United States v. Grant

933 F. Supp. 610, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10881, 1996 WL 434674
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedJuly 26, 1996
DocketNo. 3:96-CR-127-X
StatusPublished

This text of 933 F. Supp. 610 (United States v. Grant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Grant, 933 F. Supp. 610, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10881, 1996 WL 434674 (N.D. Tex. 1996).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING WALTER V. GRANT, JR.’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY

KENDALL, District Judge.

Before the Court is the Defendant Walter V. Grant, Jr.’s Motion To Withdraw Plea Of Guilt Pursuant To Rule 32(e) and Rule 11(e) filed July 22, 1996. After an evidentiary hearing on July 22,1996, the Court, from the bench, denied the Defendant’s motion to withdraw plea of guilty, which was filed within an hour of the scheduled sentencing and tendered to the Court and the Government approximately 10 minutes before the sentencing hearing began.

[611]*611The Court articulated reasons from the bench for denying the motion and a full hearing was had in which the Defendant and his counsel were allowed ample opportunity to articulate their reasons for wishing to withdraw the April 15,1996 guilty plea. This written order and opinion is for the purpose of completely and fully setting forth the Court’s reasoning for its decision and is meant to be in supplementation of the reasons given on the record in open court.

Mr. Grant is a college-educated, doctorate degree-holding televangelist. On April 15, 1996, he pleaded guilty under the terms of a plea agreement to tax evasion, with a guaranteed guideline calculation and cap of his sentence1. The defendant signed a factual resume admitting all of the elements of the offense. During the plea colloquy, he testified under oath that he was guilty, that he read and understood every document that he signed, and he swore to and stipulated that all of the elements of the indictment, as well as the factual resume were true and correct. During the presentencing process, he gave a statement to the probation department acknowledging, in detail, his guilt in this case.

Over three months later, at the sentencing hearing, after having received disclosure of the presentence report and filing numerous objections thereto, the Court and the Government entered the hearing with approximately ten minutes notice of the subject motion. The motion itself and counsel’s comments at the hearing indicated that the' motion was being made upon explicit instruction and direction of the defendant to counsel, and was against counsel’s advice.

A hearing on the motion was held in which the defendant and counsel were given free rein to pretty much say whatever they wanted to say in support of the motion. Because of the evidence adduced, (or lack thereof), and because of the reasons stated by the Court at the time, as well as the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law reduced to writing in this order, the motion was denied.

The decision of the district court to deny a motion to withdraw a plea of guilt will be disturbed only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit applies a totality of the circumstances test with a special eye to seven factors to decide whether a district court has abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 389, 343-44 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004, 105 S.Ct. 1865, 85 L.Ed.2d 159; See also United States v. Bond, 87 F.3d 695 (5th Cir.1996).

With the exception of last-minute claim of actual innocence, the defendant did not address any of the other six Carr factors.

The defendant complained about material submitted by Ole Anthony and the Trinity Foundation, a “televangelist watchdog group.” The Court granted the defendant’s motion to strike these materials and did not consider them at all in sentencing. The defendant next complained in this motion that Ole Anthony wished to testify at the sentencing hearing. Ole Anthony did not testify at the sentencing hearing, and would not have been allowed to do so unless there had been some indication that he had relevant evidence bearing on sentencing.

Next in the motion the defendant asserted as a reason for withdrawal of the plea that the government might adduce character witnesses when the government had indicated that they would not. At the sentencing hearing, the government adduced no witnesses, character or otherwise. In short, with the exception of the claim of innocence, (which will be examined in short order), the defendant articulated no justifiable reason for allowing withdrawal of the plea of guilt.

Before addressing the defendant’s claim of innocence, the Court notes that to have allowed withdrawal of the plea of guilt in this ease would have inconvenienced the Court, given the significant amount of work the Court had done in reviewing the presentence report, the voluminous objections thereto, the responses to those objections, as well as the bound volumes of character reference letters and other materials submitted by the defendant. This inconvenience factor was exacer[612]*612bated by the additional Carr factor of the delay in filing the motion. From a review of existing cases, the Court could find no other circumstance where the delay was as outrageous as in this case. Being handed a copy of the motion as you are literally putting your robe on before going into the courtroom for sentencing is a bit late. Given the delay and its attendant inconvenience on the Court because of all the work which had already been done in preparation for the sentencing, the Court must conclude that the Government likewise would have suffered the same inconvenience, waste of resources and prejudice had the motion been granted.

As previously stated, and as the plea colloquy will reflect, the original plea of guilt was without question knowing and voluntary. The defendant did not state anything to the contrary at the hearing on this motion. The defendant did not indicate that he was confused,' that he was the victim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that he did not understand something, or that there was some defense that he had failed to assert.

At the hearing, one of his own character witnesses agreed with the characterization of him as “a sophisticated business man who takes care of his business.” It is noted that this character witness was his banker who knew him in his financial life. The defendant is not some uneducated 18-year old who was naive about what was going on.

There was no allegation that at the time of the plea Mr. Grant was under any duress or coercion to plead guilty. Indeed, the ease had been investigated for over 11 months with his knowledge. The Court notes that he was represented by counsel during the ongoing investigation. He specifically stated on the record, under oath, that he was not pleading guilty to protect anyone else and no one had threatened him, coerced him, or done any violence to him to get him to plead guilty. Additionally, he testified under oath that no one had promised him anything to get him to plead guilty except the promises contained in the plea agreement. Without question, his April 15 tax evasion plea was both knowing and voluntary.

The Court finds that to allow the withdrawal of the plea of guilt in this case would have wasted judicial resources. From the signed factual résumé to the sworn statements given by the defendant at the plea of guilt, and as will be demonstrated subsequently by a transcript of an undercover IRS videotape of the defendant, the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is overwhelming.

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Related

United States v. Bond
87 F.3d 695 (Fifth Circuit, 1996)
Hibernia National Bank v. United States
740 F.2d 382 (Fifth Circuit, 1984)
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles
471 U.S. 1003 (Supreme Court, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
933 F. Supp. 610, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10881, 1996 WL 434674, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-grant-txnd-1996.