F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH November 3, 2006 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 05-8115 GREGORY E. GRAHAM, a/k/a Godfather, a/k/a G, a/k/a Big Sexy,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING (D.C. NO. 05-CR-78-J)
David L. Serelson, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Defendant-Appellant.
David A. Kubichek, Assistant United States Attorney (Matthew H. Mead, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Casper, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before HARTZ, McWILLIAMS, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
The principal issue in this case is whether a mistake in the Presentence
Report, to which the defendant objected but which was not corrected by the
district court, requires reversal of a sentence predicated on a plea agreement
stipulating to a determinate sentence of twenty-five years. W e AFFIRM . I. FA CTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 10, 2005, Gregory Graham sold approximately seven grams of
crack cocaine to a government informant. This transaction was part of a larger
drug operation centered around the C heyenne, W yoming home of John Henry
W ilson. According to government informants, M r. Graham would regularly
obtain wholesale quantities of cocaine and crack cocaine in Denver and transport
them to Cheyenne for sale at M r. W ilson's home. In July 2005, M r. Graham and
several others were charged by superceding indictment with conspiracy to possess
and distribute more than 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base (count 1), and M r. Graham
was also charged with distribution of 7.1 grams of cocaine base (count 5).
After six days of trial, encompassing nearly all the government’s case-in-
chief, several defendants, including M r. Graham, decided to plead guilty. The
accompanying plea agreements were oral rather than written. Under the terms of
his agreement, M r. Graham pleaded guilty to the distribution charge, waived his
right to appeal, and stipulated to a tw enty-five year sentence. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(c)(1)(C). M r. Graham admitted only to distribution of the 7.1 grams
charged in the distribution count. Unlike one of his co-defendants, M r. Graham
did not admit to the 1.5 kilograms charged in the conspiracy count. As its part of
the bargain, the government agreed to dismiss the conspiracy charge at
sentencing.
-2- During the plea colloquy, the court informed M r. Graham of the potential
sentences under counts one and five, of the terms of his plea agreement, including
the waiver of his right to appeal, and of the fact that the court would be bound to
sentence him to twenty-five years incarceration if it accepted the plea agreement.
The court also explained that it would postpone ruling on the plea agreement until
after it reviewed the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”). M r. Graham stated that he
understood all of this. The court then explained that, by entering the plea
bargain, M r. Graham would w aive his right to a jury trial and the privilege against
self-incrimination. Further, the court explained the elements and nature of the
crime to which M r. Graham would be pleading, specifically noting that he would
be admitting distribution of “approximately 7.1 grams of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of cocaine base . . . .” R. Vol. XI, at 13. M r.
Graham stated that he understood these facts and entered his plea of guilty. Upon
questioning from the court, M r. Graham agreed that he entered the plea
voluntarily and that he had consulted with his attorney. The court accepted the
plea but reserved acceptance of the plea agreement until sentencing. The trial
continued as to only one of the original co-defendants, who was convicted of
conspiracy to distribute in excess of 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base, and sentenced
to 300 months incarceration.
The PSR, completed on O ctober 19, 2005, calculated M r. Graham’s offense
level at thirty-eight, a score predicated on relevant conduct involving 22.27
-3- kilograms of crack cocaine (a number that took into account all of M r. Graham’s
dealings with the conspiracy, as reported by government informants), a two-level
enhancement for possession of a firearm, and a two-level reduction for acceptance
of responsibility. Combined with his criminal history category of III, this
qualified M r. Graham for a sentencing range of 292-365 months. In addition, the
PSR erroneously reported the details of the oral plea agreement, stating that
“defendant would plead guilty to Count 5 of the Superceding Indictment; relevant
conduct involved at least 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base . . . .” R. Vol. XIV, at
4–5.
M r. Graham responded to the PSR on October 28, 2005, pointing out that
he had not admitted to relevant conduct involving at least 1.5 kilograms of
cocaine base but only to relevant conduct involving 7.1 grams. M r. Graham also
objected to the two-level firearm enhancement and asserted that his criminal
history score overstated his criminal conduct. Lastly, M r. Graham stated his wish
to withdraw his guilty plea and offered three reasons for wanting to do so: first,
Ernest Daniels, a government informant who had not been called at trial, had
recanted his statements regarding M r. Graham’s involvement in the conspiracy;
second, M r. Graham felt that the twenty-five year sentence was unreasonable
given his prior record and familial responsibilities; and, third, at the time of
accepting his plea, M r. Graham had been surprised by the mid-trial pleas of his
codefendants and had only a short time to consider the offer.
-4- Sentencing occurred on November 1, 2005. M r. Graham renewed his
objections to the PSR and moved to withdraw his guilty plea. At various points
during the hearing, M r. Graham also expressed confusion about the plea he had
entered and dismay at the length of his sentence. The court denied M r. Graham’s
motion. First, the court noted that M r. Daniels’s retraction was likely motivated
by his anger at the government for not delivering on a sentencing promise and
that M r. Daniels had provided no testimony at M r. Graham’s trial. Second, the
court observed that in the continued trial of the codefendant who had chosen not
to plead, the jury determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that more than four
kilograms of crack cocaine w ere involved in this case. Third, crediting the PSR’s
erroneous report of M r. Graham’s stipulation, the court reasoned that:
the Plea Agreement in this matter was at least 1.5 kilograms. The defendant doesn’t hesitate to attempt to back out of that Plea Agreement in terms of drug quantity, but . . . he’s either committed to it by his own admission as part of the Plea Agreement or not for purposes of relevant conduct.
R. Vol. XII, at 12; see also id. at 18. Fourth, the court found that M r. Graham’s
familial role did not greatly bolster his request, given that the Sentencing
Guidelines disfavor such considerations. Fifth, the court rejected M r. Graham’s
assertion that the plea bargain unfolded too quickly for him to give it adequate
consideration; instead, the court found that his plea was the last to be taken and
that he had “substantial time . . . to consider his situation.” Id. at 13. Indeed, the
court noted that M r. Graham entered his plea bargain only after he had a chance
-5- to hear nearly all of the case against him, which put him “probably in the best
position he would ever be in to make an assessment as to whether to take the deal
that was offered by the government in this case.” Id. at 15–16.
The district court also rejected M r. Graham’s objection to his criminal
history score, noted that the binding plea sentence fell within— and was at the
lower end of— the 292–365 month range determined in the PSR, and accepted the
plea agreement. The court found that “the sentence imposed is the most
reasonable sentence upon consideration of all factors enumerated under [18
U.S.C. § 3553] and the binding Plea Agreement under [Fed. R. Crim. Pro.
11(c)(1)(C)]” and noted that “the same sentence would be imposed even if the
advisory guideline range was determined to be improperly calculated.” Id. at 32.
M r. Graham timely appealed. 1
II. D ISC USSIO N
A. M otion to W ithdraw the Plea Agreement
M r. Graham argues that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)
governs the w ithdrawal of guilty pleas and states:
A defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere:
1 On April 10, 2006, M r. Graham’s attorney filed a brief on his client’s behalf. M r. Graham, believing that this brief did not adequately present his claims, filed a motion to supplement. We granted that motion and consider both the arguments presented in the initial brief and those in the pro se supplemental brief.
-6- (1) before the court accepts the plea, for any reason or no reason; or (2) after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if: (A) the court rejects the plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(5); or (B) the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.
Because the district court accepted M r. Graham’s guilty plea at the August 23,
2005, hearing, his request falls under subdivision (d)(2)(B) of Rule 11. See
United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 671 (1997). This Court determines whether
a defendant can show “a fair and just reason” under this provision by reference to
seven factors, and we review the district court’s denial of the motion to withdraw
under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d
1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Since all factors cut against the
Defendant, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
1. Whether the defendant has asserted his innocence. M r. Graham does not
claim to be innocent of the distribution charge for w hich he was convicted.
Rather, he argues that he has asserted innocence as to the erroneous relevant
conduct stipulation in the PSR. The mistake in the PSR, however, is a separate
issue. The question here is whether the Defendant claims innocence as to the
charge to which he pleaded. He does not, and this factor thus weighs against
allowing withdrawal. See, e.g., United States v. Siedlik, 231 F.3d 744, 749 (10th
Cir. 2000).
-7- 2. Whether withdrawal would prejudice the government. M r. Graham
asserts that the government, at the sentencing hearing, “made no showing of any
prejudice that would result” from granting his motion. Brief for Defendant-
Appellant at 5. W ithdrawal of the plea, however, would require the government
to prepare and try anew a case it had substantially completed when M r. Graham
entered his guilty plea. As such, this factor cuts against withdrawal. See Siedlik,
231 F.3d at 749 (“[W]ithdrawal likely would prejudice the government by forcing
it to undergo much of the same process it already has completed.”); United States
v. Jones, 168 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d
413, 420 (10th Cir. 1996).
3. Whether defendant delayed in filing his motion to withdraw, and if so,
the reason for the delay. M r. Graham first signaled his desire to withdraw his
plea on October 28, 2005, about two months after he entered the plea and three
days before his sentencing hearing. He argues that this delay was attributable to
the late-breaking discovery of M r. Daniels’s recantation and to the fact that he
was incarcerated at some distance from his counsel. M r. Daniels, however, did
not appear as a witness at trial. Accordingly, his recantation could have had little
effect on M r. Graham’s prospects at trial, and thus does not furnish a sufficient
reason for the delay. As for M r. Graham’s incarceration at a distance from his
counsel, this is not an uncommon situation and is not one, absent further
explanation, that excuses such a lengthy delay. It seems that the true reason for
-8- M r. Graham’s motion is a change of heart about the sentence he faces under the
bargain. Such a shift, while understandable, is not an excuse for delay. This
factor w eighs against the defendant. See Siedlik, 231 at 749–50; Carr, 80 F.3d at
420 (“[I]f the defendant has long delayed his withdrawal motion, and has had the
full benefit of competent counsel at all times, the reasons given to support
withdrawal must have considerab[le] . . . force.”) (quoting United States v.
Vidakovich, 911 F.2d 435, 439–40 (10th Cir. 1990) (alterations and omissions in
original).
4. Whether withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the court. M r.
Graham argues that because the August 2005 trial would have proceeded with or
without him, and because he could be ready for a new trial on short notice,
withdraw al of his plea w ould not cause great inconvenience to the court. If M r.
Graham were allowed to withdraw his plea, however, the district court would
have to set aside time for a new trial— an obvious inconvenience. See Siedlik,
231 F.3d at 750; Jones, 168 F.3d at 1220. The district court has already expended
significant resources in trying this Defendant, and it was his choice to opt out of
that process after assessing the near entirety of the case against him. This factor
weighs against allowing withdrawal.
5. Whether close assistance of counsel was available to the Defendant. In
the brief filed by his attorney, M r. Graham asserts that although he had assistance
of counsel, he was surprised by his co-defendants’ plea bargains and had only a
-9- few hours to decide whether to accept a plea bargain or continue with trial.
Despite this short time period, M r. Graham’s lawyer advised him to plead guilty
after having had the opportunity to test the government’s case throughout the
trial. As the district court noted, when he made his plea, M r. Graham was in
“probably the best position he would ever be in to make an assessment” of
whether to plead guilty. R. Vol. XII, at 15–16. It thus appears that M r. Graham
benefitted from the close and informed assistance of counsel before choosing his
path.
In his supplemental filing, M r. Graham argues that his attorney never
advised him of the rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty. W hether or not
this assertion is true, during the plea colloquy the district court very thoroughly
catalogued the implications of entering a plea of guilty and M r. Graham stated
that he understood the waivers attendant to such a plea. See R. Vol. XI, at 11–13.
Thus, this factor also weighs against allowing withdrawal.
6. Whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. M r. Graham argues that
the lack of a written plea agreement and the pressure of a last-minute plea deal by
his codefendants affected the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea. As
demonstrated by the confusion in this case, oral plea agreements are far from
ideal; but they are valid. See e.g., United States v. Gardner, 417 F.3d 541,
544–45 (6th Cir. 2005); Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003).
And though he now professes contrary notions, M r. Graham participated in a Rule
-10- 11 colloquy that leaves little doubt that his plea was knowing and voluntary. The
court carefully explained the charges M r. Graham faced at trial, the terms of the
proposed agreement, and the rights he would relinquish by entering the
agreement. M r. Graham stated that he understood everything the court had
explained to him. This factor thus weighs against allowing withdrawal. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1573 (10th Cir. 1993) (knowing and
voluntary plea taken in compliance with Rule 11 weighs against motion to
withdraw).
7. Whether the withdrawal would waste judicial resources. This factor
triggers similar concerns as those raised under the “inconvenience to the court”
factor and w eighs against allow ing withdrawal for the same reasons.
B. Error as to the Terms of the Bargain
At various points in his pro se supplemental brief, M r. Graham objects to
the district court’s reliance on the PSR’s erroneous assertion that he had agreed in
his plea bargain to relevant conduct involving 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base
rather than 7.1 grams. To be sure, the district court committed error here, and the
fact that M r. Graham’s repeated objections prompted neither the probation
officer, nor the prosecutor, nor the court to check the transcript and correct this
mistake is disturbing. Indeed, if the error in the PSR had been determinative of
M r. Graham’s sentence, we would reverse and remand for resentencing. But that
is not the case here. M r. Graham entered into a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea bargain, in
-11- which he agreed to a stipulated sentence of twenty-five years. Such a stipulation
“binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(c)(1)(C). The court thus did not use the PSR to calculate a specific sentence,
but rather as one data point among several in determining whether to accept the
plea agreement.
M r. Graham correctly points out that the district court reserved accepting
the plea agreement pending review of the PSR. And at the sentencing hearing,
the district court credited the erroneous 1.5 kilogram stipulation as one factor in
favor of rejecting M r. Graham’s motion and accepting the plea agreement. If
these were the only facts before us, we might be inclined to remand for
reconsideration based on a corrected PSR. But the transcript of the sentencing
hearing convinces us that the court relied on several additional factors in
accepting this plea agreement and that a corrected PSR would not have made a
difference in the outcome of this case. First, the district court had before it a
trial’s worth of evidence regarding M r. Graham’s involvement in this drug
conspiracy. See R. Vol. XII, at 11. Second, the court noted that the jury in the
continued trial of M r. Graham’s co-defendant found, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the conspiracy involved 4.7 kilograms of cocaine base. See id. at 11, 15, 18.
Third, the court had before it the fact that M r. Graham agreed to this sentence
after evaluating the near totality of evidence amassed against him by the
government. Last, and most importantly, the court stated that “the same sentence
-12- would be imposed even if the advisory guideline range was determined to be
improperly calculated.” Id. at 32. Under these circumstances, we find the error
harmless.
C. Remaining Claims
M r. G raham raises several other claims that merit but brief discussion.
First, he argues that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
advising him to agree to a plea bargain. Any such claim is more appropriate for
review on habeas. See Gordon, 4 F.3d at 1570 (nothing that, aside from “rare
instances,” the “preferred avenue for challenging the effectiveness of counsel in a
federal criminal case [is] via collateral attack”).
Second, M r. Graham argues that he did not enter his plea knowingly and
voluntarily. As we have detailed above, the record of the meticulous Rule 11
colloquy in this case rebuts this argument. The district court fully informed M r.
Graham of the terms of the charges to which he was pleading, of the rights he
would give up by pleading, and of the terms of the plea bargain into which he was
about to enter. M r. Graham stated that he understood each of these warnings and
freely entered his plea.
Third, M r. Graham argues that his sentence issued in violation of United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which held that “[a]ny fact (other than a
prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict
-13- must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 244. Booker, however, is not implicated w here the district court
accepts a stipulated sentence under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea bargain. See United
States v. Silva, 413 F.3d 1283, 1284 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[N]othing in Booker
undermines the validity of sentences imposed under Rule 11(c)(1)(C).”).
Fourth, M r. Graham argues that the criminal history points reflected in the
PSR were uncounseled misdemeanor pleas and thus could not be used to enhance
his sentence. Again, we note that the PSR was not used to calculate a sentence,
but only as one data point in deciding whether the stipulated sentence in this plea
bargain should be accepted. W e therefore need not reach this argument.
Fifth, M r. Graham argues that the district court ran afoul of Rule 32(i)(3)
by not specifically ruling on a disputed matter in the PSR, namely, the
erroneously reported 1.5 kilogram stipulation. According to the Rule, “[a]t
sentencing, the court . . . must— for any disputed portion of the presentence report
or other controverted matter— rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is
unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the
court will not consider the matter in sentencing . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(3)(B). W hile the court did not explicitly rule on the objection to the error, it
did find that “the same sentence would be imposed even if the advisory guideline
range was determined to be improperly calculated.” R. Vol. XII, at 32. In other
-14- words, a “ruling [wa]s unnecessary . . . because the matter [would] not affect
sentencing . . . . Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).
A s to the other claims raised by M r. Graham in his supplemental filing, w e
have considered them and find them to be without merit. Therefore, we AFFIR M
the judgment of the district court.
-15-