F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH APR 12 1999 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 98-2100
LEWIS SAMUEL GORDON, also known as Chris Jonston,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO (D.C. No. CR-97-449-JP)
Peter Schoenburg, of Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom, Cron & Schoenburg, LLP, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the appellant.
J. Miles Hanisee, Assistant United States Attorney, (John J. Kelly, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Lewis Gordon was charged and convicted by jury of possession
with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841. He was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he
contends the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress statements
and evidence, his motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant, and
his motion for new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm.
I.
On June 27, 1997, Gordon purchased a one-way Amtrak ticket from Los
Angeles to Chicago under the name of Chris Jonston. He purchased the ticket
with cash, ten minutes before the train’s departure.
An Amtrak employee (the informant/tipster) in Los Angeles contacted DEA
Agent Kevin Small in Albuquerque and advised him of the circumstances
surrounding the purchase of the ticket. 1 Small relayed the name and physical
description of the ticket holder to DEA Task Force Officer Jeanette Tate, who
verified the ticket purchase with a passenger itinerary printout. Tate telephoned
the call-back number listed on the itinerary for Chris Jonston and reached the
1 DEA Agents are particularly suspicious of individuals who purchase one- way tickets with cash shortly before a train’s departure. To facilitate DEA interdictions, an Amtrak employee with access to the computer reservation system is stationed at the Albuquerque DEA office. Amtrak employees frequently provide tips to DEA agents and occasionally receive cash awards if the tips prove fruitful. No cash award was given in this case.
-2- answering machine of Robert Anderson.
Tate and DEA Task Force Officer Nina Bruce met the train in Albuquerque
and located Gordon in car 413. With her tape recorder running, Tate showed
Gordon her credentials and asked if he would talk to her. Gordon did not object.
He identified himself as Lewis Gordon, but provided a ticket stub bearing the
name of Chris Jonston, explaining he was “traveling” under that name. Tate
asked if Gordon had any luggage and Gordon pointed to two bags. Tate asked if
she could search the bags and, after mumbling inaudibly, Gordon replied, “Yeah.”
Aplt’s App. at 48. Gordon and the agents went to the lower level of the train car
to search the bags. Tate opened one of the bags and discovered a smaller
padlocked duffle bag inside. Tate asked Gordon if he could open the bag. In
response, Gordon took a key from his pocket and handed it to Tate. Gordon did
not object to the opening of the padlocked bag. In her search of the bag, Tate
found $28,000 in United States currency and two brick-shaped, cellophane-
wrapped packages. Gordon, a former marine, explained he had been in Los
Angeles for an informal reunion and “Rick” asked him to deliver a bag to Rick’s
girlfriend in Chicago. Gordon stated he was unaware of the contents of the
locked bag, although Rick had given him the key to the bag. Gordon was arrested
and was taken to the Albuquerque DEA Office. The contents of the cellophane-
wrapped packages were tested and found to be 8.97 kilograms of cocaine.
-3- II.
Motion to Suppress
Gordon moved to suppress all physical evidence seized from a locked
duffle bag and all statements he made to authorities during the encounter on the
train. He argued the search of the locked duffle bag exceeded the scope of his
consent, and that Tate lacked probable cause to arrest him based only on
discovery of the cellophane-wrapped packages. The district court denied the
motion, ruling (1) Gordon consented to the search of the locked bag based either
on his initial consent to the search of his bags or his voluntary relinquishment of
the padlock key to Tate, and (2) the combination of the money and the
cellophane-wrapped packages found in the locked bag constituted probable cause
to arrest.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we accept
the court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government. The ultimate question of
whether a search and seizure were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is a
question of law we review de novo. United States v. Glover , 104 F.3d 1570, 1576
(10th Cir. 1997).
-4- Consent to search locked bag
We need not rely on Gordon’s initial consent to search his bags in order to
affirm the denial of Gordon’s motion to suppress evidence seized from the locked
duffle bag. We agree with the district court that Gordon’s voluntary
relinquishment of the key evidenced his consent to search the locked duffle bag.
Gordon correctly points out Tate did not advise Gordon he did not have to
answer her questions and that he was free to leave, did not state with precision the
object for which she was searching, and did not explicitly identify herself as a
police officer. A search, however, does not become non-consensual merely
because an officer fails to do any or all of these things. See United States v.
Little , 18 F.3d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir. 1994). Rather, Tate’s failure to more clearly
express the objects of her requested search and her failure to plainly identify
herself are mere factors to be considered in determining whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, the search was consensual. See id.
When all of the circumstances are considered, Gordon’s consent is
apparent. Tate asked to see Gordon’s ticket and identification, inquired as to his
travel plans, and asked if he had any luggage. A written transcript of the
conversation, while not entirely complete because of the poor quality of the
recording, reveals Tate asked questions and did not fire orders at Gordon or
otherwise attempt to intimidate Gordon. This is consistent with Tate’s testimony.
-5- Tate and Gordon both testified that, at a minimum, Tate showed her badge to
Gordon when she approached him. Tate also advised Gordon she was “working
interdiction” and “check[ing] for passengers who are traveling back east from the
west coast.” Aplt’s App. at 85. In addition, after obtaining consent to search
Gordon’s luggage but before obtaining consent to search the locked bag, Tate
asked Gordon, “Do you have any contraband in here, Lewis?” Id. at 86.
Although Gordon might not have known exactly the object of Tate’s search, at
that point he knew Tate was searching for contraband.
When Tate encountered the locked bag, she asked Gordon, “Can you open
that?” Aplt’s App. at 86. Gordon apparently did not respond verbally but
removed the key from his pocket and handed it to Tate. Non-verbal conduct,
considered with other factors, can constitute voluntary consent to search. See
United States v. Flores , 48 F.3d 467, 469 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Benitez , 899 F.2d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 1990). Gordon contends Tate ordered him
to unlock the bag and complains he felt obligated to comply with the order.
Based on Tate’s testimony and a review of the recording transcript, the district
court found otherwise, noting Gordon “reached in his pocket voluntarily to give
her the key.” Record II at 185. As this factual finding is not clearly erroneous,
we have no basis for rejecting it.
Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, Gordon did not object to a
-6- search of the locked bag when Tate asked Gordon, “Can you open that?” or when
Tate actually searched the bag. See Jimeno , 500 U.S. at 252 (“A suspect may of
course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents.”). We
consistently and repeatedly have held a defendant’s failure to limit the scope of a
general authorization to search, and failure to object when the search exceeds
what he later claims was a more limited consent, is an indication the search was
within the scope of consent. See United States v. Pena , 143 F.3d 1363, 1368
(10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sanchez , 89 F.3d 715, 719 (10th Cir. 1996);
United States v. McRae , 81 F.3d 1528, 1538 (10th Cir. 1996); Wacker , 72 F.3d at
1470; United States v. Santurio , 29 F.3d 550, 553 (10th Cir. 1994).
In sum, Gordon gave a broad and unlimited consent to search his bags.
When Tate came across a smaller padlocked bag inside the larger bag, Gordon
voluntarily and without objection handed her the key in response to her asking
him, “Can you open that?” Tate reasonably construed Gordon’s response as
consent to search the locked bag.
Probable cause to arrest
“Law enforcement personnel may arrest a person without a warrant if there
is probable cause to believe that person committed a crime.” United States v.
Wright , 932 F.2d 868, 877 (10th Cir. 1991). To determine if probable cause
-7- existed for a warrantless arrest, we examine if, at the time of arrest, the facts and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which the officer had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent officer in
believing the defendant had committed or was committing a crime. United States
v. Snow , 82 F.3d 935, 942 (10th Cir. 1996). “Probable cause must be evaluated
in light of circumstances as they would have appeared to a prudent, cautious,
trained police officer.” Id. (quoting United States v. Morgan , 936 F.2d 1561,
1568 (10th Cir. 1991)). We review de novo the district court’s determination of
probable cause , while we review its findings of historical fact for clear error,
United States v. Barron-Cabrera , 119 F.3d 1454, 1457 (10th Cir. 1997).
Gordon argues Tate’s viewing of the cellophane-wrapped packages alone
was insufficient to create probable cause. Our view of the evidence is not that
limited. We determine the existence of probable cause to arrest based on the
totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Vazquez-Pulido , 155 F.3d
1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998). By focusing narrowly on Tate’s failure to establish
before the arrest that the cellophane-wrapped packages contained cocaine, Gordon
in essence asks that we fundamentally alter the nature of the probable cause
requirement from one based on a reasonably fair likelihood of criminal conduct to
one satisfied only upon a positive showing of criminal conduct. Such a high
threshold is inconsonant with the nature of our inquiry. Probable cause rests on a
-8- reasonable probability that a crime has been committed, not on certainty that
illegal activity is afoot. See id. (“Probable cause to arrest does not require facts
sufficient to establish guilt, but does require more than mere suspicion.”); United
States v. Buchanan , 70 F.3d 818, 826 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Potter ,
895 F.2d 1231, 1234 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendant’s argument that
officer “should have tested the powder to make sure it was methamphetamine
before arresting him”) .
Tate clearly had probable cause to arrest Gordon. At the time of arrest,
Tate knew Gordon (1) had purchased a one-way ticket with cash only minutes
before the train departed, (2) was traveling under another name, (3) was carrying
a large amount of cash (later determined to be $28,000 bundled in $20 bills), and
(4) had in his possession two brick-shaped, cellophane-wrapped packages, a type
of packaging Tate testified is commonly used to transport narcotics. This
combination of facts could lead a reasonable officer to believe Gordon was
committing or had committed a crime. See United States v. Harlan , 35 F.3d 176,
179 (5th Cir. 1994) (probable cause to arrest where individual had one-way ticket
purchased with cash, gave misleading information, had $8,000 in cash, and had
“large bulge” in his jacket); United States v. Prandy-Binett , 995 F.2d 1069, 1071
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (probable cause to arrest where individual possessed rectangular
package wrapped in silver duct tape, gave deceptive answers to officers’
-9- questions, and moved quickly through train station when he realized he was being
watched); United States v. Taylor , 956 F.2d 572, 578 (6th Cir. 1992) (probable
cause to arrest where individual paid cash for one-way ticket from source city,
provided implausible answers to officers’ questions, and search of bag revealed
“two spherical, tape-bound parcels”); United States v. Tartaglia , 864 F.2d 837,
841-42 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (facts that individual paid cash for one-way ticket and
call-back number was out of service were properly considered in probable cause
analysis); see also United States v. Mendez , 27 F.3d 126, 129 (5th Cir. 1994).
The district court properly determined Tate had probable cause to arrest Gordon.
Identity of Informant
Gordon filed a pretrial motion for disclosure of the identity of the Amtrak
employee who divulged information regarding Gordon’s ticket purchase. Gordon
claimed the tip was not based on any legitimate articulable grounds but solely on
the basis of Gordon’s race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The
motion was denied because the court had “not seen anything . . . that creates any
alarm or raises any suspicion in me that this was a race-based tip.” Aplt’s App. at
209.
A defendant seeking to force disclosure of an informant’s identity has the
burden to show the informant’s testimony is relevant or essential to the fair
determination of defendant’s case. In determining whether to require disclosure,
-10- a court must balance the public interest in protecting the flow of information
against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. Roviaro v. United States ,
353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957). The court conducts this balancing in light of the crime
charged, the possible defenses, and the significance of the informant’s testimony.
United States v. Sinclair , 109 F.3d 1527, 1538 (10th Cir. 1997). “Where it is
clear that the informant cannot aid the defense, the government’s interest in
keeping secret [the informant’s] identity must prevail over the defendant’s
asserted right of disclosure.” Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez , 979 F.2d
1424, 1429 (10th Cir. 1992)). We review a district court’s denial of a motion to
disclose for abuse of discretion. See Sinclair , 109 F.3d at 1538.
The informant’s role in Gordon’s arrest was extremely limited. The
informant did not detain Gordon, and did not participate in or witness Gordon’s
detention or the transaction in which Gordon purportedly agreed to transport
cocaine in exchange for money. We have refused disclosure in similar cases
where the informant has limited information, was not present during commission
of the offense, and cannot provide any evidence that is not cumulative or
exculpatory. See United States v. Brantley , 986 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Mendoza-Salgado , 964 F.2d 993, 1001 (10th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Scafe , 822 F.2d 928, 933 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Halbert , 668
F.2d 489, 496 (10th Cir. 1982). The Amtrak employee here simply provided a
-11- lead and in that sense was a mere “tipster” whose identity and testimony are
unrelated to any issue in Gordon’s case. See United States v. Wynne , 993 F.2d
760, 766 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Moralez , 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.
1990); United States v. Zamora , 784 F.2d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 1986) (“if a
confidential informant was only a ‘tipster,’ and not an active participant in the
criminal activity charged, disclosure of the informant’s identity is not required”).
Gordon makes much of the fact that the description provided by the
informant referenced his race and from that he reasons the tip was race-based.
This rampant speculation is not supported by any evidence in the record. We will
not require disclosure of an informant’s identity based on “mere speculation”; the
informant’s testimony must be shown to be valuable to the defendant. United
States v. Leahy , 47 F.3d 396, 398 (10th Cir. 1995). Gordon ignores the evidence
that prompted the Amtrak employee to contact the DEA in the first place -- he had
purchased a one-way ticket, with cash, only minutes before the train departed.
The Amtrak employee contacted the DEA after noting these facts because the
employee previously had been told by the DEA that these facts fit the DEA
profile of an individual who is a likely transporter of drugs.
Gordon has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating disclosure of the
informant’s identity would contribute meaningfully to his defense. In addition,
the totality of the circumstances does not permit even a remote inference that the
-12- tip was race-based.
Motion for New Trial
Gordon timely filed a motion for new trial, arguing prosecutorial
misconduct during cross-examination violated his right to a fair trial. Gordon
made several references to his four children during his direct examination, noting
he had purchased clothing for them in Los Angeles and had discussed the children
with Tate at the time of his arrest. The following exchange occurred during
cross-examination:
Q: Mr. Gordon, where are your four children now? A: I have two sons in Wisconsin. My oldest daughter is in North Carolina, and my youngest daughter is in Joliet, Illinois. Q: And did you claim these children as dependents when you were in the military? A: One. The others I didn’t have when I was in the military. Q: Is your check at work garnished so that you can pay support for these children? Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I would object and ask to approach. The Court: Yes, please come up to the bench. Defense Counsel: Judge, I am going to object and move for a mistrial. Prosecutor: He is testifying. The Court: Well, the specific question is whether his check has been garnished. What is the probative value of that? Prosecutor: Your Honor, it tends to show why he is carrying drugs and attempting to make large quantities of money, because he is unable to support--provide support otherwise. The Court: Well, I think that the probative value of that information is significantly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. I am going to keep it out under Rule 403. Defense Counsel: Judge, I would also like to move for a mistrial. We did not get into his family situation or his kids. This is
-13- just a complete cheap shot. The Court: Mistrial on what? Defense Counsel: On the basis of introducing this as totally extraneous and prejudicial. The Court: I will instruct the jury to disregard the last question. There is no basis for a mistrial. . . . (Whereupon, in the presence of the jury.) The Court: Members of the jury, I am going to instruct you to disregard the last question. Remember what I have told you before. The questions, the statements, the arguments, the objections, the explanations by the lawyers are not evidence in the case.
Aplt App. at 602-03. Gordon contends the mere asking of the “garnishment”
question was “devastating,” as it undermined his credibility and
raised in the jurors’ minds a stereotyped image of an unsavory character: a young Black man with children by apparently different mothers, who has been irresponsible and has not supported his children to the point that the state had to intervene, and who was likely to resort to drug trafficking not only out of necessity, but because it is part of his life style.
Aplt Br. at 43.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for new trial based on
prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Gabaldon ,
91 F.3d 91, 94 (10th Cir. 1996). We engage in a two-step process in reviewing
claims of prosecutorial misconduct. First, we determine if the conduct was
improper. Second, we determine if any improper conduct warrants reversal.
United States v. Lonedog , 929 F.2d 568, 572 (10th Cir. 1991). Reversal is
necessary only if the improper conduct influenced the verdict. United States v.
Alexander , 849 F.2d 1293, 1296 (10th Cir. 1988). In determining whether
-14- misconduct affected the outcome of a trial, we consider “the curative acts of the
district court, the extent of the misconduct, and the role of the misconduct within
the case as a whole.” Lonedog , 929 F.2d at 572 (quoting United States v.
Martinez-Nava , 838 F.2d 411, 416 (10th Cir. 1988)).
We agree with the district court that the prosecutor’s question was improper
in that the potential for prejudice to Gordon outweighed any probative value of
any response the question would have elicited. However, we do not conclude this
improper conduct warrants reversal of Gordon’s conviction in this case. Here, the
district court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the question and reiterated
that “questions . . . by the lawyers are not evidence in the case.” Absent evidence
to the contrary, we assume the jury follows a curative instruction. See United
States v. Iribe-Perez , 129 F.3d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Greer v.
Miller , 483 U.S. 756, 766 (1987) (prejudicial effects of improper question
generally cured by objection and issuance of curative instruction). In addition,
the purported misconduct is insignificant when the trial is considered as a whole.
It consisted of a single question in a two-day proceeding that was not answered by
Gordon nor commented on by the prosecutor in closing argument. Cf. Longdog ,
929 F.2d at 573 (no prejudice where improper question not answered). Because
the effect of any misconduct in asking the question was exceedingly slight, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gordon’s motion for new
-15- trial. See United States v. Ivy , 83 F.3d 1266, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996).
AFFIRMED.
-16-