UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 1/9/97 TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 96-3083 v. (D.C. No. 95-CR-10009-4) (District of Kansas) GUILLERMO GONZALEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Guillermo Gonzalez appeals his conviction for conspiracy to distribute
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He contends that the
district court committed three reversible errors: first, that the court refused to
allow him to obtain a timely jury determination of his guilt or innocence; second,
that the court denied dismissal for double jeopardy; third, that the court allowed
an involuntary “proffer” into evidence. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. I
On November 14, 1994, defendant was arrested under California law for
possessing a vehicle with a false or concealed compartment. Although officers
found no drugs in defendant’s Toyota Previa van, a drug detection dog “alerted”
on the hidden compartment, indicating that it had at one time contained drugs.
However, the police did find $6,550 in cash and a copy of registration papers for
another Previa van. One week later, Kansas police stopped this second van, and
found 111 kilograms of cocaine in a hidden compartment very similar to that
found in appellant’s vehicle. Imelda Gonzalez, who is not a relative of appellant,
was a passenger in this second van. Found with her was an electronic organizer
that contained defendant’s pager number. Shortly thereafter, officers stopped a
third Previa van, and inside a similarly hidden compartment, discovered 102
kilograms of cocaine.
At trial, Ms. Gonzalez testified that defendant had been recruited by Mirta
Gomez to drive vans containing cocaine from Los Angeles to New York. Ms.
Gonzalez stated that she was paid by Thelma Wingist to keep schedules of the van
trips, call drivers when a van was ready to depart, and herself make some ten trips
to New York in these vans. Ms. Gonzalez further testified that she arranged
several trips made by defendant, and that his pager number was given to her by
Mirta Gomez.
-2- II
In its opening statement, the prosecution indicated that Mirta Gomez would
testify she recruited appellant into the alleged drug conspiracy. However, Ms.
Gomez was never called to the stand by the prosecution. After the government
presented its evidence against defendant, Ms. Gomez was called as a defense
witness by defendant’s indicted co-conspirator, Irving Parker. Though Ms.
Gomez did not refer to defendant directly, she testified that she told other van
drivers that the hidden compartments were being used to conceal cocaine.
Arguing that Mr. Parker’s defense, and Ms. Gomez’s testimony in
particular would be prejudicial, defendant filed a number of motions for
severance. On the same grounds, defendant filed a motion for judgment of
acquittal at the close of the government’s case-in-chief against him and prior to
Ms. Gomez’s testimony. We review the denial of severance for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1468 (10th Cir. 1996). 1
To meet the “heavy burden” required to prevail on a severance motion, a
“defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice [from the failure to sever] and not
merely a negative spill-over effect from damaging evidence presented against
codefendants.” Id.; see also Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)
(“[A] district court should grant a severance . . . only if there is serious risk that a
1 Both the government and defendant analyze defendant’s motion for judgment as a motion for severance. For purposes of this appeal, we accept this characterization.
-3- joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or
prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”).
Showing that separate trials might have offered a better chance of acquittal is not
sufficient to meet the defendant’s burden. United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d
1313, 1331 (10th Cir. 1979).
Defendant claims he was denied the “absolute right to test [the
government’s] evidence” at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief.
Appellant’s Br. at 28. He argues that Ms. Gomez’s testimony prejudiced him
because it provided strong circumstantial evidence he knew he was transporting
cocaine during the van trips. He further contends that without this testimony the
jury might not have found he possessed the requisite knowledge for conspiracy.
Mr. Gonzalez has been unable to find federal authority addressing the
precise situation at issue here—where one defendant seeks judgment at the close
of the government’s case-in-chief, but a codefendant seeks to mount a potentially
prejudicial defense. His citation to state law, see State v. Martin, 673 P.2d 104
(Kan. 1984), is unpersuasive. In Martin, one defendant was accused of aiding and
abetting, while the second was accused of murder. In his defense, the second
accused the first of committing the murder. The second’s defense was wholly
antagonistic toward the first defendant. No such conflict is present in this case.
The core of Mr. Parker’s defense was that as a van driver he did not know he was
-4- carrying cocaine. That contention does not contradict Mr. Gonzalez’s defense in
any substantial manner.
Nor has defendant shown that the district court abused its discretion by
refusing him severance. The court specifically instructed the jury to give separate
consideration to the case of each defendant,” see Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 541, and
was careful to prevent Ms. Gomez from testifying as to her interactions with
defendant. Moreover, the government was specifically barred from asking Ms.
Gomez whether she told defendant that he was transporting cocaine. Under these
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court’s denial of severance
was “arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.” United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d 938,
943 (10th Cir. 1987).
III
Defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss for double jeopardy was premised on
his earlier conviction under California law for “Possession of a False
Compartment with the Intent to Transport a Controlled Substance,” which arose
from his original arrest in California. We review the district court’s denial of this
motion de novo. United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 73 F.3d 1023, 1024-25
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 1/9/97 TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 96-3083 v. (D.C. No. 95-CR-10009-4) (District of Kansas) GUILLERMO GONZALEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Guillermo Gonzalez appeals his conviction for conspiracy to distribute
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He contends that the
district court committed three reversible errors: first, that the court refused to
allow him to obtain a timely jury determination of his guilt or innocence; second,
that the court denied dismissal for double jeopardy; third, that the court allowed
an involuntary “proffer” into evidence. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. I
On November 14, 1994, defendant was arrested under California law for
possessing a vehicle with a false or concealed compartment. Although officers
found no drugs in defendant’s Toyota Previa van, a drug detection dog “alerted”
on the hidden compartment, indicating that it had at one time contained drugs.
However, the police did find $6,550 in cash and a copy of registration papers for
another Previa van. One week later, Kansas police stopped this second van, and
found 111 kilograms of cocaine in a hidden compartment very similar to that
found in appellant’s vehicle. Imelda Gonzalez, who is not a relative of appellant,
was a passenger in this second van. Found with her was an electronic organizer
that contained defendant’s pager number. Shortly thereafter, officers stopped a
third Previa van, and inside a similarly hidden compartment, discovered 102
kilograms of cocaine.
At trial, Ms. Gonzalez testified that defendant had been recruited by Mirta
Gomez to drive vans containing cocaine from Los Angeles to New York. Ms.
Gonzalez stated that she was paid by Thelma Wingist to keep schedules of the van
trips, call drivers when a van was ready to depart, and herself make some ten trips
to New York in these vans. Ms. Gonzalez further testified that she arranged
several trips made by defendant, and that his pager number was given to her by
Mirta Gomez.
-2- II
In its opening statement, the prosecution indicated that Mirta Gomez would
testify she recruited appellant into the alleged drug conspiracy. However, Ms.
Gomez was never called to the stand by the prosecution. After the government
presented its evidence against defendant, Ms. Gomez was called as a defense
witness by defendant’s indicted co-conspirator, Irving Parker. Though Ms.
Gomez did not refer to defendant directly, she testified that she told other van
drivers that the hidden compartments were being used to conceal cocaine.
Arguing that Mr. Parker’s defense, and Ms. Gomez’s testimony in
particular would be prejudicial, defendant filed a number of motions for
severance. On the same grounds, defendant filed a motion for judgment of
acquittal at the close of the government’s case-in-chief against him and prior to
Ms. Gomez’s testimony. We review the denial of severance for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1468 (10th Cir. 1996). 1
To meet the “heavy burden” required to prevail on a severance motion, a
“defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice [from the failure to sever] and not
merely a negative spill-over effect from damaging evidence presented against
codefendants.” Id.; see also Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)
(“[A] district court should grant a severance . . . only if there is serious risk that a
1 Both the government and defendant analyze defendant’s motion for judgment as a motion for severance. For purposes of this appeal, we accept this characterization.
-3- joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or
prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”).
Showing that separate trials might have offered a better chance of acquittal is not
sufficient to meet the defendant’s burden. United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d
1313, 1331 (10th Cir. 1979).
Defendant claims he was denied the “absolute right to test [the
government’s] evidence” at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief.
Appellant’s Br. at 28. He argues that Ms. Gomez’s testimony prejudiced him
because it provided strong circumstantial evidence he knew he was transporting
cocaine during the van trips. He further contends that without this testimony the
jury might not have found he possessed the requisite knowledge for conspiracy.
Mr. Gonzalez has been unable to find federal authority addressing the
precise situation at issue here—where one defendant seeks judgment at the close
of the government’s case-in-chief, but a codefendant seeks to mount a potentially
prejudicial defense. His citation to state law, see State v. Martin, 673 P.2d 104
(Kan. 1984), is unpersuasive. In Martin, one defendant was accused of aiding and
abetting, while the second was accused of murder. In his defense, the second
accused the first of committing the murder. The second’s defense was wholly
antagonistic toward the first defendant. No such conflict is present in this case.
The core of Mr. Parker’s defense was that as a van driver he did not know he was
-4- carrying cocaine. That contention does not contradict Mr. Gonzalez’s defense in
any substantial manner.
Nor has defendant shown that the district court abused its discretion by
refusing him severance. The court specifically instructed the jury to give separate
consideration to the case of each defendant,” see Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 541, and
was careful to prevent Ms. Gomez from testifying as to her interactions with
defendant. Moreover, the government was specifically barred from asking Ms.
Gomez whether she told defendant that he was transporting cocaine. Under these
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court’s denial of severance
was “arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.” United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d 938,
943 (10th Cir. 1987).
III
Defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss for double jeopardy was premised on
his earlier conviction under California law for “Possession of a False
Compartment with the Intent to Transport a Controlled Substance,” which arose
from his original arrest in California. We review the district court’s denial of this
motion de novo. United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 73 F.3d 1023, 1024-25
(10th Cir. 1996).
A defendant bears the burden of showing double jeopardy, id. at 1025, and
Mr. Gonzalez cannot do so. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, a defendant may
-5- be prosecuted for a violation of federal law by the federal government following
conviction in state court under state law for a crime arising out of the same acts
or occurrences. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); see also
United States v. Andersen, 940 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1991). Defendant would
have us ignore this law, but we are unable to do so.
IV
After pleading nolo contendere to the California charge, defendant was
released on the basis of time served awaiting trial, and returned to Florida.
Subsequently, he was approached outside his Florida residence by a group of
three men: Trooper Darrell Pressnell from the Drug Enforcement Agency; Deputy
Mike Crawford, also from the DEA; and Assistant United States Attorney, Blair
Watson. In response to questioning by Trooper Pressnell, the defendant twice
denied that he had recently been arrested in California. Eventually, Mr. Gonzalez
admitted to his arrest, and the four men proceeded into the residence. At that
point, Mr. Watson identified himself and stated that nothing the defendant said
would be used against him.
At trial, the statements that were made to Trooper Pressnell by the
defendant prior to the group’s moving inside the residence were admitted into
evidence. Defendant argues that such admission was erroneous for two reasons:
first, that the conversation was protected as a “proffer” under Rule 410 of the
-6- Federal Rules of Evidence; second, that as a confession, the court should have
determined the voluntariness of the statement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a).
We disagree.
We review the district court’s determination that defendant’s statements to
Trooper Pressnell lay outside the protection of Rule 410 for clear error. See
United States v. Hare, 49 F.3d 447, 450-51 (8th Cir. 1994) (denial of motion to
suppress under Rule 410 reviewed for clear error); cf. United States v. McCullah,
76 F.3d 1087, 1100 (10th Cir. 1996) (subsidiary factual findings as to
voluntariness of a confession reviewed for clear error). Neither Trooper Pressnell
nor his companions suggested that their conversation with the defendant outside
his residence was a proffer. Mr. Watson’s statement that nothing the defendant
said would be used against him was not made until after all four men had entered
the residence. Prior to that point, Trooper Pressnell sought only to ascertain
whether the defendant had recently been stopped and arrested in California. Such
a conversation cannot amount to a “plea discussion” covered by Rule 410.
Defendant provides no support for the proposition that because a later portion of
his conversation with Pressnell, Crawford, and Watson was a proffer, the entire
conversation must be treated as such. We therefore conclude that the district
court committed no clear error in finding that plea discussions did not begin until
after the parties entered the residence.
-7- Finally, even assuming that the defendant’s statements to Pressnell
constituted a “confession” under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(e), the defendant failed to
invoke his § 3501(a) right to a pre-trial voluntariness hearing pre-trial, and
thereby waived his right to do so at trial and on appeal. See United States v.
Miller, 987 F.2d 1462, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993). Although the district court may
grant relief from a defendant’s pre-trial waiver for cause, see id., none was shown
in this case. The defendant seeks to show cause by arguing that the government
convinced him his statements to Pressnell would only be used for purposes of
impeachment. Consequently, he contends, he perceived no basis on which to
object to their admission pre-trial. However, defendant’s belief that Pressnell’s
testimony would only be used for impeachment purposes was based upon an
erroneous understanding that the entire conversation fell within the terms of the
proffer. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to examine the voluntariness of the defendant’s statements
to Pressnell.
V
In conclusion, none of defendant’s arguments avail him. His motions for
severance and judgment of acquittal were properly denied. He was not subjected
to double jeopardy by his two separate prosecutions and convictions under state
and federal law. Finally, defendant’s conversation with Trooper Pressnell lies
-8- outside the protection of Rule 410, and its voluntariness was not appropriately
before the district court.
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge
-9-