United States v. Goldberg

289 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19526, 2003 WL 22478607
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedOctober 30, 2003
Docket03 CR 332
StatusPublished

This text of 289 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (United States v. Goldberg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Goldberg, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19526, 2003 WL 22478607 (N.D. Ill. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

SHADUR, Senior District Judge.

Because of concerns raised by Probation Officer Michael Alper’s summaries of a number of the letters that had been received from victims of the depredations imposed on them by defendant Jeffrey Goldberg (“Goldberg”), this Court notified the parties early on that it might give consideration to a two-level increase in Goldberg’s offense level based on the unusual vulnerability of at least some of his victims- — Sentencing Guideline (“Guideline”) § 3Al.l(b) — or perhaps to an up *1010 ward departure (see, e.g., Guideline §§ 5K2.0 and 5K2.3), or to both. Goldberg’s attorney has both responded to that August 8, 2003 memorandum and, apparently on the theory that the best defense is a good offense, has sought a downward departure.

To date no written response has been forthcoming from the government, although Assistant United States Attorney Scott Levine has submitted the October 7 Government’s Version of the Offense, repeating in material part the 11-plus page description of Goldberg’s admitted predatory activities as set out in his April 23, 2003 Plea Agreement. This should not be taken as a criticism of the prosecutor, however, for the August 18 memorandum had concluded by stating:

It is not necessary that either counsel address those subjects by written submissions (including any relevant case citations) in advance of the sentencing date, but they should be prepared to discuss both those issues on that date.

Although this memorandum has been completed just in advance of any oral submissions that counsel for the parties may make during the scheduled October 30 sentencing hearing, of course this Court has already given a great deal of thought and study to the problem, and — because the sentencing decision will obviously play such a substantial role in Goldberg’s future — this Court considers it appropriate to reduce its present views to written form. If anything that develops during the sentencing hearing were to call for a modification of what is said here, this Court expects to remain open to a possible revision of these views.

To focus first on the “vulnerable victim” issue, this Court of course recognizes the need to avoid any element of double counting that would be implicated if the identical factors that constitute an abuse of trust (see Guideline § 3B1.3) were to be treated as automatically providing a further showing that one or more victims of Goldberg’s crimes was or were unusually vulnerable. On the other hand, the October 22 Sentencing Memorandum and Motion for Downward Departure (“Memorandum”) filed by Goldberg’s attorney Jed Stone, Esq. seeks to focus on the devastation that counsel represents as having been wreaked on his own client’s life — a wholly self-inflicted wound, it must be said — and then to contrast that with the situation of Goldberg’s victims by saying this in Memorandum at 3:

Most of the investors had net worth in excess of three million dollars. Their average loss was under one hundred thousand dollars. These victims were, by and large, venture capitalists who sought large returns on risky investments.

Because that portrayal seemed seriously inconsistent with at least a material number of the supplemental reports that Probation Officer Alper had submitted to this Court after completing his thorough Pre-sentence Investigation Report (“PSI”)— supplements that had provided capsule summaries of the numerous letters received from victims of Goldberg’s massive fraud (amounting at the most recent reading to some $9.1 million) — this Court asked Probation Officer Alper to provide it with all of the victims’ actual letters, both favorable and unfavorable. This Court has read all of those letters. And before this memorandum turns to the substance of those letters, some of which must be dealt with at length or in full to convey their flavor accurately, it must frankly be said that if the Memorandum by Goldberg’s counsel had been a securities prospectus, the language that has been quoted earlier (and some other portions as well) would present a serious violation of Section 10(b) of the 1933 Securities Act and of its implementation in SEC Rule 10b-5: It includes *1011 untrue statements of material facts, or it omits material facts necessary to make its statements, in light of the circumstances, not misleading.

Before this memorandum speaks to that inaccuracy, however, it might be observed parenthetically that the paragraph quoted above from defense counsel’s Memorandum — almost hinting that Goldberg’s victims asked or deserved to be fleeced because of their own profit-seeking goals — is a bit redolent of the defendant to a rape charge who says that the victim could or should have expected to be attacked, or even that she deserved it, because she dressed in a provocative miniskirt. But that aside, some chapter and verse response is in order to demonstrate the inaccuracy of defense counsel’s statement in factual terms, so as to justify the pejorative label that this memorandum has attached to it.

Although this Court has received and read letters from more than 20 of Goldberg’s victims, it is worth reading just four of them to demonstrate graphically why this case indeed involves, as Application Note 2 to Guideline § 3Al.l(b) puts it, more than one “unusually vulnerable victim in which the defendant knows or should have known of the victim’s unusual vulnerability” — a term referred to in the same Application Note as having such vulnerability “due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” Such detailed treatment is engaged in with some reluctance, because this Court recognizes that doing so may serve to reopen painful wounds or to keep those painful wounds open. But it is also true that by the victims’ having responded to the request by government counsel for their statements, as they have, they have already shared those wounds with strangers, so that airing the statements publicly really poses no inconsistency.

Those four letters are the ones received from Bess Nagelberg, Ina and Royce Williamson, Janyce Cagan' Agruss and Lynne Miller Socol. Look at what they say. 1

To go beyond those statements would be, as Shakespeare put it, “to gild refined gold, to paint the lily... ,” 2 It is true that this Court has been selective in thus choosing the materials that best illustrate the applicability of the vulnerable victim provisions to the circumstances of this case, although a number of the other letters portray the same pictures in varying degrees, some of those others close to the four that have been dealt with at length. But this Court is prepared to hold that those four statements alone amply demonstrate that Goldberg’s crimes fit very comfortably within the terms of Guideline § 3Al.l(b) and the caselaw. In that regard it is worth quoting from the *1012 most recent statement by our Court of Appeals dealing with that Guideline, United States v. Sims, 829 F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir.2003), after having quoted Application Note 2:

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Bluebook (online)
289 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19526, 2003 WL 22478607, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-goldberg-ilnd-2003.