United States v. Guglielmi

731 F. Supp. 1273, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2981, 1990 WL 28746
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedMarch 19, 1990
DocketNo. C-CR-85-59
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 731 F. Supp. 1273 (United States v. Guglielmi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Guglielmi, 731 F. Supp. 1273, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2981, 1990 WL 28746 (W.D.N.C. 1990).

Opinion

ORDER

ROBERT D. POTTER, Chief Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on remand from the Fourth Circuit for reconsideration of this Court’s order denying Defendant’s Motion under Federal Rules of [1274]*1274Criminal Procedure 35(b) for reduction of sentence. A hearing was held on January 30, 1990. Defendant was represented by Harold J. Bender, Esq., and the Government was represented by Thomas J. Ash-craft, United States Attorney.

The Fourth Circuit interpreted this Court’s order filed May 13, 1988 as suggesting “... only two rationales for the denial.” (Slip Op. No. 88-7656, p. 5 dated June 9, 1989 [877 F.2d 60 (table) ]).

The Fourth Circuit first considered that portion of this Court’s order which stated: “On appeal the Fourth Circuit addressed this contention ... and determined that the sentence should not be disturbed The Fourth Circuit, on page 7 of its opinion, stated:

In stating that the proportionality analysis portions of Guglielmi I conveyed our instruction that Guglielmi’s sentence “should not be disturbed” the sentencing court indicates to us that it may have believed that Guglielmi I removed its discretion to conduct a plenary view of Guglielmi’s sentence in a Rule 35(b) proceeding.

The Fourth Circuit apparently misconstrued this Court’s statement which was taken out of context of the following paragraph in this Court’s order:

Defendant is still contending that the Court’s sentence was so severe that it violated the Eighth Amendment. On appeal the Fourth Circuit addressed this contention by Defendant and determined that the sentence should not be disturbed.

This Court was addressing the Defendant's contention that the Defendant’s sentence was so severe that it violated the Eighth Amendment, and was answering that contention by stating that the Fourth Circuit had already ruled that the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment and therefore should not be disturbed for that reason. This Court is well aware that, as the Fourth Circuit said on page 8 of its remand order, it is:

... axiomatic that the disposition of a Rule 35(b) motion is within the sound discretion of the sentencing courts (citing cases).

This Court did not interpret the Fourth Circuit to mean that Guglielmi I removed its discretion to conduct a plenary review of Guglielmi’s sentence in a Rule 35(b) proceeding, and if deemed proper reduce the sentence.

The Fourth Circuit's second reason for remand was stated as follows:

The second rationale for the order, representing the sentencing court’s view of the gravity of Guglielmi’s offenses indicates more clearly than the first a principled exercise of discretion. We disagree, however, that the principle has a basis in law. (citing cases).
The sentencing court offered no citation to either of the instant transportation statutes or their legislative histories, or to a case from any other court, to support its view that trafficking in obscene materials is in some sense a “violent” crime because it foments violence by those who view the materials. We have not unearthed any authority to support this conception of the statutes, and were directed to none by the United States during oral argument.

What this Court said in denying the Defendant’s Rule 35 motion was:

Contrary to Defendant’s contention that obscenity crimes are considered relatively unserious, this Court considers obscenity crimes very serious, which can (emphasis added) result in “victims,” that is those who view these films, committing sexual crimes.

This Court did not say:

... that trafficking in obscene materials is in some sense a “violent” crime because it foments violence (emphasis added) by those who view the materials ...

The Fourth Circuit, in its opinion at footnote 7, page 10, cited the “Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography” (1970) and “Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, First Report,” 215 (1986) (emphasis added) for the proposition that there is no evidence that erotic materials cause increased rates of sexual crime or sexual deviancy.

[1275]*1275More recent studies as set out in “Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography Final Report” 1986, Section 5.2.2, which is titled: Nonviolent Materials Depicting Degradation, Domination, Subordination or Humiliation, pp. 329-335, state the Commission’s conclusion on page 333:

We should make clear what we concluded here. We are not saying that everyone exposed to material of this type has his attitude about sexual violence changed. We are saying only that the evidence supports the conclusion that substantial exposure to degrading material increases the likelihood for an individual and the incidence over a large population that these attitudinal changes will occur. And we are not saying that everyone with these attitudes will commit an act of sexual violence or sexual coercion. We are saying that such attitudes will increase the likelihood for an individual and the incidence for a population that acts of sexual violence, sexual coercion, or unwanted sexual aggression will occur. Thus, we conclude that substantial exposure to materials of this type bears some causal relationship to the level of sexual violence, sexual coercion, or unwanted sexual aggression in the population so exposed. (Emphasis added).

“Degradation” as used by the Commission is defined on page 331 of the Report as follows:

The degradation we refer to is degradation of people, most often women, and here we are referring to material that, although not violent, depicts people, usually women, as existing solely for the sexual satisfaction of others, usually men, or that depicts people, usually women, in decidedly subordinate roles in their sexual relations with others, or that depicts people engaged in sexual practices that would to most people be considered humiliating. Indeed, forms of degradation represent the largely predominant proportion of commercially available pornography.

A summary of the facts as stated by the Fourth Circuit in its opinion in Guglielmi I appearing in 819 F.2d 451-54 (4th Cir.1987) were as follows:

HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge:

Guglielmi was convicted upon multiple counts of an indictment charging interstate transportation of obscene films and use of a common carrier for interstate transportation of the same films. His first, and perhaps principal, argument is essentially that the materials are so disgusting and repellent that they could not be found to appeal to the prurient interest of the average person, nor to the average zoophiliac. The latter branch of his contention is premised upon his subordinate contention that there is no such thing as an average zoophiliac. The argument is not without ingenuity, but we reject the notion that greatly offensive material has the protection of the First Amendment while less offensive material does not.

I.

Guglielmi was the operator of a warehouse in Baltimore, Maryland from which he supplied adult bookstores with films, written materials, pictures and sexual aids and devices.

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Related

United States v. Louis Guglielmi
929 F.2d 1001 (Fourth Circuit, 1991)

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