Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 12-10407 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00320-TCB-GGB-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GEORGE WASHINGTON DUNN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
No. 12-10672 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00320-TCB-GGB-5
versus Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 2 of 8
GRANT DECATUR ALLEN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _________________________
(August 14, 2013)
Before PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and WALTER, * District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
We have carefully considered the briefs and arguments of each Appellant,
and we have had the benefit of oral argument. We cannot conclude that the district
court committed reversible error. We address in turn the several issues raised, first
the issues raised by Appellant George Washington Dunn, and then the issues raised
by Appellant Grant Decatur Allen, Jr.
A. Dunn’s challenge to the district court’s exclusion of Agent Kahn as a
defense witness
Dunn acknowledges his obligation under 28 C.F.R. § 16.21 et. seq. (the
“Touhy Regulations”) to give notice to the Department of Justice of his intent to
call the government agent, Douglas Kahn, to testify, and his obligation to provide a
summary of the testimony sought. Dunn did provide the required notice of his
* Honorable Donald E. Walter, United States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
2 Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 3 of 8
intent to call Agent Kahn as a defense witness to impeach the testimony of Grady
Douglas. However, Dunn concedes that he did not give the required notice of his
intent to call Agent Kahn as a witness to impeach the testimony of Alfredo Beeks.
We conclude that Dunn’s indication of an intent to use Agent Kahn to impeach the
testimony of Douglas does not operate to satisfy the requirement of providing a
summary of the testimony sought per the Touhy Regulations, when the testimony
is sought to impeach Beeks rather than Douglas. This Circuit has upheld the
validity of the Touhy Regulations. See United States v. Bizzard, 674 F.2d 1382,
1387 (11th Cir. 1982).
We reject Dunn’s argument that the government’s delay in producing Agent
Kahn’s report of his debriefing of Beeks should excuse Dunn from providing the
required notice. Although Dunn argues that he only received Agent Kahn’s report
of debriefing Beeks “on the eve of trial,” he had the report six or seven days before
he attempted to call Agent Kahn to testify—ample time to supplement his notice
regarding Agent Kahn’s testimony. Moreover, we conclude that the testimony that
Dunn now asserts he would have elicited from Agent Kahn is so insignificant that,
even if there were error, it would be harmless.
B. Dunn’s challenge to the district court’s exclusion of his character evidence
During the testimony of Polly Biasucci, Dunn’s attorney asked if the witness
was familiar with Dunn’s reputation in the community. The government objected,
3 Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 4 of 8
and the district court granted the government’s objection on the basis “previously
discussed.” The court later clarified that it had sustained the government’s motion
in limine to exclude impermissible character evidence—namely, specific instances
of Dunn’s good conduct in the community. Defense counsel failed to clarify the
basis of the district court’s ruling at the time the objection was sustained, and failed
to argue that, although specific instances of good conduct were inadmissible,
Dunn’s reputation in the community as a law abiding citizen would have been
admissible. No objection was made by defense counsel until later, after the jury
had begun deliberations. We cannot conclude that Dunn has demonstrated plain
error.
C. Dunn’s challenge to the district court’s admission of Rule 404(b) evidence
For several reasons we reject Dunn’s argument that certain Rule 404(b)
evidence should have been excluded because Dunn had no notice of the
government’s intent to introduce the prior bad acts. Dunn concedes that he failed
to object contemporaneously. Furthermore, we doubt there was error because the
evidence of his prior marijuana transactions was intrinsic to the conspiracy, but
even assuming error, there was no plain error.
D. Dunn’s remaining arguments on appeal
We reject summarily Dunn’s challenge to the manner in which the district
court handled voir dire. The points raised by Dunn’s counsel were substantially
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covered, and the district court gave the attorneys the opportunity for follow-up
questions and counsel for Dunn asked no follow-up questions. We also summarily
reject Dunn’s severance argument and his argument that the district court erred in
failing to give a multiple conspiracy instruction. Both arguments are frivolous.
We also reject Dunn’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the
gun charge. There was ample evidence to support the charge, including the fact
that a gun was on the dryer next to the enclosed garage in which the jury could
have found that Dunn either witnessed or participated in loading the cocaine and
the cash into the secret compartment of the vehicle that Dunn drove out of the
garage.
E. Allen’s argument that the jury was tainted by extrinsic information
After jury deliberations began, Juror McCorvey consulted his cousin, an
attorney, with respect to the definition of conspiracy and conveyed that
information to the jury. The district court questioned McCorvey, who admitted
having talked with his attorney cousin but stated that what he was told did not
differ from what the judge had instructed. After the district court’s inquiry of
McCorvey, Allen’s counsel said only that he did not know what was heard, did not
know what McCorvey was told or what he told the jury, and he took the position
that the jury was contaminated. The district court then brought in the other eleven
jurors, and ascertained that what they were told was not inconsistent with what the
5 Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 6 of 8
court had charged the jury in the written charge (which was in the jury room during
deliberations). The district court also ascertained that the jury was not affected by
what McCorvey had said and that they would reach a verdict based solely on the
evidence and the charge given by the district court. After the district court’s
colloquy with the other eleven jurors, Allen’s counsel made no further objections.
In particular, until this appeal, Allen’s counsel never suggested that the jurors
should have been interviewed individually, and never requested any additional
question be asked of McCorvey or the other eleven jurors.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 12-10407 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00320-TCB-GGB-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GEORGE WASHINGTON DUNN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
No. 12-10672 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00320-TCB-GGB-5
versus Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 2 of 8
GRANT DECATUR ALLEN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _________________________
(August 14, 2013)
Before PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and WALTER, * District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
We have carefully considered the briefs and arguments of each Appellant,
and we have had the benefit of oral argument. We cannot conclude that the district
court committed reversible error. We address in turn the several issues raised, first
the issues raised by Appellant George Washington Dunn, and then the issues raised
by Appellant Grant Decatur Allen, Jr.
A. Dunn’s challenge to the district court’s exclusion of Agent Kahn as a
defense witness
Dunn acknowledges his obligation under 28 C.F.R. § 16.21 et. seq. (the
“Touhy Regulations”) to give notice to the Department of Justice of his intent to
call the government agent, Douglas Kahn, to testify, and his obligation to provide a
summary of the testimony sought. Dunn did provide the required notice of his
* Honorable Donald E. Walter, United States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
2 Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 3 of 8
intent to call Agent Kahn as a defense witness to impeach the testimony of Grady
Douglas. However, Dunn concedes that he did not give the required notice of his
intent to call Agent Kahn as a witness to impeach the testimony of Alfredo Beeks.
We conclude that Dunn’s indication of an intent to use Agent Kahn to impeach the
testimony of Douglas does not operate to satisfy the requirement of providing a
summary of the testimony sought per the Touhy Regulations, when the testimony
is sought to impeach Beeks rather than Douglas. This Circuit has upheld the
validity of the Touhy Regulations. See United States v. Bizzard, 674 F.2d 1382,
1387 (11th Cir. 1982).
We reject Dunn’s argument that the government’s delay in producing Agent
Kahn’s report of his debriefing of Beeks should excuse Dunn from providing the
required notice. Although Dunn argues that he only received Agent Kahn’s report
of debriefing Beeks “on the eve of trial,” he had the report six or seven days before
he attempted to call Agent Kahn to testify—ample time to supplement his notice
regarding Agent Kahn’s testimony. Moreover, we conclude that the testimony that
Dunn now asserts he would have elicited from Agent Kahn is so insignificant that,
even if there were error, it would be harmless.
B. Dunn’s challenge to the district court’s exclusion of his character evidence
During the testimony of Polly Biasucci, Dunn’s attorney asked if the witness
was familiar with Dunn’s reputation in the community. The government objected,
3 Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 4 of 8
and the district court granted the government’s objection on the basis “previously
discussed.” The court later clarified that it had sustained the government’s motion
in limine to exclude impermissible character evidence—namely, specific instances
of Dunn’s good conduct in the community. Defense counsel failed to clarify the
basis of the district court’s ruling at the time the objection was sustained, and failed
to argue that, although specific instances of good conduct were inadmissible,
Dunn’s reputation in the community as a law abiding citizen would have been
admissible. No objection was made by defense counsel until later, after the jury
had begun deliberations. We cannot conclude that Dunn has demonstrated plain
error.
C. Dunn’s challenge to the district court’s admission of Rule 404(b) evidence
For several reasons we reject Dunn’s argument that certain Rule 404(b)
evidence should have been excluded because Dunn had no notice of the
government’s intent to introduce the prior bad acts. Dunn concedes that he failed
to object contemporaneously. Furthermore, we doubt there was error because the
evidence of his prior marijuana transactions was intrinsic to the conspiracy, but
even assuming error, there was no plain error.
D. Dunn’s remaining arguments on appeal
We reject summarily Dunn’s challenge to the manner in which the district
court handled voir dire. The points raised by Dunn’s counsel were substantially
4 Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 5 of 8
covered, and the district court gave the attorneys the opportunity for follow-up
questions and counsel for Dunn asked no follow-up questions. We also summarily
reject Dunn’s severance argument and his argument that the district court erred in
failing to give a multiple conspiracy instruction. Both arguments are frivolous.
We also reject Dunn’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the
gun charge. There was ample evidence to support the charge, including the fact
that a gun was on the dryer next to the enclosed garage in which the jury could
have found that Dunn either witnessed or participated in loading the cocaine and
the cash into the secret compartment of the vehicle that Dunn drove out of the
garage.
E. Allen’s argument that the jury was tainted by extrinsic information
After jury deliberations began, Juror McCorvey consulted his cousin, an
attorney, with respect to the definition of conspiracy and conveyed that
information to the jury. The district court questioned McCorvey, who admitted
having talked with his attorney cousin but stated that what he was told did not
differ from what the judge had instructed. After the district court’s inquiry of
McCorvey, Allen’s counsel said only that he did not know what was heard, did not
know what McCorvey was told or what he told the jury, and he took the position
that the jury was contaminated. The district court then brought in the other eleven
jurors, and ascertained that what they were told was not inconsistent with what the
5 Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 6 of 8
court had charged the jury in the written charge (which was in the jury room during
deliberations). The district court also ascertained that the jury was not affected by
what McCorvey had said and that they would reach a verdict based solely on the
evidence and the charge given by the district court. After the district court’s
colloquy with the other eleven jurors, Allen’s counsel made no further objections.
In particular, until this appeal, Allen’s counsel never suggested that the jurors
should have been interviewed individually, and never requested any additional
question be asked of McCorvey or the other eleven jurors. Considering the totality
of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion in concluding that any presumption of prejudice had been rebutted.
We consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the introduction of the extrinsic evidence to the jury. These include: (1) the nature of the extrinsic evidence; (2) the manner in which the information reached the jury; (3) the factual findings in the trial court and the manner of the court’s inquiry into the juror issues; and (4) the strength of the government’s case.
Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1305 (11th Cir. 2010). With respect to the first
factor—the nature of the extrinsic evidence—we agree with the district court that
its nature tends toward the innocuous because what McCorvey learned from his
attorney cousin and passed on to the jury was not different from what the district
court charged in the jury instructions. With respect to the second factor, we do not
believe (and Allen does not argue) that the manner in which the information
reached the jury adds any force at all to Allen’s challenge. Rather, Allen’s
6 Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 7 of 8
challenge focuses on the third factor—the manner of the district court’s inquiry.
Although we would not proffer as a model the manner of the district court’s
inquiry here, we are satisfied that it fairly elicited the substance of what the
attorney cousin told McCorvey and the substance of what was conveyed to the
other eleven jurors; moreover, Allen’s counsel failed to request a more thorough
inquiry. Finally, we believe that the strength of the government’s case was close to
overwhelming. We are satisfied that, with the exclusion of Juror McCorvey and
the district court’s instructions, the extrinsic evidence did not affect the jury’s
deliberations.
F. Allen’s challenge to the district court’s exclusion of character evidence
We cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in this
regard. The district court properly excluded specific instances of prior good
conduct. The district court allowed testimony by the witnesses who were in
recovery from addiction in the facility nearby the Game Room. Only the fact of
Allen’s addiction and his participation in Narcotics Anonymous were excluded. In
light of the fact that neither fact is inconsistent with Allen’s activities in selling
narcotics, and in light of the fact that Allen was actually convicted in 2007 of drug
distribution (after his Narcotics Anonymous experiences in 1995), we cannot
conclude that the district court committed reversible error.
G. Allen’s remaining arguments on appeal
7 Case: 12-10407 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 8 of 8
We summarily reject Allen’s challenge to the district court’s failure to give a
multiple conspiracy instruction. Allen’s prior drug convictions in 1990, 1994, and
2007 were properly admitted under Rule 404(b) as relevant to intent. The evidence
with respect to the shooting at the Game Room was properly admitted as intrinsic
evidence. Allen’s failure to file income tax returns was properly admitted under
Rule 404(b) as evidence that the Game Room was not a legitimate business.
Allen’s hearsay challenge to the statement by Man is without merit; it was a non-
hearsay statement by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. 1 Allen’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit; the evidence against
Allen was close to overwhelming. Finally, Allen’s challenge to his sentence is
frivolous.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
1 Finding no error on the part of the district court to introduce this evidence, we reject Allen’s claim of cumulative error.