United States v. Globe Shipping Co.

2 Cust. Ct. 854, 1939 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1655
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedFebruary 24, 1939
DocketNo. 4527; Entry No. 707672, etc.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2 Cust. Ct. 854 (United States v. Globe Shipping Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Globe Shipping Co., 2 Cust. Ct. 854, 1939 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1655 (cusc 1939).

Opinion

Cline, Judge:

This is an application for review of the decision of the trial judge (Reap. Dec. 4307) in finding the value of cotton ladder tape imported from F. Rollason & Co. of Coventry, County of Warwick, England, during the years 1935 and 1936.

The merchandise entered for the account of Mason Parker Mfg. Co. was all invoiced as “cotton ladder tape, Mingled D” at a value of 24 shillings per gross yards, less a discount of 3¾ per centum and less inland freight from the factory to the port of shipment, the cost of the packing being included. The appraiser added 6 per centum to the unit value of the merchandise covered by reappraisement appeals 112376-A, 112377-A, 112378-A, 11237Q-A, 112380-A, 112381-A and 112382-A bub allowed the invoice discount of 3¾ per centum on the advanced value and the deduction for inland freight. A statement on a sheet attached to the invoice entitled “Summary of Examination and Appraisement” shows that the appraisement was made on the basis of export value.

The importer made an advance of 6 per centum on the entry covered by reappraisement appeal 112925-A to meet the advance made by the appraiser in the test cases, and the merchandise covered by that entry was passed by the appraiser as entered.

[855]*855The merchandise in reappraisement appeal 112563-A consists of three different qualities of cotton ladder tape entered by Century Yenetian Blind Co., Inc. The item invoiced as “Mingled D” was entered at 24 shillings per gross yards, that invoiced as “Chocolate D” was entered at 26 shillings per gross yards, and that invoiced as “Duck D” was entered at 23 shillings and 6 pence per gross yards, all the items being subject to a discount of 3% per centum. The inland freight was deducted also and the packing was included in the value. The appraiser added 6 per centum to make market value in that shipment instead of 6 per centum as in the other cases.

Counsel for the importer contended before the trial judge that the appraiser’s addition was that of a commission of 6 per centum which was a buying commission and not a selling commission and therefore not a part of the dutiable value of the goods.

It appears from the record that the only question presented to the trial judge was whether the 6 per centum added by the appraiser was a dutiable or nondutiable commission. This appears in the record as follows:

Judge Kinchelob. Do you agree with Mr. Puckhafer that the only controversy here is this 6 per cent, which he claims is a commission?
Mr. W eeks. That is the sole issue, if your honor please.
Judge Kinchelob. And the contention of the Government is that it is a dutiable item?
Mr. Weeks. That is it exactly, sir.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
Judge Kinchelob. As I understand this, Mr. Puckhafer contends that this 6 per cent is a commission. Does the Government concede it is a commission, but that it is a dutiable item?
Mr. Weeks. I am not sure whether it is a commission or not. The Government contends this: that the recipient of this commission or the payee is D. Roditi & Son of England; that Roditi is the sole selling agent for the manufacturer; that Roditi has the sole exclusive right from the manufacturer of this merchandise to purchase all the goods which are destined for export to both the United States and Canada. It also happens that the same Roditi is the agent of Mason & Parker, the plaintiff in the first cases we tried, the importer in those cases. Their claim is that their agent abroad, Roditi, performs certain services for which they pay this 5 or 6 per cent commission, whichever it may be.

The trial judge held that the appraiser added a 6 per centum commission paid to a buying agent and that this commission was not a part of the market value of the goods, citing Stein v. United States, 1 Ct. Cust. Appls. 36, T. D. 31007; United States v. Bauer et al., 3 Ct. Cust. Appls. 343, T. D. 32627; and United States v. Case & Co., Inc., 13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 122, T. D. 40958. The lower court held that the value of the merchandise covered by all of the appeals, except 112563-A, was the unit invoice value, less 3¾ per centum discount and less inland freight from the factory to the port of ship[856]*856ment, the packing being included in tbe price. As to appeal 112563-A, the court held that the evidence was not sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness of the action of the appraiser and dismissed the appeal. The Government included that appeal in its application for review before this division, but the importers did not cross-appeal.

In the argument before this division, counsel for the appellant raised entirely new points, not contested before the trial judge. He did not contend that the 6 per centum added by the appraiser was a selling commission and not a buying commission. His only contention was that the importer did not prove all the essential facts required to establish export value, that is, that the importer did not show the principal market, the usual wholesale quantity in which the merchandise was sold or the value of similar merchandise. The appellant contends that in the absence of such testimony the appeals should have been dismissed by the trial judge.

Counsel for the appellee did not answer the appellant on these points but limited his argument to the question of whether the 6 per centum addition was a buying commission or a selling commission, evidently considering that that was the only issue before the court below and that the appellant could not raise a new point before the appellate division which was not contested below.

In the case of United States v. American Express Co., Reap. Dec. 2816, the appellant argued a point before this division not presented to the trial judge. Judge Evans, speaking for the court, said:

The question of a restricted market was not presented to the judge below sitting in reappraisement, and he had no opportunity to rule on that point except as it appears as part of the testimony submitted by the special agent. Inasmuch as the Government made no point below that the 160-pengo price was of restricted sales it is our opinion that it cannot raise that point here. It would be unfair to the single judge so to do. The record clearly shows that the only difference between the importer and the Government at the trial was the one arising from the fact that a bounty was paid to the manufacturer. The case is therefore to be considered on the same basis on appeal. It is well settled that appellate tribunals do not pass on questions not presented to the lower court. Howland v. Beck, 56 Fed. (2nd) 35; Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U. S. 225, 229; Peck v. Heurick, 167 U. S. 624; Virginia Ry. Co. v. Mullens, 271 U. S. 220; New York v. Kleinert, 268 U. S. 646.

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Related

Millmaster International, Inc. v. United States
61 Cust. Ct. 613 (U.S. Customs Court, 1968)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2 Cust. Ct. 854, 1939 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1655, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-globe-shipping-co-cusc-1939.