United States v. Griffin

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 24, 2024
• Docket: 23-774
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 24 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-774 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:19-cr-00133-RRB-MMS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* MICHAEL JOSEPH GRIFFIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Ralph R. Beistline, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 22, 2024** Anchorage, Alaska

Before: BYBEE, FRIEDLAND, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Following a jury trial, Michael Joseph Griffin was convicted of possession

of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A), (C), and (D), carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and distribution of

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). He was sentenced to

248 months of imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.

Griffin appeals the district court’s pretrial order denying his motion to suppress

evidence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review de novo the denial of a motion to suppress, and we review the

district court’s underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Johnson,

875 F.3d 1265, 1273 (9th Cir. 2017). Whether a person is “in custody” for

purposes of Miranda is a “mixed question of law and fact warranting de novo

review.” United States v. Bassignani, 575 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2002)); see Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).

1. Griffin contends that Alaska State Trooper Christopher Bitz was required

to give Miranda warnings before questioning him during a traffic stop. But

Miranda warnings are required only when a person is “in custody,” that is, when

he has been “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” United

States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Miranda, 384

U.S. at 444). The Supreme Court has clarified that a traffic stop does not

necessarily render a driver “in custody” for purposes of Miranda. See Berkemer v.

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984).

2 23-774 Instead, to determine whether Griffin was in custody, we look to the “totality

of facts involved at the time of the alleged restraint.” United States v. Medina-

Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 519 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d

1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981)). Relevant factors “include the language used by the

officer to summon the individual, the extent to which he or she is confronted with

evidence of guilt, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the duration of the

detention and the degree of pressure applied to detain the individual.” Id. (quoting

Booth, 669 F.2d at 1235).

Bitz did not use or threaten to use force, draw his weapon, or use threatening

language. Furthermore, the traffic stop occurred on a public highway, and Griffin

was not handcuffed or arrested at the scene. Although Griffin was not free to leave

while Bitz held his driver’s license, there are many “scenarios in which a person is

detained by law enforcement officers, is not free to go, but is not ‘in custody’ for

Miranda purposes.” United States v. Butler, 249 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2001).

Bitz’s detention of Griffin was one such scenario, as the noncoercive and

nonthreatening nature of the stop confirm. We agree with the district court that

“[n]o . . . circumstances which might transform the stop into a custodial arrest were

present.”

2. Griffin also argues that Bitz unlawfully extended the traffic stop by

questioning him about marijuana distribution and the cash in the car. The proper

3 23-774 length of a traffic stop is determined by reference to the reason the stop was

initiated. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). An officer

may “conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,” but

if those checks prolong the stop, they must be justified by reasonable suspicion. Id.

at 355; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).

Griffin has not shown that the duration of the stop was impermissible. First,

most of the question about “guns, knives, bombs, drugs, [or] anything I need to be

concerned about” was appropriate to ensure Bitz’s own safety, and the inclusion of

the word “drugs,” even if not about safety, did not meaningfully extend the stop.

See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (explaining that “the tolerable duration of police

inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to

address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety

concerns” (citation omitted)); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047

(1983) (recognizing that traffic stops “are especially fraught with danger to police

officers”). Second, Bitz’s question about marijuana was permissible given what he

described as the “super strong” smell of marijuana, which created reasonable

suspicion that Griffin may have been transporting large amounts of the drug. Third,

Bitz’s observation of marijuana buds in individual bags gave him further reason to

suspect distribution. Fourth, his observation of a box of ammunition, magazines,

and a pistol holster in plain view provided reason for concern and contradicted

4 23-774 Griffin’s earlier statement that he did not have weapons. See United States v.

Baron, 94 F.3d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that inconsistencies can

contribute to reasonable suspicion), overruled on other grounds by United States v.

Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Finally, the large amounts of cash

in the glove box—which Bitz observed while Griffin searched for the vehicle’s

registration—contributed to his reasonable suspicion that Griffin was engaged in

illegal drug activity. See United States v. Pacee, 564 F.2d 306, 307 (9th Cir. 1977)

(holding that the discovery of a large amount of cash contributed to reasonable

suspicion and “justified additional questioning”).

Although Bitz’s questions were unrelated to Griffin’s speeding, they were

permissible because the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable

suspicion of an independent offense that justified any extension of the traffic stop.

United States v. Taylor, 60 F.4th 1233, 1242 (9th Cir. 2023); see Rodriguez, 575

U.S. at 355. The district court did not err in denying Griffin’s motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

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