United States v. Harang

165 F.2d 106, 36 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 492, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3867
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedDecember 30, 1947
DocketNo. 11945
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 165 F.2d 106 (United States v. Harang) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Harang, 165 F.2d 106, 36 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 492, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3867 (5th Cir. 1947).

Opinion

LEE, Circuit Judge.

The question presented by this case is whether oil royalties received during the years 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1940, by the taxpayer from his separate property constituted community income or his separate income. The facts were stipulated and found by the district court in accordance with the stipulation.

The taxpayer resides in Louisiana and was married prior to the tax years; during those years a community of acquets and gains existed between him and his wife. He owns, as his separate property, an undivided % interest in producing oil lands in Louisiana, a interest having been inherited from his father and a % interest having been the gift of his mother. During the tax years, he received certain royalty and over-riding royalty from his interest in these lands. Treating these royalties as income belonging to the community, the taxpayer reported in his tax returns only one half of the amounts which he had received. The Commissioner determined deficiencies for the years 1937 through 1940 on the ground that the royalties were the separate property of the taxpayer and should have been included in their entirety in his taxable income. The taxpayer paid the deficiencies and, claims for refund having been rejected by the Commissioner, instituted this suit to recover the taxes and interest which were allegedly overpaid. The court below held that the royalties constituted income belonging to the community, only one half of which should have been included in the taxpayer’s taxable income, and gave judgment for the amount overpaid. The Government appealed.

The opinion and judgment of the lower court were filed September 27, 1946, a few months before this court handed down its opinion in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gray, 5 Cir., 159 F.2d 834. The Gray case is indistinguishable from the case at bar, and all parties agree that unless it is overruled the judgment appealed from must be reversed.

In the Gray case we held that oil royalties from the taxpayer’s (husband’s) separate property were, under local law, his separate, not community, income. We reviewed the local law and the decisions of the Supreme Court of Louisiana and concluded: (1) That the word “profits,” as used in Civil Code, article 2402, enumerating property forming the community, was an erroneous translation from the French text of the Code of 1825, and should read “fruits.” (2) That article 2402 of the Civil Code of 1870 is identical with article 2371 of the English text of the Code of 1825. (3) That where the French text of the Code conflicts with the English text, the French text prevails. (4) That under Louisiana law royalties under a mineral lease are not “fruits” but are a share of the product reserved by the owner for permitting another to use his property, and where the lessee delivers to the lessor royalties stipulated and reserved to the lessor in the lease, he is delivering to the lessor a share of the product, the right to which was vested in the lessor by virtue of his ownership of the land. So concluding, we held that the royalties received by the husband from oil and gas leases on his separate realty fell into his separate estate and constituted his separate income for income tax purposes. Appellee’s able counsel seems to concede that if the word “profits” in article 2402 of the present Code means “fruits,” the decision in the Gray case is correct, for he concedes that “fruits” do not include minerals and timber.1 His con[108]*108tention is that the word “profits” in article 2402 is broader than “fruits” and that it includes royalties from lands containing oil. He asserts that “there was no French text of the Civil Code of 1825; that the Civil Code of 1825 was enacted in English and promulgated or published in both French and English,” and, as there was no French text of the Code of 1825 which was the law, the word “profits” appearing in the English text of the .Code of 1825 could not have been an erroneous translation of the word “fruits” appearing in the text of the Code of 1825 published in French. As authority for his conclusion that the Civil Code of 1825 was enacted in English, appellee relies on section 15 of article 6 of the Constitution of 1812, providing that all laws passed by the Legislature shall be promulgated, preserved, and conducted in the language in which the Constitution of the United States is written. Appellee argues that since the constitutional article required laws to be passed in the English language, the English text of the Code of 1825 only was enacted by the Legislature, and that the Code as published in French was a translation into French of the English text, and that if any differences existed between them the English text governed. Appellee cites as supporting this contention the following decisions of the Supreme Court of Louisiana: State v. Mix, 8 Rob., La., 549; State v. Ellis, 12 La.Ann. 390; Williams v. Robinson, 5 La.Ann. 110; State v. Judge of Eighth Judicial District Court, 14 La.Ann. 486; and Parish of Lafourche v. Parish of Terrebonne, 34 La.Ann. 1230., The cases cited all deal with ordinary legislative acts. The acts of the Legislature were printed in both French and English from 1808 through 1867. Ordinary statutes were passed in the English form and translated by a clerk into the French for publication. The procedure was stated by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in State v. Ellis, 12 La.Ann. 390, 392, in these words:

“ * * * We know that the practice of the legislative department under this provision [referring to the article of the Constitution that acts be passed in the English] has been to introduce and carry through the various stages of legislation bills in the English language alone. They wre translated into French for enrollment by a clerk, but the statutes are adopted in the English only. They are not even required by the Constitution to be translated before receiving the Governor’s signature.

“The English text, therefore, of our ordinary statutes is emphatically the law. The French version is not the work of the two Houses and the Governor, but is a mere clerical labor, its correctness depending upon the skill and accuracy of the clerk employed.” (Emphasis supplied.)

To solve the problem presented, a review of the three Civil Codes of Louisiana and the decisions of the Supreme Court of that State applying them is necessary. The Code of 1808 was written in French and translated into English; it was then passed and promulgated in both languages.2 The English and the French of each article were printed on opposite pages, and the Legislature directed that they should “mutually serve to the interpretation of one and the other.”

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Bluebook (online)
165 F.2d 106, 36 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 492, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3867, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-harang-ca5-1947.