TIMBERS, District Judge.
Appellant was convicted, after a jury trial, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, T. Emmet Clarie, District Judge, upon one count of entering a bank with intent to commit a felony affecting the bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) ¶ 2. On this appeal he claims that certain evidence taken from his hotel room three days after the bank entry was erroneously admitted at the trial because obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure; that evidence of his fingerprints was erroneously admitted at the trial because obtained as tainted fruit of an unlawful arrest and detention; and that the indictment failed to charge an offense against the United States in that it did not charge the essential elements of a federal felony. We hold that Judge Clarie properly admitted the evidence of which áppellant complains and that he correctly rejected appellant’s claim as to the insufficiency of the indictment which was first raised on a motion in arrest of judgment. We affirm the conviction.
Illegal Search and Seizure
On the night of September 11, 1964, the First National Bank of Windsor Locks, North Thompsonville Branch, was forcibly entered and a sum of money in excess of $100 was taken. That same night a fishing pole and tackle box were taken from a garage adjoining the bank. Appellant was seen with a fishing pole and tackle box across the street from the bank on the same night.
Two nights later, September 13, an automobile agency in Windsor (12 miles from North Thompsonville) was broken into; cash, a money bag, a gun and ammunition were taken. The following morning, September 14, at about 8 A.M., the owner of the automobile agency turned over to the Windsor police a receipt dated September 13 for Room 1540 at the Statler Hotel in Hartford which he had found under the window through which the break at the automobile agency had been made the night before. The police inspected the scene of the break at the automobile agency and found bloodstains from which they inferred that whoever broke into the building may have cut himself.
That same morning, September 14, the Windsor police, pursuing their investigation of the automobile agency break,
learned from the manager of the Statler that the occupant of Room 1540 was one “Fred Herter” who had registered the night of September 11; and one of the clerks at the Statler told the police, “There was a man there with a bandage on his face.” Three Windsor police officers, together with a Hartford police detective, thereupon went to the Statler in Hartford (7 miles from Windsor) where they arrived at 9:15 A.M. They had neither a search warrant nor an arrest warrant. Accompanied by the manager, the four police officers proceeded to Room 1540 and knocked several times on the door. There was no response, although movements in the room were heard.
One of the police officers went to a house phone 40 or 50 feet down the hall and called Room 1540. When the occupant answered, the officer said, “This is the police; we would like to come in and talk to you.” The occupant replied, “All right.” After the occupant opened the door and before the officers entered, they again identified themselves as policemen and again asked permission to enter. The occupant said, “Come on in.” As they entered the room, the officers explained they were investigating several burglaries in the area and asked permission to look around the room. The occupant said, “Go ahead.”
As the door to the room was opened, one of the officers noticed a 3" x 1%" bandage over the occupant’s right forehead. Another of the officers testified that when he saw the freshly bandaged cut on the occupant’s head as he opened the door, he “felt 99 per cent sure” that the occupant was the man they were looking for in connection with the automobile agency break.
Upon entering the room, the officers saw protruding from an open bureau drawer a money bag which proved to be the one taken from the automobile agency. Once the police were in the room, upon request of one of them, the occupant pointed to a gun under the bed which turned out to be the one taken from the automobile agency. They also discovered in the room the fishing pole and tackle box which had been taken from the garage adjoining the bank the night the bank was entered. Several rolls of coins were found in the room which later were traced to the bank which was entered the night of September 11.
The occupant of the room was formally arrested by one of the Windsor police officers immediately upon discovery of the money bag. He was taken to Hartford police headquarters and booked on the charge of breaking and entering the automobile agency; later that day he was taken to Windsor and booked on the same charge. The following morning, September 15, the occupant, having been identified as appellant on the basis of the name found in his wallet in the room at the Statler, was arraigned in the State Circuit Court at Enfield on the same charge and was remanded to the State Jail at Hartford. The following day, September 16, he was interviewed by two FBI agents who obtained his fingerprints, under circumstances related below, to compare them with fingerprints discovered at the bank after its entry. Appellant was indicted by a Federal grand jury on September 18 on the charge of entering the bank with intent to commit a felony.
Pursuant to Rule 41(e), Fed.R.Crim. P., appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his hotel room, including the money taken from the bank, the gun, ammunition and money bag taken from the automobile agency two nights later and the fishing pole and tackle box taken from the garage adjoining the bank the night the bank was entered, all of which was either directly or circumstantially relevant and material (its competence being the ground of objection) to connecting appellant with the offense of entering the bank. After a full evidenti-ary hearing before trial, the motion to suppress was denied on the ground appellant voluntarily consented to the search. At the trial, a renewed motion to suppress was denied and the evidence was admitted over appellant’s objection. We
hold that Judge Clarie’s rulings in each instance were correct.
Voluntary Consent to Search
In upholding voluntary consents to search, we have said that “Of course the search and seizure in each case must stand or fall on its own special facts, and in the district court’s judgment of the credibility of the witnesses,” United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949, 950-951 (2 Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912, 79 S.Ct. 1298, 3 L.Ed.2d 1262 (1959), and that “A consent is not a voluntary one if it is the product of duress or coercion, actual or implicit. Moreover, to be voluntary, a consent must have been unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given.” United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657, 663 (2 Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906, 83 S.Ct. 717, 9 L.Ed.2d 716 (1963).
Appellant need not have had a positive desire that the search be conducted in order for his consent to have been voluntary and effective. He had three opportunities to object to the entrance and search by the police. Each time, in response to the requests of the police to enter his room or to look around, he replied, “All right,” “Come on in,” or “Go ahead.” The record is devoid of any evidence of displeasure on his part. Nor was there any evidence of exhaustive questioning, persistent demands or coercive action on the part of the police.
Appellant testified, at the hearing before trial on the motion to suppress, that he did not object because it would have been ineffectual. From our perspective his permissive attitude may seem foolhardy; it is on this basis that we are asked to draw an inference of coercion. Perhaps there is a coercive effect inherently produced when several police officers, with their uniforms and accompanying paraphernalia, confront a suspect and ask for permission to search. To sustain such a claim of coercion, absent any coercive words or acts by the police, would preclude a voluntary consent to search whenever more than one armed police officer confronts a suspect; it is only their number, their equipment and the fact they were police that appellant claims adds up to coercion. We refuse to so hold.
Appellant had to make a hurried choice. He lacked knowledge as to whether the police were searching the entire hotel or had focused on him. He knew nothing of the police discovery of the room receipt, of the bloodstains at the'automobile agency, of the indication that the room occupant had a bandage on his face or of the money bag protruding from the open bureau drawer. It is irrelevant whether appellant consented in the hope that the officers were only routinely checking the hotel and would-move on, or because he believed the police had caught up with him and his best course would be to cooperate. In either circumstance his consent was “unequivocal, specific and intelligently given.” On the facts of this case, Judge Clarie properly denied the motion to suppress after hearing the evidence and evaluating the credibility of the witnesses; and he correctly admitte'd the seized evidence at the trial over objection. United States v. Smith, supra at 663-664; United States v. Dornblut, supra at 950-951; United States v. Bracer, 342 F.2d 522, 524-525 (2 Cir. 1965); United States v. Simpson, 353 F.2d 530, 531 (2 Cir. 1965); United States v. Ziemer, 291 F.2d 100 (7 Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877, 82 S.Ct. 120, 7 L.Ed.2d 78 (1961); cf. United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81 (9 Cir. 1962) (en banc).
We are mindful of the importance of careful delineation of the facts of a case such as the instant one, where the district court’s finding of voluntary consent to search was based on a consent which was unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, from cases where the consent to search was the product of deceit and coercion, actual or implicit, rather than an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right. Compare Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 S.Ct. 266, 65 L.Ed. 654 (1921); Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 303-306, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921); United States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891 (2 Cir. 1965); United States v. Gregory, 204 F.Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y.1962), aff’d on other grounds, 309 F.2d 536 (2 Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 953, 83 S.Ct. 1684, 10 L.Ed.2d 707 (1963).
This is another sensitive area where constant vigilance is required to maintain the delicately calibrated balance between the rights of the individual suspected or accused of crime and the rights of society to be protected from criminal interference with its liberty and property. Cf. United States v. Cone, 354 F.2d 119, 128 (2 Cir. 1965) (en banc); United States v. Robinson, 354 F.2d 109, 114-115 (2 Cir. 1965) (en banc); United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132, 143 (2 Cir. 1965) (en banc). In dealing with the difficult issues of a voluntary consent to search, we have observed that “in few branches of the law is a precise case by case analysis and meticulous comparison of precedential authority so essential.” United States v. Como, supra at 893. We think it also important in this process of defining the permissible bounds of searches and seizures to make clear what we believe to be correct police procedure, as we have not hesitated to condemn it when wrong. The instant case is part of a swelling wave of federal bank robberies which has been engulfing the Country.
The tools the police most need and deserve to cope with this emergency are guideline decisions from the courts telling them what is right as well as what is wrong with their procedure so that they may get on with their job intelligently.
We think the police work in the instant case was commendable. The bank entry in North Thompsonville occurred Friday night, September 11; no clues were left. The breaking and entry at the automobile agency in Windsor came two nights later, Sunday night, September 13; the only clues were the receipt for Room 1540 at the Statler in Hartford, bloodstains near the broken window and the missing gun, ammunition and money bag — all of which the Windsor police learned about at 8 A. M. on Monday, September 14. An hour later the Windsor police and a Hartford detective were at Room 1540, accompanied by the Statler manager. The steps which the police pursued in gaining entrance to the hotel room, searching it, seizing the contraband and arresting appellant speak for themselves in reflecting credit upon police activity of the highest order.
Search Incidental to Lawful Arrest
While we uphold Judge Clarie’s ruling that the evidence in question was seized pursuant to a voluntary consent to search, we note that the record also would support a holding that the search was permissible as an incident to a lawful arrest. United States v. Simpson, supra; United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837, 841-842, 843 (2 Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 947, 86 S.Ct. 408, 15 L.Ed.2d 355 (1965); United States v. Bracer, supra at 523-524; United States v. Smith, supra at 661-663.
Although formal announcement of appellant’s arrest was made upon discovery of the money bag protruding from the bureau drawer in the hotel room, actually his arrest was complete as soon as the police entered the room and restricted his liberty of movement. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); United States v. Boston, 330 F.2d 937, 939 (2 Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004, 84 S.Ct. 1940, 12 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1964). Immediately upon entering the room, the police told appellant not to move. Although no force was used to obtain entry or after entry, appellant considered himself under restraint for he requested and obtained permission to get dressed.
Appellant having been arrested immediately upon entry of the police into the hotel room, the question arises whether there was probable cause for the arrest at or before that time and without regard to what the subsequent search disclosed. Henry v. United States, supra at 103; Johnson v. United States, supra at 14-17; United States v. Boston, supra at 938-939. Before entering the hotel room, the police inferred, on the basis of the receipt for Room 1540 found under the window through which the break at the automobile agency had been made, that the occupant of the hotel room may have had something to do with that crime. Strong corroboration for such inference is found in the information given to the police by one of the Statler clerks that the occupant of Room 1540 had a bandage on his face, coupled with the police knowledge that bloodstains had been found near the broken window at the automobile agency. Moreover, although the police did not intend to arrest appellant when they went to Room 1540, one of the officers said he felt 99 per cent sure that appellant was the man they were looking for in connection with the automobile agency bréale when appellant opened the door and the officer saw the bandage on appellant’s head. This was more than mere suspicion; and certainty is not required for a finding of probable cause. Henry v. United States, supra at 101-104; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-312, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed. 2d 327 (1959); United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106 (2 Cir. 1945).
There was probable cause for appellant’s arrest; and the search, aside from having been consented to, may be sustained on the alternative ground of being a reasonable one
incidental to a lawful arrest. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.
2d 777 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-37, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed. 2d 726 (1963); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60-66, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed.2d 1879 (1949); United States v. Simpson, supra; United States v. Hall, supra at 841-843; United States v. Bracer, supra at 523-524; United States v. Boston, supra at 938-939; United States v. Williams, 336 F.2d 183 (2 Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 857, 85 S.Ct. 112, 13 L.Ed.2d 60 (1964); United States v. Wai Lau, 329 F.2d 310 (2 Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 856, 85 S.Ct. 108, 13 L.Ed.2d 59 (1964); United States v. Smith, supra at 661-663; Crawford v. Bannan, 336 F.2d 505 (6 Cir. 1964); Bartlett v. United States, 232 F.2d 135, 138-139 (5 Cir. 1956); United States v. Lodewijkx, 230 F.Supp. 212, 217-218 (S.D.N.Y.1964).
As a second string to his bow, appellant argues that even if there was probable cause for the arrest it was unlawful because made in Hartford by a Windsor police officer outside of his precinct (referring to the Town of Windsor) m violation of the Connecticut Arrest Law.
State law is controlling on this issue of the validity of an arrest without a warrant absent an applicable federal statute. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589-590, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948); United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595, 599 (2 Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903, 83 S.Ct. 1291, 10 L.Ed.2d 199 (1963). The Connecticut courts, so far as we can determine, have not ruled upon the issue here presented.
The second clause of the first sentence of § 6-49 (the italicized portion of the statute printed in the margin) clearly authorizes any state police officer, local police officer or county detective to arrest without a warrant
any place in the State
any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony; “reasonable grounds” and “probable cause” in this context have substantially the same meaning. United States v. Boston, supra at 938 n. 1. The limitation in the first clause of the first sentence of § 6-49 to warrantless arrests “in their respective precincts” applies (i) to the arresting officers specified in that clause
and
(ii) to suspects
taken or apprehended in the act or on the speedy information of others. The second and third sentences of § 6-49, added in 1961 by Public Act 239, authorize local police officers, in immediate pursuit of anyone they are empowered to arrest under this statute, to pursue such person any place in the State to arrest him, and to return him to the place of the offense.
Appellant’s arrest was clearly lawful under the Connecticut Arrest Law. At the time of his arrest in the hotel room in Hartford, the police (three from Windsor and one from Hartford
) had probable cause, as we have held above, to arrest him; that is to say, in the statutory language of § 6-49, the police had reasonable grounds to believe he had committed a felony. The offense of which he was suspected — breaking and entering the automobile agency in Windsor— is a felony under Conn.Gen.Stats. §§ 1—1, 53-76, 53-77, 53-78 (1958). After being arrested and booked at Hartford popolice headquarters, he was taken the same morning to Windsor police headquarters where he was booked again.
Fingerprint Evidence
Appellant claims that “major case fingerprints” taken by two FBI agents from appellant while he was held at the Hartford State Jail on September 16, two days after his arrest, were erroneously admitted over his objection because obtained as the tainted fruit of his unlawful arrest and detention.
Having held that appellant’s arrest was lawful, we turn directly to his claim that he was unlawfully detained at the time the fingerprints in question were taken.
The short answer to appellant’s claim of unlawful detention on September 16 is that he had been arraigned the previous day, September 15, at 10 A.M. in the State Circuit Court at Enfield, at which time, among other things, counsel had been appointed to represent him.
Appellant argues that unnecessary and unreasonable delay until the morning of September 15 in arraigning him, having been arrested by Windsor and Hartford police the previous morning, resulted in an illegal detention on September 15 which somehow carried over to invalidate his detention on September 16 when the fingerprints were taken by FBI agents, even though subsequent to arraignment. Without accepting appellant's conclusion, there is no merit whatsoever in his premise that
there Was unnecessary and unreasonable delay in arraigning him, even assuming that cooperation (for which there is no support in the record) between state and federal officials resulted in his detention during the 24 hour period prior to arraignment. Cf. United States v. Coppola, 281 F.2d 340 (2 Cir. 1960) (en banc), aff’d, 365 U.S. 762, 81 S.Ct. 884, 6 L.Ed.2d 79 (1961). The sole purpose of appellant’s detention between his arrest on September 14 and his arraignment on September 15 was investigatory — to question him, to check his story and to run down leads either confirming or contradicting his story. Cf. United States v. Middleton, 344 F.2d 78, 83 (2 Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Corbo v. LaVallee, 270 F.2d 513, 518 (2 Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 950, 80 S.Ct. 403, 4 L.Ed.2d 382 (1960). The reasonableness and necessity of the period during which this investigation continued is borne out by the number of offenses of which he was suspected (three breaks and entries, in addition to the bank entry), the fact he had used a fictitious name and the fact he had escaped three days before the bank entry from a mental institution apparently without knowledge of that institution. The purpose of his detention was not to keep him in custody for an indefinite period until he confessed; in fact, no claim is raised on this appeal of any alleged confession obtained during his detention other than the fingerprints taken after he was arraigned. Appellant’s detention prior to arraignment was not unlawful. United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837, 842-843 (2 Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 947, 86 S.Ct. 408, 15 L.Ed.2d 355 (1965); United States v. Middleton, supra at 82-83; United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2 Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823, 82 S.Ct. 837, 7 L.Ed.2d 788 (1962); United States v. Ladson, 294 F.2d 535 (2 Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 824, 82 S.Ct. 840, 7 L.Ed.2d 789 (1962); United States v. Coppola, supra.
We hold that appellant’s fingerprints were not obtained as the product of an unlawful arrest or detention and therefore were properly admitted in evidence.
Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether appellant freely consented to the taking of the fingerprints in question after being fully informed of his rights and of the purpose for which the fingerprints were sought, although we do note there is substantial evidence that he did so consent. Moreover, we need not, and therefore do not, reach the question whether fingerprints obtained during detention following an unlawful arrest are necessarily inadmissible. See Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465 (D.C.Cir. 1958); Note, Excluding From Evidence Fingerprints Taken After an Unlawful Arrest, 69 Yale L.J. 432 (1960).
Insufficiency of Indictment
Finally, appellant claims that the indictment
failed to charge an offense against the United States in that, in charging that appellant entered the bank “with intent to commit in such bank a felony affecting such bank, that is, the taking of money in excess of $100.00 from the said bank,” the indictment did not charge the essential elements of a federal felony affecting such bank.
The indictment charged an offense under, and in the language of, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) ¶ 2,
that appellant entered the
bank with intent to commit in the bank a felony affecting such bank in violation of -a federal statute. Specifying the “felony affecting such bank,” the indictment went on to add, “that is, the taking of money in excess of $100.00 from the said bank,” intending to incorporate the offense covered by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) ¶ 1.
In omitting the essential element of “intent to steal” from its specification of the § 2113(b) ¶ 1 offense, the indictment certainly was defective. At best the indictment was poorly drawn;
at worst it did not constitute a “plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged,” Rule 7(c), Fed.R.Crim.P., and as such would have warranted corrective action by the district court upon a timely motion to dismiss, Rule 12(b), Fed.R.Crim.P., or a motion for a bill of particulars, Rule 7(f), Fed.R. Crim.P. No such motion was made.
The case was tried by both sides upon the clear understanding that the “felony affecting such bank” referred to in the indictment was the offense specified in § 2113(b) ¶ 1. Judge Clarie so charged the jury. Among the essential elements carefully included in the charge was that of intent to steal. Compare United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570 (2 Cir. 1965). No exceptions were taken to the charge.
Appellant’s claim that the indictment did not charge an offense against the United States was first made on a motion in arrest of judgment, Rule 34, Fed.R.Crim.P., filed five days after conclusion, of the trial and six months after the indictment was returned. The claim came too late. Technically, a claim that the indictment does not charge an offense may be raised on a motion in arrest of judgment and such motion was made in time here. But the courts of the United States long ago withdrew their hospitality toward technical claims of invalidity of an indictment first raised after trial, absent a clear showing of substantial prejudice to the accused— such as a showing that the indictment is “so obviously defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to charge the offense for which conviction was had.” Finn v. United States, 256 F.2d 304, 307-308 (4 Cir. 1958); McGann v. United States, 249 F.2d 431, 432 (4 Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 923, 78 S.Ct. 708, 2 L.Ed.2d 718 (1958); Gibson v. United States, 244 F.2d 32, 34 (4 Cir.
1957); Olson v. United States, 234 F.2d 956, 957 (4 Cir. 1956); Aaron v. United States, 188 F.2d 446 (4 Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 954, 71 S.Ct. 1006, 95 L.Ed. 1376 (1951); Dickerson v. United States, 175 F.2d 440 (4 Cir. 1949); Fippin v. United States, 162 F.2d 128, 131 (9 Cir. 1947); Pifer v. United States, 158 F.2d 867, 868 (4 Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 815, 67 S.Ct. 636, 91 L.Ed. 695 (1947); Lucas v. United States, 158 F.2d 865, 867 (4 Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 841, 67 S.Ct. 977, 91 L.Ed. 1287 (1947); Muench v. United States, 96 F.2d 332, 334-335 (8 Cir. 1938).
Here there was no prejudice whatsoever. Judge Clarie properly denied the motion in arrest of judgment.
Affirmed.
We express our appreciation to Maxwell Heiman, Esq., court-appointed counsel on appeal, for his conscientious and able brief and oral argument on behalf of appellant in this Court.