United States v. Gomez-Salamanca

34 F. App'x 878
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedMay 20, 2002
Docket01-4806
StatusUnpublished

This text of 34 F. App'x 878 (United States v. Gomez-Salamanca) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Gomez-Salamanca, 34 F. App'x 878 (4th Cir. 2002).

Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Jose Amilcar Gomez-Salamanca pled guilty to one count of unauthorized reentry of a deported alien after conviction of an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (West 1999). He appeals his sentence, contending that the district court erred in finding that it lacked authority to depart downward pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2, cmt. n. 5 (2000). A district court’s refusal to grant a downward departure is not renewable unless the court based its decision on the mistaken belief that it lacked authority to do so. United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 352-53 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910, 121 S.Ct. 260, 148 L.Ed.2d 188 (2000). The existence of a district court’s authority to depart under USSG § 2L1.2 is a legal determination that is reviewed de novo. United States v. Hall, 977 F.2d 861, 863 (4th Cir.1992).

Gomez-Salamanca takes issue with the district court’s finding that he was ineligible for the departure in question because the term of imprisonment imposed for his prior aggravated felony exceeded one year. Gomez-Salamanca contends that because two years of the three-year term he received for the aggravated felony were suspended, the “term of imprisonment” imposed was actually one year, rendering him eligible for the departure under Application Note 5.

After review, we conclude that the district court did not misapprehend its authority to depart and properly determined that Gomez-Salamanca was not in fact eligible for the departure at issue. See United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 170 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir.1999) (holding, in context of potential USSG § 2L1.2 departure under Application Note 5, that “term of imprisonment” for prior aggravated felony was five years even though the sentence was stayed and the defendant placed on probation on condition he serve 45 days in jail); United States v. Yanez-Huerta, 207 F.3d 746, 748-49 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 981, 121 S.Ct. 432, 148 L.Ed.2d 440 (2000).

*879 We accordingly affirm Gomez-Salamanca’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

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Related

United States v. Yanez-Huerta
207 F.3d 746 (Fifth Circuit, 2000)
United States v. Danny Ray Hall
977 F.2d 861 (Fourth Circuit, 1992)
Legaspi v. First America Bank of Illinois
531 U.S. 910 (Supreme Court, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
34 F. App'x 878, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-gomez-salamanca-ca4-2002.