United States v. Gordon Jones, Jr.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: December 31, 2025
• Docket: 25-4351
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4351

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GORDON RAY JONES, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:21-cr-00324-WO-1)

Submitted: December 23, 2025 Decided: December 31, 2025

Before WILKINSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Eugene E. Lester, III, LESTER LAW, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julie Carol Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Gordon Ray Jones, Jr., appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised

release and sentencing him within his Sentencing Guidelines policy statement range to 24

months’ imprisonment. Jones’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but

questioning whether Jones’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable.

Although notified of his right to do so, Jones has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. The

Government has declined to file a response brief. We affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of

supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020). “[W]e

will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly

unreasonable.” United States v. Cohen, 63 F.4th 250, 258 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly

unreasonable, [we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or

substantively unreasonable,” Patterson, 957 F.3d at 436, evaluating “the same procedural

and substantive considerations that guide our review of original sentences” but taking “a

more deferential appellate posture than we do when reviewing original sentences,” United

States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). If

a revocation sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable, we need not

consider “whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable—that is, whether the

unreasonableness is clear or obvious.” Patterson, 957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

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“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately

explains the chosen sentence after considering the Chapter Seven policy statement range

[from the Guidelines] and the applicable [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) sentencing factors.” Id. at

436; see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (specifying applicable § 3553(a) factors). “[A]lthough the

court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be

when imposing a post-conviction sentence, it still must provide a statement of reasons for

the sentence imposed.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017)

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

“A [revocation] sentence is substantively reasonable if the totality of the

circumstances indicates that the court had a proper basis for its conclusion that the

defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” United States v. Amin, 85 F.4th 727, 740

(4th Cir. 2023). A sentence within the policy statement range is presumed substantively

reasonable. Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373.

Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied that Jones’s 24-month sentence is

procedurally reasonable. The district court properly calculated the policy statement range,

adequately explained its chosen sentence in terms of the applicable § 3553(a) factors, and

thoroughly addressed Jones’s arguments for a lower sentence.

We also conclude that Jones cannot rebut the presumption of substantive

reasonableness afforded to his within-policy-statement-range sentence. The district court

properly emphasized that it had previously revoked Jones’s supervised release for

violations similar to those underlying the instant revocation and that the prison sentence

imposed for that revocation had no deterrent effect on Jones. Indeed, the district court

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observed that Jones again began violating the terms of his supervision almost immediately

after he was released from prison on his first revocation sentence. Finally, the district court

appropriately highlighted Jones’s repeated breaches of the court’s trust and the need to

protect the public from Jones’s unlawful conduct.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Jones requests that a petition be

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that

a copy thereof was served on Jones.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED