United States v. Gould

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-6627 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:16-cv-01041-TSZ v. MEMORANDUM* DAVID A. GOULD,

Defendant - Appellant,

and

JANE C. POLINDER, WHATCOM COUNTY TREASURER, FINANCIAL CONCEPTS, LTD., GOLDSTAR ENTERPRISES, INC., BROOKLINE PROPERTIES,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 15, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: NGUYEN, OWENS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

David A. Gould appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment reducing

his federal income tax liabilities to judgment and foreclosing federal tax liens, and

the district court’s related post-judgment enforcement orders. We review de novo

the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Oppenheimer & Co. Inc. v.

Mitchell, 135 F.4th 837, 844 (9th Cir. 2025). As the parties are familiar with the

facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We affirm.

1. The district court correctly entered summary judgment against Gould for

the assessed taxes, penalties, and interest for 2000 through 2004. In an action to

reduce tax assessments to judgment, the government satisfies its initial burden by

introducing competent evidence of the assessments, which are entitled to a

presumption of correctness when supported by a minimal factual foundation. See

Oliver v. United States, 921 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.

Stonehill, 702 F.2d 1288, 1293–94 (9th Cir. 1983); Palmer v. IRS, 116 F.3d 1309,

1312–13 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, the government introduced declarations from IRS

officials, substitute returns, notices of deficiency, Forms 4340 reflecting the

assessments, and supporting examination materials. It also submitted bank, credit

card, and other financial records linking Gould to the unreported income on which

the assessments were based. The Forms 4340 constitute probative evidence that

2 24-6627 the assessments and notices were properly made. See Hughes v. United States, 953

F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1992); Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir.

1993) (per curiam).

Gould failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the

assessments were arbitrary or erroneous. See Stonehill, 702 F.2d at 1294. His

decade-late tax returns did not overcome the presumption of correctness because

they merely reflected his own calculations after the IRS had already prepared

substitute returns pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6020(b). Moreover, Gould failed to

substantiate the income, deductions, credits, and exemptions claimed in those

returns. His accountant testified that the returns were largely drawn from Gould’s

estimates and a brief email summary, not contemporaneous records, and Gould

produced no documentary evidence corroborating the claimed figures. Gould’s

self-serving estimates are insufficient to rebut an otherwise-valid assessment. See

Cracchiola v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 1383, 1385 (9th Cir. 1981); Geiger v.

Commissioner, 440 F.2d 688, 689 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). Ultimately, Gould

has identified no material factual dispute that would call into question the district

court’s grant of summary judgment.

Nor was Gould deprived of his due process rights when the government

revised its calculations downward before summary judgment. The revised

computations were disclosed during the litigation, explained in an IRS declaration,

3 24-6627 and supported by accompanying documentation. Gould had the opportunity to

challenge those revised calculations in opposing summary judgment. Because he

had a meaningful opportunity to contest the evidence before the judgment, he was

not denied due process. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). The

district court thus properly entered judgment based on the revised, reduced

liabilities.

2. The district court correctly concluded that Gould had a property interest in

the 6109 Evergreen Way property held by Brookline Properties. As the district

court acknowledged, Gould failed to raise any challenges to the government’s

nominee or alter ego theories at the summary judgment stage. See LVRC Holdings

LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We will not reverse a

district court's grant of summary judgment unless the party opposing the summary

judgment motion has identified the evidence establishing a genuine issue of

material fact in its opposition to summary judgment.”); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000). Although Gould

now argues that Brookline Properties was not his nominee or alter ego, he has

waived that challenge by failing to raise it below. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d

1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“As a general rule, we will not consider arguments that

are raised for the first time on appeal.”). Thus, we need not reach the district

4 24-6627 court’s alternative conclusion that the transfer of the Evergreen Way property to

Brookline Properties was fraudulent and voidable.

3. The district court properly exercised its broad discretion to appoint a

receiver and enforce the judgment. Federal district courts are authorized by statute

to issue an order appointing a receiver to enforce a valid federal tax lien in an

I.R.C. § 7403 action like this one. I.R.C. § 7403(d). Gould’s argument that his

appeal from the district court’s judgment and order of sale divested that court of

jurisdiction to enter orders regarding that judgment fails because a “district court

may retain jurisdiction . . . in aid of execution of a judgment that has not been

superseded.” Stein v. Wood, 127 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 1997).

AFFIRMED.

5 24-6627