, but only conditionally free, we answer that all the purposes of the Government for the collection of revenue on such a cargo, if revenue was due, would be served>by the withdrawal of samples of the cargo on arrival or during the hours of a customs day after discharge had been begun, and that no benefit accrues to the Government, either from a revenue view or any other view, or to the ship by causing an inspector to attend the vessel during discharge, when all that can be seen to connect the vessel or her cargo with the shore is a flexible rubber hose attached by bolts to the mouth of an iron pipe projecting slightly above the deck of the vessel, which rubber hose connects at the shore end with the mouth of an iron pipe, which, within a few feet thereof, disappears into the ground, so that none of the cargo which has come from the bowels of the ship is exposed to the human eye, and the only way in which could be told that creosote oil or anything else was flowing through the pipe just named was the slight oscillation of the flexible rubber hose, the sound of the ship’s pumps, and by sounding with a lead and a line either the tanks of the ship, from which the creosote oil was being withdrawn, or by proceeding a mile or two away to the shore tanks into which the creosote oil was being discharged through the underground pipe and periodically sounding those tanks in order to find whether fluid was flowing in or out of them.
We maintain that this case is on all fours with the cases the subject of T. D. 36330, supra, and ask that the amount collected as overtime be refunded.
Case to be put upon Galveston docket; notice to us.
Respectfully,
Hawley & Letzerich.
H.

The protest was forwarded to the United States Customs Court where the case was tried, apparently on the sole question as to whether or not the collector was justified, under Treasury regulations and [112] under the law, in collecting said charges for inspector’s services in unlading a cargo which, protestants claimed, was free of duty, and which unlading did not require the services- of a customs inspector. A majority of the third division of the court below, one justice dissenting, held that it did not “appear that there was any necessity for assigning an inspector overtime, or that one was actually assigned,” and that the charge was an unnecessary one and a burden upon the importer, and sustained the protest.

The Government has appealed from the decision of the court below and here contends that under sections 450 and 451 of the Tariff Act of 1922 no distinction was made between dutiable and nondutiable merchandise for the purpose of inspector’s charges, and further argues that there is a presumption in law that the sworn officers of the Government performed their respective duties and that all statutory regulations and requirements were complied with. The main burden of the argument of the Government before us, however, is, to our way of thinking, directed to a far more important and perplexing question, to wit, that the court below and this court have no jurisdiction to decide the case, in so far as sections 450, 451, and 514 of the Tariff Act of 1922, when considered in connection with section 5 of the act of February 11, 1913, as amended by the act of February 7, 1920, and section 308 of title 28 of the Code of Laws of the United States, show that Congress did not intend to confer upon the lower court or upon this court jurisdiction in cases like the one at bar.

The appellees have filed no brief and their contentions as to the law, as far as we are advised, are to be found in the protest set out above, and this, of course,-is of no assistance in determining the jurisdictional question at hand.

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United States v. Hawley, 17 C.C.P.A. 110, 1929 CCPA LEXIS 28 (ccpa 1929).

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