United States v. Harvey

651 F. Supp. 894, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15975
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedDecember 24, 1986
Docket85-6204-Cr
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 651 F. Supp. 894 (United States v. Harvey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Harvey, 651 F. Supp. 894, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15975 (S.D. Fla. 1986).

Opinion

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

PAINE, District Judge.

The recommendations of United States Magistrate Ann E. Vitunac have been reviewed together with an independent de novo review of the entire record herein. The government’s memorandum of objections to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation has also been studied by the undersigned. On the issues presented by the government in its memorandum the following findings and conclusions are made:

1. Both transactional and use immunity were extended to the defendant and agreed to between the government and the defendant through representatives of the Department of Justice in Alabama.

2. The defendant provided immunized information of a financial nature relating to his drug transactions which surely furnished, at a minimum, leads to the government for the evidence it would use in support of the indictment in this case. The government’s evidence has, thereby, been tainted even if it is assumed that the evidence to be presented in support of some or all of the counts in the indictment may be shown to have been obtained from “independent” sources.

3. Only where the government’s evidence is not tainted may it be presented during trial where illegally obtained evidence was used to obtain an indictment from a Grand Jury. Having determined that the evidence or leads to the same was tainted it is clear that a basis for dismissal of the indictment is available.

4. While the defendant may not have specifically informed the government that he had committed the tax offenses which are the subject of the instant indictment or anything regarding the content or the preparation of the filing of his tax returns, information regarding his finances as related to his drug deals including particulars related to his income should also be included in the immunity which was extended to him. The knowledge that the defendant failed to report interest from capital gained from illegal drug transactions must also be classified as tainted.

5. While as the government points out in its memorandum, the credibility of the defendant and his motive for testifying in a way favorable to his position can be arguably questioned, the credibility of witnesses, including the defendant, is for the trier of the facts. In this instance that person is the United States Magistrate. The Magistrate’s finding that the defendant was extended both transactional and use immunity was based, not only on statements of the defendant, but on the testimony of William Kimbrough, Tom Haas and Patrick Sullivan.

6. Although suppression of the illegally obtained evidence is an alternative remedy which might have been utilized, it is not necessary to proceed with the trial during which the suppression of tainted evidence would surely deprive the government of the totality of its evidence.

Having considered the matter it is the view of this Court that the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate should be and are hereby approved and adopted by this Court. It is, therefore,

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the indictment is dismissed with prejudice.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ANN E. VITUNAC, United States Magistrate.

This cause came before the Court on a Motion for Pretrial Kastigar Hearing (DE32). Defendant’s Motion for Pretrial Kastigar Hearing was then supplemented by Defendant, Harvey’s Supplement To His Kastigar Motion (DE71). The supplemental motion to Harvey’s Kastigar Motion *896 included within a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment as being the product of tainted evidence. This final motion was predicated on evidence adduced before this Court at Pre-Kastigar Evidentiary Hearings held on October 10th, 17th and 31st of 1986.

The purpose of a Kastigar Hearing is for the Government to show, after an initial burden of the defendant has been met, that the Government did not use evidence that was the subject of an immunity grant (or evidence derived therefrom) to obtain an indictment. The purpose of a Kastigar Hearing is also to show that the Government is not intending to use immunized evidence or evidence derived therefrom during the trial on the subject indictment.

At the initial hearing held by this Court on October 10, 1986, it became evident to the Court that before this Court could determine whether or not to hold a Kastigar Hearing, this Court would have to hold a Pre-Kastigar hearing in order to determine:

1. Was the defendant given immunity?

2. If so, what kind of immunity was the defendant given?

3. What did the defendant say which is subject to the grant of immunity?

These issues had to, of necessity, be resolved before the Court could determine the necessity for a Kastigar Hearing. The issue with respect to the Kastigar Hearing is whether or not the Government would be able to show to the Court that the indictment and the trial evidence with respect thereto is based on evidence separate and apart from the defendant’s immunized statement and not derived therefrom.

This Court heard in excess of fifteen (15) hours of testimony from both the Government and the Defendant to determine the Pre-Kastigar issues. This Court finds that the defendant met his initial burden of showing that the defendant was given some kind of immunity which would require this Court to make both factual and legal determinations with respect to the effect of that immunity grant on his present prosecution for tax evasion.

FACTS

The facts in this case are far from clear. The main reason that the factual determination is particularly difficult is that the Government failed to memorialize its agreement with the defendant, Harvey, in any written form. Not only did the Government lawyers in Alabama not have a written contract of immunity with the defendant, Harvey, the Southern District of Florida failed to memorialize any agreement with the defendant, Harvey as well. Further, the agents charged with the responsibility of “debriefing” Harvey failed to make any written reports or keep any notes whatsoever concerning the matters about which they spoke to the defendant, Harvey. Additionally, the Drug Enforcement Agents never documented that such a meeting ever took place. This Court will now state its factual findings in greater detail.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The defendant, Jerry Lee Harvey, was arrested the 13th day of June 1980, in Mobile County in the Southern District of Alabama. He was arrested along with several other persons and charged in a methaqualone importation case. The defendant, Harvey, hired legal counsel to represent him on that case. That lawyer was Tom Haas.

According to the testimony of Tom Haas at the Pre-Kastigar Hearing, the case against Harvey was unbeatable and therefore contrary to his normal practice he, Tom Haas, advised Harvey to cooperate with the Government and attempt to negotiate a deal for some consideration with respect to the charges pending against him.

According to the testimony of William Kimbrough, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Alabama, the defendant, Harvey, in fact, negotiated a deal with respect to the Mobile case.

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Related

Harvey v. Commissioner
1999 T.C. Memo. 229 (U.S. Tax Court, 1999)
Harvey v. United States
730 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Florida, 1990)
United States v. Jerry Lee Harvey
869 F.2d 1439 (Eleventh Circuit, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
651 F. Supp. 894, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15975, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-harvey-flsd-1986.