United States v. Gulf Oil Corp.

47 C.C.P.A. 32, 1959 CCPA LEXIS 138
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedDecember 7, 1959
DocketNo. 4991
StatusPublished

This text of 47 C.C.P.A. 32 (United States v. Gulf Oil Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 47 C.C.P.A. 32, 1959 CCPA LEXIS 138 (ccpa 1959).

Opinion

Rich, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal is from the judgment of the United States Customs Court, Second Division, C.D. 2045, sustaining the importer’s protest.

The imported merchandise is steel oil well casing and tubing complying with the American Petroleum Institute’s specifications for API grade “J-55.” The casing was classified as structural shapes under paragraph 312 and the tubing as tubes, ms.p.f., under paragraph 328 of the Tariff Act of 1930. These classifications are not disputed.

In addition to the duty assessed under paragraphs 312 and 328, the Collector imposed an additional duty of 4% ad valorem pursuant to paragraph 305, of said Act, as modified by GATT, 82 Treas. Dec. 305, T.D. 51802. The sole issue before us is the liability for this additional duty. This liability, if there be one, arises by virtue of the manganese content of the steel of which the imported casing and tubing were made. There is no dispute as to the presence of manganese in the imported steel articles or as to its amount. The imported casing and tubing admittedly contains between 0.7% and 1.4% manganese. As will appear, the figure 1% is recited in the statute involved and since there was no attempt to segregate the importations according to manganese content, they must all be treated as though they contained more than 1%. There was no shipment wherein all the steel had a manganese content less than 1%. As to this there is no dispute.

Paragraph 305, which is in Schedule 3, “Metals and Manufactures of,” as enacted and insofar as pertinent, reads:

Par. 305. In addition to the rates of duty provided for in paragraphs 803, 304, 307, 308, SIB, 313, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 322, 323, 324, 327, and S28 of this schedule, there shall be levied, collected, and paid on all steel or iron in the materials and articles enumerated or described in such paragraphs:

(1) A duty of 8 per centum ad valorem if such steel or iron contains more than one-tenth of 1 per centum of vanadium, or more than two-tenths of 1 per centum of tungsten, molybdenum, or chromium, or more than six-tenths of 1 per centum of nickel, cobalt, or any other metallic element used in alloying steel or iron: Provided, That phosphorus shall not he conr sidered as alloying material unless present in the steel or iron in excess of 5 per centum, nor shall manganese or silicon he so considered unless either [34]*34is present in the steel in excess of 1 per centum, or unless either is present in the iron in excess of 3 per centum; * * *. [Emphasis ours except “Provided.”]

Pursuant to Presidential Proclamation effective January 1, 1948, the 8% duty was reduced to 4%.

We are here concerned with steel. The steel must be treated, for lack of segregation as stated above, as containing more than 1% manganese, though much of it did not. It is not disputed that manganese is a metallic element or that manganese is sometimes used in alloying steel, though it is not admitted that it was used in alloying the imported steel. The issue is clearly drawn, the Government taking the position that under paragraph 305 all steel containing more than 1% of manganese is subject to payment of the additional duty, regardless of the reason for its presence, and the importer urging that it is not payable except on steel wherein manganese has been used as an alloying ingredient, to produce what is known in the trade as “alloy steel.”

This issue centers our attention on an ambiguity, not too apparent at first glance, in the phrase of paragraph 305: “other metallic element used in alloying steel.” Does it mean every metallic element ever so used, or does it mean used in “alloying” the imported steel, and what, in turn, is meant by “alloying” ? In this connection, what is the significance of the ensuing phrase “shall not be considered as alloying material unless * * * present in the steel in excess of 1 per centum”? Is this a requirement that if it is present in excess of 1% it must be considered to be alloying material? Or is it simply a directive that raises a conclusive presumption that 1% or less .shall not be considered an alloying material while the presence of more than 1% requires a further determination on the evidence that it was used in alloying the imported steel, before the additional duty can be imposed ?

Clearly the provision of the statute that manganese shall not be considered “as alloying material” unless present “in excess of 1 per centum” does not necessarily require a holding that it is alloying material when present in excess of 1%. It would have been a simple matter for the legislative drafters to have said that all steel containing more than 5% phosphorous or more than 1% manganese or silicon should be subject to the extra duty. Congress used this affirmative form of statement in paragraph 305 with respect to vanadium, tungsten, molybdenum, chromium, nickel, and cobalt. It has done so, too, with respect to “any other metallic element used in alloying steel or iron” where present in excess of 0.6%, unless the element be phosphorous, manganese or silicon. As to these three elements the negative [35]*35form of expression of the proviso has been employed. Another thing which is quite apparent from study of the wording of this paragraph is that phosphorous, silicon and manganese are, when present in steel, sometimes “alloying material” and sometimes not, otherwise the proviso would have no purpose. This means that, at least in one sense, manganese is a metallic element used in alloying steel. These and other considerations create an uncertainty which requires that we delve further into the matter in order 'to 'be reasonably sure of construing paragraph 305 so as to carry out the intent of Congress, in accordance with the master rule of statutory interpretation. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. United States, 26 CCPA 161; C.A.D. 11. To ascertain such intent, the entire context of the statute must be considered and every effort made to give effect to all of its language. Dart Export Corp., et al. v. United States, 43 CCPA 64, 74; C.A.D. 610.

THE BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF PARAGRAPH 305

Paragraph 305 had its origin in the Tariff Act of 1922, paragraph 305 of which was similar except that the figure with respect to “nickel, cobalt, vanadium, chromium, tungsten, molybdenum, or any other metallic element used in alloying steel” was a uniform “six-tenths of 1 per centum.” The proviso, insofar as pertinent, read: “Provided, That manganese and silicon shall not be considered as alloying material unless present in the steel in excess of 1 per centum manganese or silicon.” It will be noted that the 1922 proviso did not mention phosphorous and that in the 1930 Act there was a lowering of the per centum figures with respect to vanadium (reduced to 0.1%) and tungsten, molybdenum and chromium (reduced to 0.2%).

The Tariff Act of 1913 contained the first mention of alloy steels (Tariff Information Surveys, 1921, Survey C-7, p. 88), the following appearing in paragraph 110 thereof:

* * * all steels by whatever process made, containing alloys [sic], such as nickel, cobalt, vanadium, chromium, tungsten, wolfram, molybdenum, titanium, iridium, uranium, tantalum, boron, and similar alloys, 15 per cent ad valorem.3

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47 C.C.P.A. 32, 1959 CCPA LEXIS 138, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-gulf-oil-corp-ccpa-1959.