United States v. Garcia-Camacho

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: October 19, 2021
• Docket: 20-1303U
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 20-1303

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

EVARIS NAOMI GARCÍA-CAMACHO,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Thompson, Selya, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

Johnny Rivera-González on brief for appellant. W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá- Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and Robert P. Coleman III, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

October 19, 2021 SELYA, Circuit Judge. In this sentencing appeal,

defendant-appellant Evaris Naomi García-Camacho strives to

persuade us that the district court procedurally and substantively

erred in imposing her sentence by focusing on aggravating factors

and disregarding mitigating factors. Because these claims of error

are not supported by the record, we summarily affirm the challenged

sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the

case. "Where, as here, a sentencing appeal follows a guilty plea,

we glean the relevant facts from the change-of-plea colloquy, the

unchallenged portions of the presentence investigation report (PSI

Report), and the record of the disposition hearing." United States

v. Vargas, 560 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2009).

On February 25, 2019, Puerto Rico police officers

executed a search warrant at an apartment in San Juan. In the

apartment, they found the appellant and her boyfriend. They also

found a cache of firearms, ammunition, and controlled substances.

The appellant was arrested and — having waived her rights under

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) — confessed that

she and her boyfriend were selling drugs.

On March 14, a federal grand jury sitting in the District

of Puerto Rico returned an indictment, which charged the appellant

with possession with intent to distribute a substance containing

- 2 - cocaine base and cocaine (Counts 1 and 2, respectively), see 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); possession with intent to

distribute a substance containing marijuana (Count 3), see id.

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); and possession of a firearm in furtherance

of a drug trafficking crime (Count 4), see 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A). The appellant initially maintained her innocence,

but later changed course and entered a guilty plea to Counts 2 and

4. Pursuant to her plea agreement, the government agreed to

dismiss Counts 1 and 3.

The PSI Report recommended a guideline sentencing range

of twelve to eighteen months in prison for Count 2. The statutory

minimum sentence and, thus, the guideline sentence for Count 4 was

sixty months (to run consecutive to any sentence imposed on Count

2). See id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (c)(1)(D)(ii). Neither side

objected to these guideline calculations.

At the disposition hearing, defense counsel advocated

for a twelve-month term of immurement on Count 2 and a sixty-month

term of immurement on Count 4. He described the appellant — then

age 21 — as "very young" and "very immature" and stated that she

was "in a very toxic relationship." He concluded by telling the

court that the appellant's sentencing memorandum "includes

everything."

The prosecutor took a different view, noting that the

appellant "was participating in a drug trafficking operation that

- 3 - was being run out of her apartment" and that there were many

firearms, ammunition, and controlled substances in the apartment.

She asked for an eighteen-month term of immurement on Count 2 and

a sixty-month term of immurement on Count 4.

The appellant allocuted. She stated that she was

"repentant" and asked the court for "a fair and reasonable

sentence."

After confirming that it had reviewed the appellant's

sentencing memorandum, the court adopted the guideline

calculations contained in the PSI Report. It then canvassed the

sentencing factors limned in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), discussing

(among other things) the appellant's age, education, former

employment, and substance-use history. Next, the court summarized

the facts pertaining to the offenses of conviction and described

the many incriminating items found in the apartment. The court

expressed the view that the parties' sentence recommendations

"d[id] not reflect the seriousness of the offenses, d[id] not

promote respect for the law, d[id] not protect the public from

further crimes by [the appellant], and d[id] not address the issues

of deterrence and punishment." It concluded that a twelve-month

prison sentence on Count 2, followed by a consecutive seventy-two-

month prison sentence on Count 4, was a condign punishment. The

court sentenced the appellant accordingly. After the court denied

her motion for reconsideration, this appeal ensued.

- 4 - II. ANALYSIS

The appellant contends that her sentence is both

"procedurally and substantively unreasonable."1 Despite this

duality, she combines both points in a unitary claim of error.

For ease in analysis, we examine her arguments through both

procedural and substantive lenses.

A. The Procedural Lens.

The appellant's principal claim of error is that the

district court failed adequately to balance the section 3553(a)

factors. Specifically, she asserts that the court "placed all

weight on the negative factors and disregarded the multiple

mitigating factors." Because this claim of error was not advanced

below, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Duarte,

246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001). The appellant stumbles at the

first step of plain-error review because she cannot show that any

error occurred.

Where, as here, a sentencing court has properly

calculated a defendant's guideline range, it becomes the court's

task "to sift" all the information furnished to it in the

sentencing memorandums and at the disposition hearing and to

The appellant is less than precise as to whether she is 1

challenging her twelve-month prison sentence on Count 2, her seventy-two-month prison sentence on Count 4, or both. We read the appellant's claim as being directed toward her seventy-two- month prison sentence. After all, she received exactly the sentence she requested on Count 2.

- 5 - balance the relevant sentencing factors. United States v. Madera-

Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011). When explicating the

sentence imposed, the court "is not required to address [the

sentencing] factors, one by one, in some sort of rote incantation."

United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 205 (1st Cir. 2006). It is

enough for the "court simply to identify the main factors driving

its determination." United States v. Sepúlveda-Hernández, 817

F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2016).

In the case at hand, the record makes manifest that the

sentencing court adequately considered all the relevant section

3553(a) factors. The court read the appellant's sentencing

memorandum and listened to defense counsel's arguments in

mitigation. The court discussed the appellant's age, education,

prior employment, substance-use history, and lack of any prior

criminal record. It also discussed the offenses of conviction,

describing in detail the firearms, ammunition, controlled

substances, and other items discovered in the appellant's

apartment. The court then factored in the gravity of the offenses,

the need for respect for the law, the need to protect the public

from further crimes by the appellant, and the goals of deterrence

and condign punishment. No more was exigible.

The appellant's contention that the court "failed to

take into consideration . . . [the a]ppellant's advanced

pregnancy, youth, complete[ly] dysfunctional up bringing, [and]

- 6 - spousal abuse syndrome" is without merit. These arguments were

brought to the court's attention with unmistakable clarity.

"[T]hat the district court did not explicitly mention them during

the sentencing hearing suggests they were unconvincing, not

ignored." United States v. Lozada-Aponte, 689 F.3d 791, 793 (1st

Cir. 2012). The claim of procedural error fails.

B. The Substantive Lens.

We next examine the appellant's claim of error through

a more substantive lens. With respect to the substantive

reasonableness of a sentence, our review is for abuse of

discretion. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct.

762, 766 (2020); United States v. Bruno-Campos, 978 F.3d 801, 808

(1st Cir. 2020).

"In the sentencing context, 'reasonableness is a protean

concept.'" United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir.

2011) (quoting United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir.

2008)). Consequently, "[t]here is no one reasonable sentence in

any given case but, rather, a universe of reasonable sentencing

outcomes." Id. Our task, then, is "to determine whether the

[challenged] sentence falls within this broad universe." United

States v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2020).

In making this determination, "we cannot substitute our

judgment of the appropriate sentence for that of the sentencing

court; to the contrary, we must accord significant deference to

- 7 - the court’s informed determination that the section 3553(a)

factors justify the sentence imposed." Id. In the end, "a

sentence is substantively reasonable so long as the sentencing

court offers a plausible rationale and the sentence represents a

defensible result." Id.

The court below adequately articulated its sentencing

rationale. The court mulled the parties' arguments and considered

the relevant section 3553(a) factors. It then determined that the

gravity of the offenses, the need to protect the public, and a

constellation of similar considerations demanded substantial

punishment. We find its rationale plausible.

So, too, the challenged sentence represents a defensible

result. Given the gravity of the offenses and the types and kinds

of contraband involved, we cannot say that a seventy-two-month

term of immurement on Count 4 was an indefensible result. Serious

crimes warrant substantial punishment — and the district court

recognized as much. The mitigating factors emphasized by the

appellant do not tip the balance so heavily as to demand a

different result.

Finally, the appellant complains that the seventy-two-

month sentence was an upward variance and that she was given no

advance notice of the sentencing court's intent to vary upward.

There was nothing untoward about the court's deployment of an

upward variance. "[A] mandatory minimum sentence is just that:

- 8 - the lowest sentence that can lawfully be imposed. A sentencing

court may lawfully select a higher sentence up to the statutory

maximum."2 United States v. Rivera-González, 776 F.3d 45, 51-52

(1st Cir. 2015). And unlike a sentencing departure, an upward

variance from a properly calculated guideline range almost never

requires advance notice to a defendant. See United States v.

Daoust, 888 F.3d 571, 575 (1st Cir. 2018). No advance notice was

required here.

III. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,

the challenged sentence is summarily

Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).

2 In this case, the statutory maximum sentence on Count 4 was life imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

- 9 -