United States v. Guy B. Barham Co. ex rel. University Shoppe

26 C.C.P.A. 83, 1938 CCPA LEXIS 203
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 2, 1938
DocketNo. 4142
StatusPublished

This text of 26 C.C.P.A. 83 (United States v. Guy B. Barham Co. ex rel. University Shoppe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Guy B. Barham Co. ex rel. University Shoppe, 26 C.C.P.A. 83, 1938 CCPA LEXIS 203 (ccpa 1938).

Opinion

Hatfield, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:2

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States Customs Court, Second Division, holding imported “spun yarn of rayon and cotton, plied, consisting substantially of rayon, the percentages being 80 percent rayon and 20 percent cotton,” dutiable as “Spun yarn of rayon * * *, if plied,” at 12% cents per pound and 50 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 1303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as claimed by counsel for the importer, rather than as “manufactures of filaments, fibers,” etc. in chief value of rayon, not specially provided for, under paragraph 1312 of that act, as assessed by the Collector of Customs at the port of Los Angeles, Calif.

[84]*84The paragraphs in question read:

Par. 1303. Spun yarn of rayon or other synthetic textile, 12)4 cents per pound, and, in addition, if singles, 45 per centum ad valorem, if plied, 50 per centum ad valorem.
Par. 1312. Manufactures of filaments, fibers, yarns, or threads, of rayon or other synthetic textile, and textile products made of bands or strips (not exceeding one inch in width) of rayon or other synthetic textile, all the foregoing, wholly or in chief value of rayon or other synthetic textile, not specially provided for, 45 cents per pound and 65 per centum ad valorem.

The issue presented is one of law, and involves the construction and application of the quoted provisions of the tariff act. The question is whether the provision for “Spun yarn of rayon or other synthetic textile," contained in paragraph 1303, supra, was intended by the Congress to be limited to yarn which is composed wholly or substantially wholly of such textiles, as claimed by counsel for the Government, or whether it was intended to be sufficiently comprehensive to include yarn composed in chief value of such textiles, but containing a substantial portion of cotton, as claimed by the importer and as held by the trial court.

It is well settled that the general rule is that when a tariff statute provides for “an article of specified material, without declaring to what extent it must be composed of that material, it is at least confined to merchandise of which the specified material is that of chief value or is the predominant one therein,” and the words “composed of,” “made of,” and “kindred expressions” in tariff statutes may, according to the context, mean wholly or substantially wholly of a specified material, or wholly or in chief value of such material. Vantine & Co. v. United States, 3 Ct. Cust. Appls. 488, T. D. 33124; Kenyon Co. v. United States, 4 Ct. Cust. Appls. 344, T. D. 33529; Blumenthal & Co. et al. v. United States, 5 Ct. Cust. Appls. 327, T. D. 34529; Steinhardt & Bro. v. United States, 8 Ct. Cust. Appls. 372, T. D. 37629; Simiansky & Co. v. United States, 9 Ct. Cust. Appls. 288, T. D. 38224; United States v. Kalter Mercantile Co. et al., 11 Ct. Cust. Appls. 540, T. D. 39680; United States v. Linen Thread Co., 13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 359, T. D. 41257.

In its decision, the trial court quoted from our decision in the case of United States v. Linen Thread Co., supra, and seemingly relied upon it as controlling in principle of the issue in the instant case.

In the Linen Thread Go. case, supra, we held that paragraph 1011 of the Tariff Act of 1922, which provided for “Plain-woven fabrics, not including articles finished or unfinished, of flax, hemp, ramie, or other vegetable fiber, except cotton, weighing less than four and one-half ounces per square yard,” was not intended to be limited, due to its context and that of other paragraphs in pari materia — 1009 and 1010 — of that act, to plain woven fabrics composed wholly or sub[85]*85stantially wholly of “flax,” and that plain-woven fabrics composed in -chief value of flax, the other statutory requirements being present, were dutiable under that paragraph. We there followed and applied the so-called “chief value” rule, and held that the provisions of the •statute under consideration did not require that the fabrics provided for in paragraph 1011, supra, be composed wholly or substantially wholly of the materials enumerated therein.

The provisions there involved related to fabrics; whereas, the provisions of paragraph 1303, supra, relate to spun yarn.

Under schedule 13 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the Congress has provided in paragraph 1301 for filaments and yarns “of rayon or other ■synthetic textile” of certain weights and length; in paragraph 1302, for certain waste, filaments, noils, slivers, tops, and roving of rayon ■or other synthetic textile, and for “garnetted or carded” rayon or •other synthetic textile; in paragraph 1303, for “Spun yarn,” singles ■or plied, of rayon or other synthetic textile; in paragraph 1304, for yarn, “put up for handwork, and sewing thread” of rayon or other synthetic textile; in paragraph 1305, for “Rayon or other synthetic textile in bands or strips not exceeding one inch in width, suitable for the manufacture of textiles”; in paragraphs 1306 to 1311, inclusive, for certain fabrics, articles, and wearing apparel, composed wholly or in chief value of rayon or other synthetic textile; and in paragraph 1312 for “Manufactures of filaments, fibers,” etc., composed “wholly ■or in chief value of rayon or other synthetic textile, not specially provided for.” (Italics ours.)

Restated, the Congress has provided in paragraphs 1301 to 1305, inclusive, for rayon or other synthetic textile in various forms, including filaments, yarn, spun yarn, and bands or strips; in paragraphs 1306 to 1311, inclusive, for certain named articles or fabrics composed ■wholly or in chief value of rayon or other synthetic textile; and in paragraph 1312 for manufactures of fibers, filaments, etc., composed wholly or in chief value of rayon or other synthetic textile, not specially provided for.

When H. R. 2667, which later became the Tariff Act of 1930, passed the House of Representatives, paragraphs 1301 to 1305, inclusive, provided, respectively, among other things, for “Rayon yarn,” “Rayon waste,” “Spun rayon yarn,” “Rayon yarn put up for handwork,” and “Rayon in bands or strips.”

In its report to accompany H. R. 2667, relative to the term “rayon,” the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives (Report No. 7, Tariff Readjustment, 1929, p. 121) made the following observation:

Shortly after the enactment of the Tariff Act of 1922, both the manufacturers and merchants of these products, which were then quite generally known .as [86]*86artificial silk, sought to eliminate that name because on the one hand objection was made to the word “artificial” and on the other to the word “silk.” In consequence, a conference was held by manufacturers and representatives of the National Retail Dry Goods Association who proceeded to consider a new name for this rapidly growing product. The term “rayon” was finally adopted in May 1924, and since then it has been generally used in the trade except by one or two parties interested in maintaining their own trade names. There seems, however, to be no valid objection to the adoption of this generic term, as it does not represent any particular process or any particular manufacturer.

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Related

Vantine v. United States
3 Ct. Cust. 488 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1913)
United States v. Burne
4 Ct. Cust. 298 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1913)
Kenyon Co. v. United States
4 Ct. Cust. 344 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1913)
Glass v. United States
4 Ct. Cust. 430 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1913)
Blumenthal & Co. v. United States
5 Ct. Cust. 327 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1914)
Steinhardt & Bro. v. United States
8 Ct. Cust. 372 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1918)
Simiansky & Co. v. United States
9 Ct. Cust. 288 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1919)
United States v. Kalter Mercantile Co.
11 Ct. Cust. 540 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1923)
United States v. Linen Thread Co.
13 Ct. Cust. 359 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1925)

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Bluebook (online)
26 C.C.P.A. 83, 1938 CCPA LEXIS 203, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-guy-b-barham-co-ex-rel-university-shoppe-ccpa-1938.