NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-6667
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:20-cr-00197-RAJ-4 v.
HUMBERTO GARCIA, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 18, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: TALLMAN, OWENS, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Humberto Garcia appeals several issues stemming from
his jury trial and conviction for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 1291 and affirm.
We review a district court’s factual findings about whether the defendant’s
attire was identifiable as prison clothing for clear error. United States v. Sarno, 73
F.3d 1470, 1499–1500 (9th Cir. 1995).
We review preserved evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and reverse
only if they are manifestly erroneous. United States v. Tsarnaev, 595 U.S. 302, 322–
23 (2022). This includes admitting evidence over an objection that it is unfairly
prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. United States v. Sullivan, 159 F.4th
579, 590 (9th Cir. 2025).
We review a district court’s finding about whether the evidence is sufficient
to support a buyer-seller or multiple-conspiracies instruction for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Moe, 781 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Ocampo-
Estrada, 873 F.3d 661, 665 (9th Cir. 2017). But we have also applied de novo review
to this question, at least in the multiple-conspiracies context. See United States v.
Job, 871 F.3d 852, 867 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting intra-circuit conflict). We review
unpreserved objections to jury instructions for plain error. Johnson v. United States,
520 U.S. 461, 464–66 (1997).
1. Garcia argues that the district court “improperly forced [him] to appear
for trial in prison garb,” and that he is thus entitled to a new trial. First, Garcia’s
objection was untimely and unspecific. Garcia waited until jury selection was
2 24-6667 almost done to tell the court, “I’m still in prison uniform in front of the jury.” Since
Garcia’s delay gave “the jury the opportunity to observe [him] in [prison]-issued
clothing,” his objection was untimely. United States v. Martin, 964 F.2d 714, 719–
20 (7th Cir. 1992). And without a timely objection, his claim fails. See Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976); Sarno, 73 F.3d at 1499.
Second, Garcia fails to show that the court clearly erred in finding that his
clothing did not identify him as a prisoner. See Sarno, 73 F.3d at 1499. The court
observed that Garcia was dressed in an open-collar, long-sleeve white shirt with a
dark colored t-shirt underneath tucked into pants that looked no different than
khakis. Nothing indicates that Garcia’s clothes had any labels or writing identifying
them as prison-issued. See Felts v. Estelle, 875 F.2d 785, 785–86 (9th Cir. 1989).
The court also noted that Garcia was seated at a table that blocked essentially all his
attire beneath the bench from view. See United States v. Collins, 109 F.3d 1413,
1418 (9th Cir. 1997). We have upheld findings that similar attire was not readily
identifiable as prison clothing. See United States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1421–
23 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1979). This
forecloses Garcia’s argument.
2. Garcia argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence of his agreement to help murder a coconspirator suspected of stealing
drugs. Garcia concedes that “this challenged evidence could be relevant to the
3 24-6667 existence and scope of a charged drug conspiracy.” That Garcia was asked to supply
a gun for a murder in furtherance of the drug-trafficking operation—and he was
willing to do so—showed both that he was a trusted member of the organization and
that he would help commit murder if it furthered the operation. The intercepted calls
and text messages were relevant evidence of Garcia’s involvement in the charged
conspiracy. Garcia asserts that the district court should have excluded them under
Rule 403 because they undermined his defense and portrayed him as involved “in a
violent, international drug conspiracy.” Of course, this evidence did prejudice
Garcia by undermining his defense “that he engaged in his role effectively to pay for
his access to drugs as an addict.” But there was nothing unfair about this, nor did it
outweigh the probative value of the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Garcia also argues that the court abused its discretion by allowing a federal
agent to testify as an expert about drug traffickers and drugs. The agent testified that
because drug traffickers cannot go to the police, they use firearms to protect their
drugs and “resolve their business conflicts themselves through violence, or at least
the threat of violence.” This was permissible expert testimony and not unfairly
prejudicial to Garcia. Cf. United States v. Taren-Palma, 997 F.2d 525, 534–35 (9th
Cir. 1993) (upholding admission of expert testimony on “use of guns in narcotics
transactions”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10,
11 (1994).
4 24-6667 The agent also testified about the nature and value of the drugs involved in
the conspiracy (heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl), where they were
manufactured, and how they were smuggled into Washington. This expert testimony
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-6667
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:20-cr-00197-RAJ-4 v.
HUMBERTO GARCIA, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 18, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: TALLMAN, OWENS, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Humberto Garcia appeals several issues stemming from
his jury trial and conviction for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 1291 and affirm.
We review a district court’s factual findings about whether the defendant’s
attire was identifiable as prison clothing for clear error. United States v. Sarno, 73
F.3d 1470, 1499–1500 (9th Cir. 1995).
We review preserved evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and reverse
only if they are manifestly erroneous. United States v. Tsarnaev, 595 U.S. 302, 322–
23 (2022). This includes admitting evidence over an objection that it is unfairly
prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. United States v. Sullivan, 159 F.4th
579, 590 (9th Cir. 2025).
We review a district court’s finding about whether the evidence is sufficient
to support a buyer-seller or multiple-conspiracies instruction for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Moe, 781 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Ocampo-
Estrada, 873 F.3d 661, 665 (9th Cir. 2017). But we have also applied de novo review
to this question, at least in the multiple-conspiracies context. See United States v.
Job, 871 F.3d 852, 867 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting intra-circuit conflict). We review
unpreserved objections to jury instructions for plain error. Johnson v. United States,
520 U.S. 461, 464–66 (1997).
1. Garcia argues that the district court “improperly forced [him] to appear
for trial in prison garb,” and that he is thus entitled to a new trial. First, Garcia’s
objection was untimely and unspecific. Garcia waited until jury selection was
2 24-6667 almost done to tell the court, “I’m still in prison uniform in front of the jury.” Since
Garcia’s delay gave “the jury the opportunity to observe [him] in [prison]-issued
clothing,” his objection was untimely. United States v. Martin, 964 F.2d 714, 719–
20 (7th Cir. 1992). And without a timely objection, his claim fails. See Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976); Sarno, 73 F.3d at 1499.
Second, Garcia fails to show that the court clearly erred in finding that his
clothing did not identify him as a prisoner. See Sarno, 73 F.3d at 1499. The court
observed that Garcia was dressed in an open-collar, long-sleeve white shirt with a
dark colored t-shirt underneath tucked into pants that looked no different than
khakis. Nothing indicates that Garcia’s clothes had any labels or writing identifying
them as prison-issued. See Felts v. Estelle, 875 F.2d 785, 785–86 (9th Cir. 1989).
The court also noted that Garcia was seated at a table that blocked essentially all his
attire beneath the bench from view. See United States v. Collins, 109 F.3d 1413,
1418 (9th Cir. 1997). We have upheld findings that similar attire was not readily
identifiable as prison clothing. See United States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1421–
23 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1979). This
forecloses Garcia’s argument.
2. Garcia argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence of his agreement to help murder a coconspirator suspected of stealing
drugs. Garcia concedes that “this challenged evidence could be relevant to the
3 24-6667 existence and scope of a charged drug conspiracy.” That Garcia was asked to supply
a gun for a murder in furtherance of the drug-trafficking operation—and he was
willing to do so—showed both that he was a trusted member of the organization and
that he would help commit murder if it furthered the operation. The intercepted calls
and text messages were relevant evidence of Garcia’s involvement in the charged
conspiracy. Garcia asserts that the district court should have excluded them under
Rule 403 because they undermined his defense and portrayed him as involved “in a
violent, international drug conspiracy.” Of course, this evidence did prejudice
Garcia by undermining his defense “that he engaged in his role effectively to pay for
his access to drugs as an addict.” But there was nothing unfair about this, nor did it
outweigh the probative value of the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Garcia also argues that the court abused its discretion by allowing a federal
agent to testify as an expert about drug traffickers and drugs. The agent testified that
because drug traffickers cannot go to the police, they use firearms to protect their
drugs and “resolve their business conflicts themselves through violence, or at least
the threat of violence.” This was permissible expert testimony and not unfairly
prejudicial to Garcia. Cf. United States v. Taren-Palma, 997 F.2d 525, 534–35 (9th
Cir. 1993) (upholding admission of expert testimony on “use of guns in narcotics
transactions”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10,
11 (1994).
4 24-6667 The agent also testified about the nature and value of the drugs involved in
the conspiracy (heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl), where they were
manufactured, and how they were smuggled into Washington. This expert testimony
about the source, quantity, and value of drugs was admissible to demonstrate the
scope of the conspiracy and was not unfairly prejudicial to Garcia. See United States
v. Sepulveda-Barraza, 645 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011).
3. Garcia argues that the district court should have instructed the jury on
the buyer-seller rule. “Under the buyer-seller rule, ‘mere sales to other individuals
do not establish a conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to distribute.’” Moe,
781 F.3d at 1124 (citation omitted). Because Garcia merely proposed an instruction
earlier in the trial but did not make a “specific objection” and state “the grounds for
the objection before the jury retire[d] to deliberate,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d), we
review for plain error. See United States v. Anderson, 741 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir.
2013) (“[A] defendant’s mere proposal of an alternate instruction does not satisfy
Rule 30’s standard of specificity.”).
There was ample evidence that Garcia conspired to distribute drugs, including
his brokering of and presence at several large drug deals. Because the evidence at
trial failed to sustain Garcia’s theory that he was a mere addict, the court did not err
by refusing to give a buyer-seller instruction. See Ocampo-Estrada, 873 F.3d at 665.
And, even if a defense theory has some foundation in the evidence, “it is not error to
5 24-6667 refuse a proposed instruction so long as the other instructions in their entirety cover
that theory.” United States v. Singh, 979 F.3d 697, 714 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted). Because the district court gave other conspiracy instructions that
precluded a conviction based solely on a buyer-seller relationship, it was not
required to deliver a separate instruction. Moe, 781 F.3d at 1128–29. Finally, “an
improper jury instruction rarely justifies reversal of a conviction for plain error.”
United States v. Lo, 447 F.3d 1212, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006). Where, as here, there was
overwhelming evidence of guilt and “no reasonable probability the jury’s verdict
would have been different” with the additional instruction, any error was not plain.
Singh, 979 F.3d at 707 (citation modified).
Garcia also argues that the court improperly refused to give a
multiple-conspiracies instruction. Even under de novo review, Garcia’s argument
fails. “A multiple conspiracy instruction is not required when a defendant ‘stands
trial alone.’” United States v. Liu, 631 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). This is because “a multiple conspiracies instruction is generally designed
for trials involving multiple defendants engaged in multiple conspiracies, not for
trials of lone defendants who are worried that the jury may not agree upon the same
set of facts.” United States v. Anguiano, 873 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1989).
Because Garcia was tried alone and no evidence showed that he was part of “a
conspiracy separate from or unrelated to the overall conspiracy to distribute charged
6 24-6667 in the indictment,” he was not entitled to a multiple-conspiracies instruction. Job,
871 F.3d at 868; see also Moe, 781 F.3d at 1127.
AFFIRMED.
7 24-6667